Economy & Society
453 Million People on the Move: Understanding India’s Internal Migration — Who They Are, Why They Move, and Why the System Keeps Failing Them
India’s internal migrants — 453 million people as of the last Census — are the backbone of its urban economy. They build its roads, run its restaurants, clean its homes, and recycle its waste. Yet they remain the most under-counted, under-protected, and under-served population in the country. We explain who they are, how they move, and what India must fix.
Every monsoon season, something happens in the villages of Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, and eastern Uttar Pradesh that the government’s data systems are poorly equipped to track. Men — and increasingly families — pack their belongings into cloth bundles, board trains that are chronically overcrowded, and travel hundreds of kilometres to cities and construction sites where seasonal work is available. They work for five, six, or eight months. Then, when the work dries up or when the agricultural calendar pulls them back for sowing, they return. They arrive. They work. They disappear from the data.
This circular, seasonal, informal movement is the dominant form of internal migration in India — and it is the movement that India’s policy systems have the hardest time seeing, counting, and serving.
The COVID-19 pandemic made the invisibility catastrophic: when cities shut down in March 2020, an estimated 50 to 120 million workers had no income, no welfare access, and no transport home. They walked. And the country watched, in real time, the consequences of decades of indifference to a population it had always needed but never quite acknowledged.
First: What Do We Mean by “Internal Migration”?
Internal migration simply means movement of people within a country’s borders. Unlike international migration — which crosses national boundaries — internal migration requires no passport, no visa, and no formal permission. But it brings almost all the same challenges: a new place, new language, loss of welfare entitlements, and no existing social network to fall back on.
Types of Internal Migration in India
3 Scales and 4 Directions
By distance covered (the three types):
- Intra-district migration: Moving within the same district — the most common and least disruptive form
- Intra-state migration: Moving to a different district but within the same state — still within the same language, often within the same welfare system
- Inter-state migration: Moving to a different state altogether — the most economically significant form, and the one that creates the most welfare portability problems
By origin and destination (the four streams):
- Rural-to-urban: The most discussed and most studied — a villager moving to a city for work. Comprises 25.2% of all internal migration in India
- Urban-to-urban: Moving from one city to another — 22.9% of all migration
- Urban-to-rural: Moving from city back to village — 17.5%, often return or retirement migration
- Rural-to-rural: Moving from one village to another — 4.4%, often seasonal agricultural labour
One additional distinction matters enormously for policy: the difference between permanent migration and circular or seasonal migration. A permanent migrant moves once and stays at the destination. A circular migrant moves repeatedly between source and destination — working in the city for months, returning home, coming back. Most Indian labour migration is circular, not permanent — which is exactly why it is so hard to count and so hard to serve.
India’s Census provides the most comprehensive data on internal migration, though it has important limitations. The two ways the Census defines migrants tell us something about those limitations:
- Migrant by place of birth: A person counted at a Census location different from where they were born
- Migrant by last residence: A person who has lived continuously at their current location for at least six months, having come from somewhere else
Both definitions miss seasonal migrants — people who move for one to six months at a time, which is the majority of India’s labour migration.
Internal Migration in India
- 1991 Census: 232.1 million internal migrants
- 2001 Census: 314.6 million internal migrants
- 2011 Census: 453.7 million internal migrants — 37% of total population
- Migration in India (2020–21) survey: ~400 million migrants — approximately 29% of population
- Share of migrants in rural India: rose from 26.1% (1991) to 32.5% (2011)
- Share of migrants in urban India: rose from 32.3% (1991) to 48.4% (2011)
- Intra-state migration share: ~85% of all migration
- India’s urbanisation rate (2021): 35% — vs 63% in China, 43% in lower-middle-income countries globally
Who Actually Migrates — and Why
Internal migration in India is not random. It is patterned along lines of gender, age, caste, religion, region, and economic class — and understanding those patterns is essential to designing policies that actually help.
Gender:
Migration in India has distinct gendered dimensions. The single largest reason for female migration in India is marriage — when a woman marries and moves to her husband’s household, she is technically a migrant by Census definition. This means a significant share of India’s counted migration is actually marriage-driven female mobility, not labour migration.
Male migration, by contrast, is predominantly work-driven. Young men from rural areas in low-income states move to construction sites, factories, and service sectors in wealthier states. The “general trend for migration for work or employment reflects that such migrants are mostly youth,” as Patgiri notes — linking labour migration directly to India’s demographic transition and the large youth cohort now entering the workforce.
Women who do migrate for work face specific and compounded vulnerabilities: lower wages than male counterparts, higher risk of exploitation and trafficking, limited access to childcare and reproductive healthcare at the destination, and social stigma around women travelling alone. Female migrants in domestic work — one of the largest employment categories for migrant women — operate with almost no legal protections and no formal contract.
Caste, Tribe, and Religion:
Migration in India is also segmented along social identity lines. Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe workers are disproportionately represented in distress migration — they are more likely to migrate out of economic necessity than by choice, more likely to work in hazardous informal sector jobs at the destination, and least likely to access the social networks that connect migrants to better opportunities. Caste hierarchies at destination cities do not dissolve when workers cross state borders — they often reproduce in the form of occupational segregation, where workers from specific communities are channelled into specific types of work regardless of their skills.
The Seasonal and Circular Migrants:
The 64th round of the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), conducted in 2007–08, made a specific attempt to capture seasonal short-term migrants — those who had migrated for a period of at least one month but no more than six months for employment. This was a methodological breakthrough: the first serious government attempt to count the people who make up the majority of India’s labour migration.
What Is Seasonal Migration?
Seasonal migration is the temporary movement of people from one place to another in response to seasonal changes in employment availability. Think of a family in rural Odisha that sends its working-age members to construction sites in Surat between October and April — the agricultural off-season at home — and brings them back for the kharif sowing and harvest. The family’s income depends on both: the agricultural production at home and the wage income from the city.
This kind of migration is “distress-driven” more often than not — meaning people move because staying home during the off-season produces no income, not because the city is offering something especially attractive. The distress origin does not make the movement less rational; in the absence of alternatives, it is the most rational economic decision available. But it does mean that migrants arrive at their destinations in a vulnerable position, with no savings buffer, no local contacts beyond their community network, and no fallback if work dries up.
Seasonal migrants in India’s cities work across a remarkably wide range of sectors: construction and infrastructure, small factories and workshops, hotels and restaurants, domestic help, head-loading (manual cargo carrying), scrap recycling, and vegetable vending.
They are the people who pour the concrete for new buildings, carry the luggage at railway stations, and cook the food in the dhabas that feed the city’s workforce. They are also among the most likely to be living in overcrowded, inadequate housing: often in migrant dormitories, under-bridge settlements, or in the same construction sites where they work.
The Informal Economy:
The structural changes in India’s economy following liberalisation in 1991 contributed to the growth of a large informal economy — unregulated, unprotected, and highly flexible. The informal sector became the primary employer of migrant labour, for a reason that is not complicated: informal employers want workers they can hire and fire at will, without contractual obligations or labour law compliance. Migrants, especially seasonal migrants without local roots, local political connections, or local documentation are ideal informal workers precisely because they are so easy to dismiss.
Migrant workers “find it hard to enter into formal jobs because of limited bargaining power and constrained networks,” . Without formal contracts, they have no recourse when wages are withheld. Without labour union membership, they have no collective voice. Without local registration, they cannot access government schemes. They are productive for the economy and invisible to the welfare system: a combination that has persisted for decades because it is convenient for employers, cities, and state governments alike.
The COVID Crisis: Reverse Migration and What It Revealed
The nationwide lockdown announced on March 24, 2020, with four hours’ notice, immediately made visible everything India had been ignoring about its migrant workers. Factories shut. Construction stopped. Restaurants closed. Within days, an estimated 50 to 120 million workers found themselves stranded in cities where they had no income, no food entitlement (because their ration cards were registered in home states they had not lived in for months), and no way home (because transport was suspended).
The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2020–21, which incorporated new migration-specific questions in response to the crisis, confirmed what was visible on the roads: a massive movement of people from urban to rural areas, far exceeding what any normal reverse migration would look like. The data revealed not just the scale of distress but the complete absence of any social safety net capable of catching people in a crisis of this kind.
The primary concern in the aftermath was reabsorption: where would the returning workers go, what would they do, and how would they survive? Many had left behind accumulated wages that employers refused to pay on exit. Many arrived home to find MGNREGS work unavailable or underfunded. The risk of falling deeper into poverty was very real for a significant share of the returnees.
What Needs to Change:
Making Migration Safer and More Productive:
1. Fix the data problem first.
Without a reliable, current count of seasonal and circular migrants, no policy can be well-targeted. The 2021 Census, still delayed, must include specific questions on short-term and circular migration. The e-Shram portal needs to identify migrants as a distinct category. Telecom and banking data can supplement official surveys to track migration trends in real time.
2. Reduce the cost of migration.
Economists have pointed out that the costs of migration — transport, documentation, information-gathering — are disproportionately high relative to migrant incomes, reducing the mobility of workers who might otherwise move. State-level migrant assistance centres, migrant information portals, and subsidised transport corridors to high-demand destinations can reduce these costs.
3. Food security portability — One Nation One Ration Card.
The ONORC scheme, allowing migrants to access PDS food entitlements anywhere in India using an Aadhaar-linked card, is the most directly relevant welfare portability measure for migrants. It has been rolled out nationally. But uptake remains low due to limited awareness and the practical difficulty of simultaneously maintaining food access for the family left behind. Better awareness campaigns, simplified access points, and dual-family provisions are needed.
4. Social security that travels with the worker.
Health insurance (PMJAY), accident compensation, and pension contributions should be linked to the worker’s identity (via Aadhaar and e-Shram) rather than their state of residence. A worker who moves from Bihar to Maharashtra should not lose their health coverage on crossing the border.
5. Enforce written contracts and wages.
The Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act of 1979 requires contractors to register migrant workers and ensure minimum wages and other protections. It has been chronically under-enforced. The new Labour Codes that consolidate existing labour laws must be effectively implemented, with specific provisions for migrants and dedicated enforcement capacity.
6. Adequate housing near job clusters.
Migrant workers in cities often live in conditions that are both unsafe and far from their workplaces. Affordable Rental Housing Complexes (ARHCs) near industrial areas and construction corridors need to be implemented at scale.
7. Strengthen welfare provision at the source.
If migration is to become less distress-driven and more opportunity-driven, source regions must become more viable. MGNREGS, agricultural income support, skill development, and rural infrastructure investment in the highest-migration districts reduce the desperation that forces people to migrate in the most vulnerable conditions.
Migration, at its best, is a rational strategy by which households move labour from places where it earns little to places where it earns more; and in doing so, reduce poverty, transfer remittances to source regions, and fuel the urban construction and service sectors that drive national growth. India’s internal migrants do all of this, at an extraordinary scale, largely without formal support, legal protection, or data visibility.
The COVID crisis was a stress test that the system failed. The returning workers who walked home in 2020 were not anomalies or exceptions — they were the visible face of a structural condition that has existed for decades. Most of them came back. The conditions that sent them walking have not fundamentally changed.
Making migration safer and more productive does not require new discoveries. It requires implementing what is already known — portable welfare, enforceable contracts, reliable data, and functional housing. The only thing missing, for most of India’s migration policy history, has been the political will to prioritise a population that does not vote in the cities where it works, and does not make noise in the villages it comes from.
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- Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) Coalition, a collective of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway governments, came up with a $1 billion fund.
- LEAF is supported by transnational corporations (TNCs) like Unilever plc, Amazon.com, Inc, Nestle, Airbnb, Inc as well as Emergent, a US-based non-profit.
- The world lost more than 10 million hectares of primary tropical forest cover last year, an area roughly the size of Switzerland.
- Ending tropical and subtropical forest loss by 2030 is a crucial part of meeting global climate, biodiversity and sustainable development goals. Protecting tropical forests offers one of the biggest opportunities for climate action in the coming decade.
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- The LEAF coalition initiative is a step towards concretising the aims and objectives of the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism.
- REDD+ was created by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It monetised the value of carbon locked up in the tropical forests of most developing countries, thereby propelling these countries to help mitigate climate change.
- It is a unique initiative as it seeks to help developing countries in battling the double-edged sword of development versus ecological commitment.
- The initiative comes at a crucial time. The tropics have lost close to 12.2 million hectares (mha) of tree cover last year according to global estimates released by Global Forest Watch.
- Of this, a loss of 4.2 mha occurred within humid tropical primary forests alone. It should come as no surprise that most of these lost forests were located in the developing countries of Latin America, Africa and South Asia.
- Brazil has fared dismally on the parameter of ‘annual primary forest loss’ among all countries. It has lost 1.7 mha of primary forests that are rich storehouse of carbon. India’s estimated loss in 2020 stands at 20.8 kilo hectares.
- Between 2002-2020, Brazil’s total area of humid primary forest reduced by 7.7 per cent while India’s reduced by 3.4 per cent.
- Although the loss in India is not as drastic as in Brazil, its position is nevertheless precarious. For India, this loss is equivalent to 951 metric tonnes worth carbon dioxide emissions released in the atmosphere.
- It is important to draw comparisons between Brazil and India as both countries have adopted a rather lackadaisical attitude towards deforestation-induced climate change. The Brazilian government hardly did anything to control the massive fires that gutted the Amazon rainforest in 2019.
- It is mostly around May that forest fires peak in India. However, this year India, witnessed massive forest fires in early March in states like Odisha, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Mizoram among others.
- The European Union’s Copernicus Atmospheric Monitoring Service claimed that 0.2 metric tonnes of carbon was emitted in the Uttarakhand forest fires.
- Implementation of the LEAF Coalition plan will help pump in fresh rigour among developing countries like India, that are reluctant to recognise the contributions of their forest dwelling populations in mitigating climate change.
- With the deadline for proposal submission fast approaching, India needs to act swiftly on a revised strategy.
- Although India has pledged to carry out its REDD+ commitments, it is impossible to do so without seeking knowledge from its forest dwelling population.
- providing Dominion Status to India, i.e., equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations;
- all Provinces (ruled by the British India government) and Indian States (ruled by Indian princes) should constitute one Indian Union by the British Constitution;
- the Constitution of India should be framed by an elected Constituent Assembly of Indian people but if any province (or Indian State) which was not prepared to accept the Constitution was to be free to retain its constitutional position which had existed at that time.
- Such provinces were to be free to enter separate constitutional arrangements.
- there should a Union of India consisting of British India and the States, which would have jurisdiction over subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Communication;
- all residuary powers would belong to the Provinces and the States;
- the Union would have Executive and Legislature consisting of the representatives from the Provinces and the States but for decision relating to a major communal issue in the legislature a majority of representatives of two major communities would be present, and voting along with the majority of all members present and voting would be required;
- the provinces would be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures;
- and each group would be free to determine the Provincial Subjects which would be taken up by the Group organisation.
- India’s telecom market has seen monopoly as well as hyper-competition.
- Twenty-five years ago, the government alone could provide services.
- Ten years later, there were nearly a dozen competing operators.
- Most service areas now have four players.
- The erstwhile monopolies, BSNL and MTNL, are now bit players and often ignored.
- India is ranked second globally—after China—in the number of people connected to the internet. However, it is also first in the number of people unconnected.
- Over 50% of Indians are not connected to the internet, despite giant strides in network reach and capacity.
- India’s per capita or device data usage is low. It has an impressive 4G mobile network. However, its fixed network—wireline or optical fibre—is sparse and often poor.
- 5G deployment has yet to start and will be expensive.
Context:-
At the recently concluded Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021, Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) Coalition, a collective of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway governments, came up with a $1 billion fund plan that shall be offered to countries committed to arrest the decline of their tropical forests by 2030.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]What is LEAF Coalition?
Why LEAF Coalition?
Brazil & India
According to the UN-REDD programme, after the energy sector, deforestation accounts for massive carbon emissions — close to 11 per cent — in the atmosphere. Rapid urbanisation and commercialisation of forest produce are the main causes behind rampant deforestation across tropical forests.
Tribes, Forests and Government
Disregarding climate change as a valid excuse for the fires, Indian government officials were quick to lay the blame for deforestation on activities of forest dwellers and even labelled them “mischievous elements” and “unwanted elements”.
Policy makers around the world have emphasised the role of indigenous tribes and local communities in checking deforestation. These communities depend on forests for their survival as well as livelihood. Hence, they understand the need to protect forests. However, by posing legitimate environmental concerns as obstacles to real development, governments of developing countries swiftly avoid protection of forests and rights of forest dwellers.
For instance, the Government of India has not been forthcoming in recognising the socio-economic, civil, political or even cultural rights of forest dwellers. According to data from the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs in December, 2020 over 55 per cent of this population has still not been granted either individual or community ownership of their lands.
To make matters worse, the government has undertaken systematic and sustained measures to render the landmark Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 ineffective in its implementation. The Act had sought to legitimise claims of forest dwellers on occupied forest land.
Various government decisions have seriously undermined the position of indigenous people within India. These include proposing amendments to the obsolete Indian Forest Act, 1927 that give forest officials the power to take away forest dwellers’ rights and to even use firearms with impunity.
There is also the Supreme Court’s order of February, 2019 directing state governments to evict illegal encroachers of forest land or millions of forest dwellers inhabiting forests since generations as a measure to conserve wildlife. Finally, there is the lack of data on novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) deaths among the forest dwelling population;
Tardy administration, insufficient supervision, apathetic attitude and a lack of political intent defeat the cause of forest dwelling populations in India, thereby directly affecting efforts at arresting deforestation.
Way Forward
Tuntiak Katan, a global indigenous leader from Ecuador and general coordinator of the Global Alliance of Territorial Communities, aptly indicated the next steps at the Climate Summit:
“The first step is recognition of land rights. The second step is the recognition of the contributions of local communities and indigenous communities, meaning the contributions of indigenous peoples.We also need recognition of traditional knowledge practices in order to fight climate change”
Perhaps India can begin by taking the first step.
INTRODUCTION:-
The Constitution of India was adopted on 26 November 1949, which means it was finalised by the Constituent Assembly on that day. But it became operative two months after its adoption, i.e., on 26 January 1950, which is also known as the date of its “commencement”.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]However, some provisions of it, i.e., those relating to citizenship, elections, provisional Parliament, temporary and transitional provisions had become operative on 26 November 1949 itself. The reason for its commencement after two months of its adoption was to signify the January 26 as the original date of achievement of Independence.
It was this day, i.e. 26th January, in 1930 which the Indian National Congress (INC) had first celebrated as the Independence Day of India. It is important to note that the Constitution of India is product of a longdrawn process and deliberations.
EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1858-1935
The Constitution of India embodies provisions providing basic democratic rights of human beings including the persons who are not Indian citizens. It also embodies provisions for the availability of institutions for legislation, execution and jurisdiction for the fulfilment these rights.
It presents a vision for social transformation and deepening of democracy in India. The process of evolution of democratic institutions and rights had started much before the Constituent Assembly really made the Constitution of India.
It, however, must be underlined that the features of democratic institutions and values which were introduced during the colonial period were meant to serve the colonial interests in contrast to the purpose of the provisions of the Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly of India.
Although the Indian Constitution was result of the deliberations (from December 9, 1947 to November 26, 1949) of the Constituent Assembly, some of its features had evolved over three quarters of a century through various Acts, i.e., from 1858 to 1935.
The Government of India Act, 1935, and Other Acts
With the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown, the British Parliament got involved in managing affairs of India. For achieving this purpose, from 1858 till 1935, the colonial government introduced certain features of constitution or rules of governance through different Acts. The Government of India Act, 1935 was the most important among these Acts.
First of these other Acts was Government of India Act, 1858. It provided for a combination of centralised and decetralised power structure to govern India. The centralised structure was introduced in the areas which were under the direct control of the Crown. These areas were known as British India provinces or provinces. The decentralized structure was introduced in the areas which were not under the direct control of the Crown. These areas were ruled by the Indian princes, and were known as princely states or states.
Under this system, the princes had freedom to govern in all internal matters of their princely states, but they were subject to the British control. In the centralized structure of power which was introduced in the provinces, all powers to govern India vested in the Secretary of State for India (and through him in the Crown). He acted on behalf of the Crown.
He was assisted by a fifteen-member council of ministers.There did not exist separation of executive, legislative and judicial functions of government; these all were concentrated in the hands of the Secretary of State for India. In British India, the Secretary of State of India was assisted by the Viceroy, who was assisted by an executive council.
At the district level, the viceroy was assisted by a small number of British administrators. The provincial government did not have financial autonomy. In 1870 viceroy Lord Mayo ensured that all parts of provincial administration received due share of revenue to meet their needs.
The scope of political institutions in the provinces was expanded a little further following the introduction of Council of India Act, 1909. This Act introduced for the first time a “representative element” in British India, which included elected non-official members.This Act also introduced separate representation to Muslim community.
The Government of India Act 1919 devolved some authority to the provincial governments, retaining the control of the central government (unitary government) on them.It relaxed the control of the central government in a limited way. It divided the subjects for jurisdiction of administration and sources of revenue between centre and provinces.
Under this arrangement, the provincial government was given control on resources of revenue such as land, irrigation and judicial stamps. The provincial subjects were divided into “transferred’ and “reserved” categories.
The “transferred” subjects were governed by the governor, and “reserved” subjects were governed by the legislature. The governor (executive head) was not accountable to the legislature.
The Government of India Act, 1935 was different from the earlier Government of India Acts. Unlike the earlier Acts, the Government of India Act, 1935 also provided for provincial government enjoying provincial autonomy. It provided “safeguards” for minorities.
Such “safeguards” included provisions for separate representations to Muslims, Sikhs, the Europeans, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians. This Act also provided for three lists of divisions of power between the federation (central government) and provinces: federal (central), concurrent and provincial.
The Act also provided for establishment of a federal court to adjudicate disputes between federation and provinces. The executive head of the provincial government was Governor, who enjoyed special power. Under the special power the Governor could veto the decisions of the provincial legislature.
He acted on behalf of the Crown, and was not a subordinate of the Governor-General (the changed designation of Viceroy). He enjoyed discretionary powers to exercise his “individual judgments” in certain matters. In such matters, he did not need to work under the advice of ministers: he was to act under the control of the Governor-General, and indeed the Secretary of the State.
He was also not accountable to the legislature but he was required to act on the advice of ministers, who were accountable to the legislature.
Government of India Act, 1935 also had provisions for setting up a central government consisting of representatives from the provinces(areas ruled by the British India government) and the states (the areas covered under princely states).Such government was supposed to be known as federal government because of composition with members both from provinces and the states.
However, the federal government could not be formed because there was no unanimity among the princes to join the federation; consent of all princes was essential for the formation of federation. Thus, only the provincial governments could be formed as per this Act.
And election to the provincial legislature as per the Government of India Act, 1935 was held in 1937. Following the election of 1937, provincial governments headed by the Indian National Congresswere formed in eight provinces. The Indian National Congress government resigned in 1937. Nevertheless, according to M. Govinda Rao and Nirvikar Singh (2005), the Government of India Act, 1935 provided a basis to the Constituent Assembly to make the Constitution.
The Nehru Report(1928): First Indian Initiative to Draft Constitution
As you have read above, attempts to introduce elements of constitution in British India through different Act since 1858 were made by the British rulers. Indians had no role in it.
The first attempt by Indians themselves to prepare a Constitution of India was made in the Nehru Report(1928).Earlier, effort by Indians was made in the name of the swaraj (self-rule) by leaders of Indian national movement during the non-cooperation movement in 1921-22.
The Nehru Report was known as such because it was named after the chairman of its drafting committee, Motilal Nehru. The decision to constitute the drafting committee was taken in the conference of the established All India parties. The principal among these parties included Indian National Congress, Swaraj Party and Muslim League. The Justice Party of Madras and Unionist Party of Punjab did not participate in this meeting.
The Nehru Report demanded universal suffrage for adults and responsible government both in the centre and in the provinces. It, however, supported the Dominion Status, not complete independence for India.
It meant that Indians would have freedom to legislate on certain limited matters under the control of the British India government. For this, the Nehru Report prepared list of central and provincial subjects, and fundamental rights. It also raised demands for universal suffrage for men and women adults.
Indeed, it was in 1934, a few years after the preparation of the Nehru report, that the Indian National Congress officially demanded a constitution of Indian people, without the interference of outsiders.
FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
The Cripps Mission
Initially, the colonial authorities resisted the demand for creation of a Constitution of India. But with the change in the circumstances – the outbreak of the World War II and formation of the new Coalition (Labour-led) government in Britain, the British government was forced to acknowledge the urgency to solve the problem related to Constitution of Indians.
In 1942, the British government sent its cabinet member – Sir Stafford Cripps with the draft declaration on proposals (regarding formation of constitution for Indians) to be implemented at the end of the WW II provided both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress had agreed to accept them.
The draft proposals of the Cripps Mission recommended the following:
Both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League did not accept the proposals of the Cripps Mission. The Muslim League demanded that India should be divided on the communal lines and some provinces should form an independent state of Pakistan; and, there should be two Constituent Assemblies, one for Pakistan and another for India.
The Cabinet Mission
The British Indian government made several attempts to bridge the differences between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. But it was unsuccessful.
The British government sent another delegation of the Cabinet members, known as the Cabinet Delegation, which came to be known as the Cabinet Mission Plan. It consisted of three cabinet members – Lord Pathic Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A.V. Alexander.
The Cabinet Delegation also failed to bring the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League to an agreement. It, however, made its own proposal which was announced simultaneously on 16 May, 1946 in England as well as in India.
The Cabinet delegation made the following recommendations:
Election to the Constituent Assembly
Meanwhile, according to the proposals of the Cabinet Mission, the election to the Constituent Assembly was held in which members of both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League were returned. The members of the Constituent Assembly were elected by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies.
However, differences between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League arose on interpretation of “Group Clauses” of the Cabinet Mission.
The British government intervened at this stage and explained to the leaders in London that the contention of the Muslim League was correct. And on December 6, 1946, the British Government published a statement, which for the first time acknowledged the possibility of two Constituent Assemblies and two States.
As a result, when the Constituent Assembly first met on December 9, 1946, it was boycotted by the Muslim League, and it functioned without the participation of the Muslim League.
NATURE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY’S REPRESENTATION
It is often argued that the Constituent Assembly of India did not represent the masses of India because its representatives were not elected through the universal adult franchise. Rather they were indirectly elected by the restricted adult franchise confined to the elite sections of society – the educated and tax payers.
According to Granville Austin the reasons for the restricted franchise and indirect election to the Constituent Assembly members were spelled by the Cabinet Mission Plan. These were to avoid the cumbersome and slow progress in the process of Constitution making.
The Cabinet Mission provided for the indirect election to the Constituent Assembly by the elected members of the provincial legislature. The Indian National Congress agreed to this proposal of the Cabinet Mission forsaking the claim of adult franchise to hold election to the Constituent Assembly.
Despite having been elected through the restricted adult franchise, the Constituent Assembly represented different shades of opinions and religious communities of India. Austin observed that though there was a majority of the Indian National Congress in the Constituent Assembly, it had an “unwritten and unquestioned belief” that the Indian National Congress should represent social and ideological diversity.
There was also its “deliberate policy” that the representatives of various minority communities and viewpoints should be represented in the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly consisted of members with different ideological orientations, and three religious communities -Sikhs, Muslims and General (Hindus and all other communities like the Anglo-Indians, Parsis, etc).
In words of K. Santaram “There was hardly any shade of opinion not represented in the Assembly”. Majority of the Constituent Assembly members belonged to the Indian National Congress. It also included more than a dozen non-Indian National Congress members.
Some of these were A.K. Ayyer, H.N. Kunjru, N.G. Ayyanger, S.P. Mukherjee and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. S.P. Mookerji represented the Hindu Mahasabha.
The Constituent Assembly included representatives from the Princely States as well. It needs to be underscored that Dr. Ambedkar was initially elected to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal as member of the Scheduled Caste Federation. But he lost this seat due to the partition of Bengal and was re-elected by the Bombay Indian National Congress (as a non-Indian National Congress candidate) at the request of the Indian National Congress High Command.
The Constituent Assembly sought to address concerns of every person irrespective of their social and cultural orientations. Before incorporating a provision in the constitution, it held elaborate deliberations. Thus, the members of the Constituent Assembly could overcome the limitations of having been elected by the restricted franchise.
The Constituent Assembly sought to accommodate universal values of democracy. The Constituent Assembly adopted several provisions from different constitutions of world and adapted them to the needs of India. In fact, Austin argues that while incorporating different provisions in the Constitution including those which were borrowed from other countries the Constituent Assembly adopted “two wholly Indian concepts” of resolving differences among its members, i.e., consensus and accommodation.
Most members of the Constituent Assembly participated in its proceedings. But these were twenty individuals who played the most influential role in the Assembly.
Some of them were Rajendra Prasad, Maulan Azad, Vallabhbhai Patel, Jawaharlal Nehru, Govind Ballabh Pant, P. Sitaramayya, A.K. Ayyar, N.G. Ayyangar, K.M. Munshi, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Satyanarayan Sinha. Though the Constituent Assembly was the sole forum where deliberations took place, yet the deliberations took place in coordination of three bodies – the Constituent Assembly, the Indian National Congress Party, and the interim government.
Some members of the Constituent Assembly were also members of other bodies at the same time. Austin said that “an oligarchy” of four – Nehru, Patel, Prasad and Azad had enjoyed unquestioned honour and prestige in the Assembly. They dominated the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly.Some of these were simultaneously in the government, Indian National Congress Party and the Constituent Assembly.
Prasad was President of Indian National Congress before becoming the President of the Constituent Assembly. Patel and Nehru were Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively at the same time. They were part of the inner circles of the committees of the Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution Drafting Committee meticulously incorporated in the draft constitution the decisions of the Constituent Assembly. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the Drafting Committee played the leading role in drafting of the Constitution.
Acknowledging the pivotal role of Dr. Ambedkar, T.T. Krishnamachari, a member of the Drafting Committee, said in one of his speeches: “The House is perhaps aware that out of the seven members nominated by you, one had resigned from the house and was replaced. One had died and was not replaced. One was away in America and his place was not filled up, and another person was engaged in State Affairs, and there was a void to that extent. One or two people were far away from Delhi and perhaps reasons of health did not permit them to attend. So it happened ultimately that the burden of drafting this constitution fell upon Dr. Ambedkar and I have no doubt that we are grateful to him for having achieved this task in a manner which is undoubtedly commendable.”
Dr. Ambedkar on his part “gave much of credit” to S.N. Mukerjee – B.N. Rau’s and Ambedkar’s assistant, the Drafting Officer of the Assembly, “for the careful wording of the Constitution”.
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN THE MAKING OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1946-1949
The inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 9 December 1946. It was supposed to be attended by all 296 members but only 207 members could attend it because the Muslim League members absented from it.
As stated earlier, they had boycotted the Constituent Assembly. In this meeting, Acharya J.B. Kripalani requested Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha to be the temporary chairman of the House. The members passed a resolution on 10 December 1946 for election of a permanent chairman, and on 11 December 1946, Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected as the permanent Chairman of the Constituent Assembly.
The Constituent Assembly divided its work among different committees for its smooth functioning. Some of the important committees were:
(a) Union Power Committee. It was chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru and had nine members;
(b) Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities. It had 54 members and Sardar Ballabh bhai Patel was its chairman;
(c) Steering Committee and its 3 members which included Dr. K.M. Munshi (chairman), Gopalaswami Iyangar and Bhagwan Das;
(d) Provincial Constitution Committee. It had 25 members with Sardar Patel as its chairman;
(e) Committee on Union Constitution. It had 15 members with Jawahalal Nehru as its chairman.
After discussing the reports of these committees, the Constituent Assembly appointed a Drafting Committee on 29 August 1947 under the chairmanship of Dr. B.R. Ambedakar. The draft was prepared by Sir B.N. Rau, Advisor to the Constituent Assembly.
A 7-member Committee was constituted to examine the draft. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who was Law Minister as well as chairman of the Drafting Committee piloted the draft in the Assembly. Dr. Ambedkar presented “Draft Constitution of India”. The “Draft Constitution” was published in February, 1948.
It was discussed by the Constituent Assembly clause by in its several sessions and was completed by October 17, 1949. This discussion was known as the second reading. The Constituent Assembly again met on 14 November 1949 to discuss the draft further or to give it a third reading.
It was finalised on 26 November 1949 after receiving the signature of the President of the Constituent Assembly. But it was January 26, 1950 which became the date of commencement of the Constitution.
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUION
The Indian Constitution has some salient features. These features give Indian Constitution a distinct identity. It is based on the features of different constitutions of the world. In the words of Dr. Ambedkar, The Indian constitution was prepared “after ransacking all the known Constitutions of the world”.
The chapter on Fundamental Rights is based on the American Constitution; the Parliamentary System has been adopted from the British Constitution; the Directive Principles of State Policy have been adopted from the constitution of Ireland; the Emergency provisions are based on the Constitution of Weimar (Germany) and Government of India Act, 1935.
The features which have been borrowed from other Constitutions have been modified in the light of the needs of our country. It is the longest written constitution. At the time of its formation, the constitution of India had 395 Articles and 8 Schedules. It ensures both Justiciable and Non-Justiciable Rights: Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the State Policy.The constituent makers preferred universal adult franchise over the separate electorates.
Universal Adult Suffrage and Abolition of the Separate Electorate
After debating its draft list of Fundamental rights the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights did not recommend inclusion of all of them in the section III of the Constitution as the Fundamental Rights. Instead, it suggested that these should be incorporated in other places in the Constitution.
One such example is that of the Universal suffrage, and Secrete and periodic elections. The sub Committee agreed unanimously in favour of the Universal suffrage but suggested that it should not be part of the Fundamental Rights.
Accordingly, it was placed in the Article 326 of the Part XV on election.The word “universal”, however, is missing from the Article 326. But the fact that every adult citizen of the country is entitled to vote makes it practically a universal adult franchise.
In fact, before Indians really got the right to universal adult franchise, the prominent leaders of the Indian National movement strove for the abolition of the separate electorate in favour of the joint electorate.
The British had sought to continue separate electorate in India since the Morley-Minto reforms, 1909 till the Communal Award of 1932 in the Constitution.
The Communal Award aimed to accord separate electorate for Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians. It also provided for seats for the Depressed Classes which were to be filled in elections from special constituencies. In such constituencies only the depressed classes could vote.
In addition, the depressed classes were also entitled to vote in general constituencies. Gandhi opposed the recommendation of the notion of separate electorate for the depressed classes. In opposition to the proposal for separate electorate, he set on fast unto death in September 1932. Gandhi’s fast evoked opposition from Ambedkar. However, both Gandhi and Ambedkar reached compromise in Poona Pact.
According to the Poona Pact, seats were reserved for the depressed classes in the general constituencies. This resulted in the abolition of the separate electorate.The abolition of separate electorate got reflected in the reservation of seats in the legislative bodies Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The making of Indian Constitution largely consisted of two phases – 1858 to 1935 and 1946 to 1949. With the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown, the British government introduced different elements of governance through different Acts.
These also included the elements of representation of Indians in the institutions of governance. The motive of the British to introduce them was to serve their colonial interests rather than to provide democratic rights to them. The provision for communal representation introduced through the Morley-Minto Reforms in 1909 and through the Communal Award in 1932 was opposed by the leaders of the Indian National Movement.
Gandhi’s fast resulted in the Poona Pact abolishing the separate electorate and in giving the reservation to the depressed classes in the provincial legislature. After the Indian National Congress emphasized the need for making of a Constitution of India by their own Constitient Assembly, the changed political situation following the Second World War and change of government in Britain, the British reluctantly realized the urgency for establishment of the Constituent Assembly of India for Indians.
The Constituent Assembly which was set up following the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission Plan was elected through the restricted adult franchise by the provincial assemblies. Despite having elected by the privileged sections of the society, the Constituent Assembly represented different shades of opinions and ideologies.
It also represented different social groups of India. The Constituent Assembly discussed all issues thoroughly before reaching decision on them. The decision and suggestions of different sub-Committees of the Constituent Assembly were finally incorporated in the Constitution of India.
The Constitution of India is a document which provides a vision for social change. The Constitution is an embodiment of principles of liberal democracy and secularism, with some elements of social democracy. It ensures protection of cultural, linguistic and religious rights of individuals and communities.
Context
Sunil Mittal, the chairman of Bharti Airtel, said recently that it would be “tragic” if India’s telecom-access market was to be reduced to only two competing operators. He was probably referring to the possible exit of the financially-stressed Vodafone Idea and the increasing irrelevance of government-owned operators, BSNL and MTNL. This would essentially leave the market to Reliance Jio and Airtel. A looming duopoly, or the exit of a global telecommunications major, are both worrying. They deserve a careful and creative response.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Thus Far
The reduced competition is worrying. Competition has delivered relatively low prices, advanced technologies, and an acceptable quality of services. These gains are now at risk. There is a long way to go in expanding access as well as network capacity.
The Indian Telecom Irony
Vodafone Tragedy
Filling the gaps in infrastructure and access will require large investments and competition. The exit of Vodafone Idea will hurt both objectives. The company faces an existential crisis since it was hit hardest by the Supreme Court judgment on the AGR issue in 2019, with an estimated liability of Rs 58,000 crore.
The closure of Vodafone Idea is an arguably greater concern than the fading role of BSNL and MTNL. The government companies are yet to deploy 4G and have become progressively less competitive. Vodafone Idea, on the other hand, still accounts for about a quarter of subscriptions and revenues and can boast of a quality network.
It has been adjudged the fastest, for three consecutive quarters, by Ookla, a web-service that monitors internet metrics. India can ill-afford to waste such network capacity. The company’s liabilities will deter any potential buyer.
Vodafone+MTNL+BSNL ?
A possible way out could be to combine the resources of the MTNL and BSNL and Vodafone Idea through a strategic partnership. Creative government action can save Vodafone Idea as well as improve the competitiveness of BSNL and MTNL.
It could help secure government dues, investment, and jobs. It is worth recalling here that, about 30 years ago, the Australian government’s conditions for the entry of its first private operator, Optus, required the latter to take over the loss-making government satellite company, Aussat. Similar out-of-the-box thinking may well be key to escape the looming collateral damage.
It is not trivial to expand competition in India’s telecom market. Especially since there are no major regulatory barriers to entry anymore. Any new private player will be driven largely by commercial considerations. Global experience suggests that well-entrenched incumbents have massive advantages. New players are daunted by the large investments—and much patience!—needed to set up networks, lure existing customers and sign new ones.
However, regulators and policymakers have other options to expand choice for telecom consumers. Their counterparts in mature regulatory regimes—e.g., in the European Union—have helped develop extensive markets for resale. Recognising the limited influence of smaller players, regulators mandate that the incumbent offer wholesale prices to resellers who then expand choice for end-users.
This has been virtually impossible in India. There is a near absence of noteworthy virtual network operators (VNOs) and other resellers. A key barrier to resale is India’s licence fee regime which requires licence-holders to share a proportion of their revenues with the government. Thus, resale could hurt exchequer revenues unless resellers are subject to identical levies. Understandably, the levies—and consequently additional reporting and compliance—is a disincentive for smaller players. The disincentive flows from levies based on revenues which comes with considerable costs of compliance. It would almost vanish if the levies were replaced by say, a flat fee computed objectively.
The ball is in the court of the regulator and the government. They have options. But will they take decisive action to exercise them? It will be ‘tragic’ if they can’t.