As the world continues to be ravaged by the covid pandemic, more than a year on, it is becoming increasingly evident that the greatest burden has fallen on the global poor.
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Even the poor in rich countries, which have relatively secure social safety nets and well developed public health systems, have seen a sharp drop in incomes and suffered the hardest impact of the virus itself, since they are not in occupations in which work-from-home is feasible.
While an investment banker, a senior civil servant or university professor can safely work remotely, this is obviously not an option for a food-delivery worker, a store clerk, or a front line medical worker.
If the impact on the poor in rich countries has been severe, in lower and lower middle income countries, it has been nothing short of devastating. A recent study by Pew Research Center compares the impact in China and India.
While China’s gross domestic product (GDP) rebounded in 2020, after an initial drop on account of the pandemic, India’s GDP collapsed last fiscal year, but is projected to revive in 2021-22. This difference helps account for the big difference in impact on the poor in the two countries.
Pew’s methodology is a counterfactual one—that is, it computes the change in the number of poor and those in other income strata as compared to a scenario of normal GDP growth in the absence of the pandemic and subsequent lockdowns.
In other words, this is a conceptually clean methodology for determining the pandemic’s impact on poverty. The survey’s definition of those in poverty is the standard international definition of a daily income (actual or imputed) of $2 or less.
For China, the study shows a very modest increase in the number of people in absolute poverty—only a million or so—whereas 30 million more people were pushed into the low-income (but not absolutely poor) category. Meanwhile, 10 million people fell out of the Chinese middle class, 18 million from the upper middle class, and 3 million from the high-income category.
By contrast, for India, a staggering 75 million people were pushed back into poverty by the covid crisis—this is almost 60% of the global total increase in poverty caused by the pandemic. India’s lower middle income category lost 35 million people, and the country’s middle class shrank by 32 million, many of these, evidently, accounting for those who slipped back into poverty.
Additionally, there was a loss of 7 million people from the upper middle class, and a drop of 1 million from the count of high-income earners.
The covid crisis in India has undone years of progress in combating poverty and also reversed several years of gains in drawing those in lower and lower middle income groups into the country’s middle class.
If these statistics are not grim enough, there is now added concern globally of a looming sovereign debt crisis, especially in middle- income emerging countries. In a 29 March interview with the Financial Times, United Nations secretary-general António Guterres pointed to the fact that large, middle-income countries such as Brazil and South Africa have borrowed heavily in domestic bond markets.
There is little danger of an external debt crisis, but there is a danger all the same, as maturities are coming down in many large middle-income countries such as Brazil and South Africa.
Shortened maturities may reduce the interest service cost of debt, given how low short rates are, but they mean that borrowings must be rolled over more frequently, which can heighten the possibility of a crisis in a context of greater macroeconomic instability.
While India is not in such crisis territory, unrestrained fiscal profligacy and an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio can add to macroeconomic pressures in the not-so-distant future, especially if rising retail inflation forces the Reserve Bank of India to raise its policy rate to damp it down, thus raising borrowing costs.
Taking a longer view, the global crisis and its aftermath have impeded the process of economic convergence between richer and poorer economies, a beneficial impact of globalization that had been in train, at least in fits and starts, since the 1990s.
India, in particular, suffered a serious GDP contraction last year, and even the prospect of higher growth this year, which could give India back its crown as the world’s fastest growing major economy, has reduced the chances of achieving the government’s putative goal of making India a $5 trillion economy anytime soon.
Even a month or so ago, there was somewhat greater optimism, thanks to vaccine rollouts around the world, over a reduction in the covid infection rate in many countries and the easing of pandemic restrictions. However, cases are again on the rise in many places, and new variants and mutations of the virus appear to be more resistant than earlier thought to our existing vaccines.
India, in particular, is seeing an alarming increase in cases and increased stress on its healthcare system. If this necessitates renewed curbs and lockdowns, as have been imposed partially in some states, it will almost certainly lead to a significant downward revision in India’s growth forecast for the current fiscal year.
Lower growth, in turn, foretells a rather grim year ahead for India’s poor.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.