In June 2020, PLA troops “surprised” India in the Ladakh sector of the contested LoAC (line of actual control) where the Indian Army lost 20 lives, including that of Colonel Santosh Babu in the Galwan valley.
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In a welcome move, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on June 12 approved a revised policy on how India compiles, archives and disseminates its war documents and related history. As per the new policy, once an operation/war is completed, the first cut of history is to be prepared and disseminated for internal circulation within five years. Whether this first draft of history is to be placed in the public domain or not, will be determined on a case by case basis, depending on the sensitivity of the operation/war. Predictably, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report relating to the 1962 war with China, which is still under wraps, will not be part of the new policy. Apparently, another committee will take a view on previous wars.
Unveiling this new policy on the eve of the first anniversary of the Galwan “scuffle” on June 15 has complex symbolism about India’s strategic culture and the opacity cum ostrich-act that envelops its China policy in particular. From all accounts, with Prime Minister at the helm, India’s bilateral relationship with China seemed more than buoyant and the image-rich Modi-Xi summitry that moved from Ahmedabad to Wuhan to Mamallapuram conveyed a sense of shared bonhomie. However, this optimism was clearly misplaced and the tea leaves were not read astutely.
In June 2020, PLA troops “surprised” India in the Ladakh sector of the contested LoAC where the Indian Army lost 20 lives, including that of Colonel Santosh Babu in the Galwan valley. The PLA also lost their troops, though the official number admitted is only four personnel.
Galwan is a major punctuation in the troubled bilateral relationship and India has come off second best in the Ladakh “scuffle”. Delhi has to contend with an altered LoAC and a Beijing that has decided to violate the 1993 Jiang Zemin-Narasimha Rao agreement. Carefully shaped narratives about the military defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity are crucial for any political leadership — authoritarian or democratic — and Galwan has special salience for both China and India.
While India has interpreted Galwan as a case of Chinese perfidy and places the onus on Beijing to restore the status quo, the view from China is very different. In the run up to the July 1 centenary of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), the PLA action against India is being projected as a case of guarding the border and defending the motherland.
A Chinese flag “once raised on Pangong Lake” is being taken by elite PLA troops from units posted along the LoAC to educational institutions to stoke pride in military and muscular nationalism, wherein the military reiterates its allegiance to the party as represented by President Xi Jinping. The CCP in turn has accorded unto itself the sacred duty of defending the territoriality of the motherland and Galwan is being accordingly consecrated.
India’s narrative about Galwan remains opaque and there has been no detailed official statement from the Ministry of Defence on the current tactical situation in Ladakh. PM Modi’s statement soon after the Galwan incident (June 20, 2020) that, “No one entered Indian territory nor were Indian posts taken” has set the obfuscation template about transgressions by the PLA.
Recently in May this year, the Army Chief General M M Naravane noted in an interview: “There has been no transgression of any kind and the process of talks is continuing.” If indeed there has been no “transgression” then what is the meaning of insisting on a return to the pre-Galwan status quo?
From a policy perspective and in keeping with the latest directive about military operations and narratives, the Galwan anniversary should encourage the government to set up an independent panel of experts to review the institutional lapses that led to an altered LoAC in the Ladakh sector.
Concurrently, Delhi will need to objectively review and anticipate what the PLA may embark upon next. Beijing has staked an expansive territorial claim that includes Arunachal Pradesh and the completion of the Lhasa-Nyingchi high-speed railway network by end June has multiple tactical and strategic implications. This railway line would terminate at a point that is less than 15 kilometres from the LoAC north of the Tuting sector in Arunachal Pradesh.
Galwan could have a silver lining if it encourages Delhi to review its China narrative in an objective and unvarnished manner and craft affordable and effective long-term strategic/security policies that are not clouded by political compulsions.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.