Changes in Global Atomic Policy
The 2005 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Mohamed El Baradei in lieu of their work in preventing military use of nuclear energy and for their efforts towards the safest possible standards of the use of nuclear for peaceful purposes.
The United Nations (UN) is aware that the UN came to fore at the dawn of the nuclear age late into the 1940s. The environment and atomic policy of the UN as such was greatly shaped by this fact.
On July 7, 2017, many member states meeting in New York in a UN Conference signed into the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which represents the first legal instrument multilaterally binding member states for nuclear disarmament in the last 20 years. The vote consisted of 122 ayes in favour of the treaty and only 1 nay by the Netherlands against the treaty.
The treaty covers a wide range of nuclear weaponization activities including the developing, testing, production, manufacture, acquisition, possession and stockpiling of nuclear armaments as well as the issuing of threats to use nuclear armaments (UN News Centre, 2017). Although the UN’s previous Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 included 191 signatories, many countries like North Korea continue to attempt to transcend limitations imposed by the NPT.
IAEA’s Engagement with the Environment and Atomic Policy of the UN
The IAEA and its relationship with the UN is critical in light of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which follows a general agreement entered into by the two bodies in 1957 such that the IAEA is to work in conformity with the policies of the UN. This greatly helps the IAEA in achieving its goal of worldwide nuclear disarmament by working in a partnership with organizations connected to the UN’s system.
This also helps the IAEA in encouraging the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the legal regime provided by the UN. In this the IAEA partners with various agencies within the UN including the United Nations Environment Programme. Some of these partnerships include partnerships with the World Health Organization (WHO) in cancer control and treatment, which is a major consequence of exposure to lethal radiation, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in moving towards a green economy with cleaner nuclear production and disposal.
The IAEA’s involvement with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is critical, and both have a stated aim to co-operate on issues such as the UN’s environmental policy, nuclear waste management, nuclear resource efficiency and climate change. Both have a role in shaping the environment and atomic policy of the UN. The co-operation between the UNEP and the IAEA began in 1974, when both entered into a project based on the IAEA’s Laboratory for Marine Radioactivity Studies located in Monaco.
The IAEA and the UNEP entered into a Practical Arrangement in 2014 that looked to govern collaboration between the two bodies. The focus of the Practical Arrangement was to foster co-operation specifically in terms of climate change, management of ecosystems, efficient and sustainable use of resources, hazardous waste disposal and in influencing environmental policy.
In the collaboration framework provided in this Practical Arrangement, both bodies are to work together to support members to the UNEP and member states of the IAEA to provide support in developing scientific capabilities, meet environmental challenges, achieving resource sustainability and deal with the variability caused by climate change (IAEA, 2017).
The IAEA’s overall legal framework for safety requirements in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is met by the only legal policy to implement safety standards in managing radioactive wastes internationally – the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
The Joint Convention seeks to achieve nuclear safety through an international collaborative approach based on the sharing of expertise on radioactive wastes and spent fuel management. The Convention fixes international safety standards and measures to ensure nuclear safety based on agreements between stakeholders and it strives to achieve national arrangements in individual countries based on the standards agreed upon in the convention.
The Convention also includes clauses that facilitate individual countries with improper infrastructures to receive international assistance in case of a lack of resources. The Convention applies both to countries with nuclear power programmes and those using radiation sources for industrial and commercial purposes (IAEA, 2011). The UNEP thus forms part of the IAEA’s collaborative approach that aims to build consensus on issues of nuclear safety.
Under the NPT of 1968, the IAEA conducts on-site inspections of nuclear materials in countries to ensure nuclear safety. Other than this, the UN also has the legal document of the UN Conference on Disarmament, which was adopted in 1996 to promote nuclear disarmament. In addition the UN also has the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for the curbing the use of nuclear armaments in outer space and the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Radiation to report on safety standards on the effects of exposure to nuclear radiation worldwide. The UN also has the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980 to protect nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands (UN, 2017).
The UNEP does not consider nuclear power as a renewable source of energy, with its principal problem with nuclear power being the disposal of radioactive wastes. The UNEP fears environmental contamination by nuclear waste such as spent nuclear waste pools of water. Nuclear power and fuel also pose security threats, which can immensely increase contamination risks. The UNEP is also opposed to nuclear power plants being built near populated areas and the dependence of certain countries such as France and Japan on nuclear power.
The UNEP also feels that nuclear power plants are outside the reach of underdeveloped countries, imposing an unfair balance of trade for the poorer nations (UNEP, 2016). The UNEP stands for strict safety standards for nuclear power plants and views nuclear waste as a source for severe forms of contamination and pollution.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.