By standing firm with Bhutan and helping it militarily, India has displayed its resolve. Now it’s time to get down to some deft diplomacy.
As the military standoff over Doka La (or Doklam plateau) between India and China spills over into its second month, it is important to understand both the military and geo-strategic reasons behind the incident.
Technically the Doklam plateau is Bhutanese territory but New Delhi, as Bhutan’s closest friend in the region, has an obligation to stand up for Thimphu against the aggressive posturing by China, notwithstanding the subtle change in the language of an updated treaty signed in 2007 at the advent of Parliamentary democracy in Bhutan.
Article 2 in the earlier treaty, clinched in 1949 had said: “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”
This clause was amended in 2007 to read: “In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other”
However Article 1 has remained constant. It reads in both treaties: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between India and Bhutan.” India, thus does have an obligation to defend Bhutan from any aggression.
China, in keeping with its policy of creeping advancement against smaller neighbours, has been pressuring Bhutan to settle the boundary dispute between the two. The boundary dispute exists in three pockets (see map) but for China, the one at tri-junction, is military, the most vital.
The Chinese want to gain control of the Doklam plateau for tactical military reasons by building a road into the Doklam plateau. The PLA has been trying to build a road up to Gyemochen, which is towards the lower end of the tri-junction. China claims Gyemochen is the tri-junction between India, China (Tibet) and Bhutan whereas Survey of India maps of 1956 show Batang La, north of Gyemochen, as the tri-junction. The Batalang tri-junction at the narrow end of the Chumbi Valley — wedged between East Sikkim and West Bhutan — leaves China very little depth or width to deploy its forces.
The border, as it stands today between both India and China and between China and Bhutan, affords India a tactical advantage since its forces based in North and North-east Sikkim can easily cut off the Chinese deployment in the narrow Chumbi Valley should China try any misadventure here.
The Kalimpong headquartered 27 Division can easily employ mechanised forces in north and north-east Sikkim and press home the advantage against the Chinese in the Chumbi Valley (towards the town of Yadong or Yatung in Tibet), the Gangtok-based 17 Division is well-poised to take care of any Chinese deployment from east Sikkim.
These formations have their tasks clearly defined to cut off Chinese forces by deploying rapidly from North, north-east and east Sikkim towards Bhutan. The Chinese forces in the narrow Chumbi Valley are currently in the line of sight and fire of Indian forces poised on the ridges along the Sikkim-Tibet border.
Aware of this vulnerability, the Chinese have been eyeing the Doklam plateau since any troops stationed there will be away from visible observation and beyond artillery range of Indian forces either based in North or north-east Sikkim. Moreover, once the Chinese gain control of the plateau, they can easily roll down the Zimplri ridge and undermine Indian defences in the Siliguri Corridor that connects rest of India to the seven north-eastern states. That is why India has kept a close watch on Chinese activities around the Doklam plateau since it has anticipated the possibility of the Chinese attempting to get behind Indian defences through Bhutan.
The Chinese did try to alter the ground reality once in 2008 but were unsuccessful. This time, the standoff began in late May and peaked on 5-6 June when Indian troops, alerted by their Bhutanese counterparts, blocked the Chinese construction party from extending the road into the Doklam plateau.
Tactical military compulsion apart, there is a geostrategic reason why China chose to up the ante. That Beijing made its first public statement on the standoff at a time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in the US for his first meeting with President Donald Trump clearly shows China’s annoyance with India’s perceived tilt towards the US. Peeved with India’s refusal to join the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing chose to make a series of aggressive statements against India including one that sought to remind India of the 1962 war between the two, which India lost. The remark on 1962 received a riposte from India’s Defence Minister Arun Jaitley that ‘2017 is not 1962.’
Indeed, 55 years after the 1962 war, one can confidently say that the Indian Army has firmly and exorcised the ghost of 1962, thanks to a deeper understanding of the Chinese psyche and decisive victories in two major military face offs since then — one in 1967 and the other in 1987. In fact, the standoff at Nathula, not very far from the current impasse in 1967, gave the Chinese a bloody nose, just five years after 1962. The other eyeball to eyeball confrontation at Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, exactly 30 years ago too forced the Chinese to back down from its creeping encroachment.
There are a few firsts in the current stalemate. For once China is projecting itself as the aggrieved party. Two, Beijing has retaliated by cancelling the Mansarovar Yatra through Nathu La, one of the more easily implementable confidence building measures. Three, China has called India to withdraw its troops from what it calls Chinese territory for any further talks to commence.
A far more assured and confident India reacted to the barrage of intemperate statements by China with a measured statement and offered Beijing a way out. The statement said in conclusion: “India has consistently taken a positive approach to the settlement of its own boundary with China, along with the associated issue of the tri-junctions”.
“India cherishes peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas. It has not come easily. Both sides have worked hard to establish institutional framework to discuss all issues to ensure peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas. India is committed to working with China to find peaceful resolution of all issues in the border areas through dialogue.”
The belligerence displayed by some of India’s military veterans from the safety of TV studios notwithstanding, both New Delhi and Beijing have the wisdom and sagacity to resolve the latest dispute calmly. By standing firm and helping a weaker friend militarily, India has displayed its resolve. Now it’s time to get down to some deft diplomacy.
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Context:-
At the recently concluded Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021, Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) Coalition, a collective of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway governments, came up with a $1 billion fund plan that shall be offered to countries committed to arrest the decline of their tropical forests by 2030.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]What is LEAF Coalition?
Why LEAF Coalition?
Brazil & India
According to the UN-REDD programme, after the energy sector, deforestation accounts for massive carbon emissions — close to 11 per cent — in the atmosphere. Rapid urbanisation and commercialisation of forest produce are the main causes behind rampant deforestation across tropical forests.
Tribes, Forests and Government
Disregarding climate change as a valid excuse for the fires, Indian government officials were quick to lay the blame for deforestation on activities of forest dwellers and even labelled them “mischievous elements” and “unwanted elements”.
Policy makers around the world have emphasised the role of indigenous tribes and local communities in checking deforestation. These communities depend on forests for their survival as well as livelihood. Hence, they understand the need to protect forests. However, by posing legitimate environmental concerns as obstacles to real development, governments of developing countries swiftly avoid protection of forests and rights of forest dwellers.
For instance, the Government of India has not been forthcoming in recognising the socio-economic, civil, political or even cultural rights of forest dwellers. According to data from the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs in December, 2020 over 55 per cent of this population has still not been granted either individual or community ownership of their lands.
To make matters worse, the government has undertaken systematic and sustained measures to render the landmark Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 ineffective in its implementation. The Act had sought to legitimise claims of forest dwellers on occupied forest land.
Various government decisions have seriously undermined the position of indigenous people within India. These include proposing amendments to the obsolete Indian Forest Act, 1927 that give forest officials the power to take away forest dwellers’ rights and to even use firearms with impunity.
There is also the Supreme Court’s order of February, 2019 directing state governments to evict illegal encroachers of forest land or millions of forest dwellers inhabiting forests since generations as a measure to conserve wildlife. Finally, there is the lack of data on novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) deaths among the forest dwelling population;
Tardy administration, insufficient supervision, apathetic attitude and a lack of political intent defeat the cause of forest dwelling populations in India, thereby directly affecting efforts at arresting deforestation.
Way Forward
Tuntiak Katan, a global indigenous leader from Ecuador and general coordinator of the Global Alliance of Territorial Communities, aptly indicated the next steps at the Climate Summit:
“The first step is recognition of land rights. The second step is the recognition of the contributions of local communities and indigenous communities, meaning the contributions of indigenous peoples.We also need recognition of traditional knowledge practices in order to fight climate change”
Perhaps India can begin by taking the first step.