By Categories: FP & IR

“Operation Sindoor was a strike. But defeating the ‘Other Punjab’—Pakistan’s jihadi heartland—will require a war of patience, precision, and persistence.”

To truly defeat terrorism, India must go beyond bombs. It must break the spine of Pakistan’s Punjab—the breeding ground of jihad.”

From Pahalgam to Bahawalpur:

On April 22, 2025, the scenic town of Pahalgam was shattered by a brutal terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. The strike was not random—it was orchestrated. And India knew where it came from: across the border, where terror groups enjoy not just sanctuary—but sponsorship.

India’s answer was swift. Operation Sindoor, launched on May 6, saw the Indian Air Force targeting terror hubs across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and critically—Pakistan’s Punjab.

Operation Sindoor: Tactical Victory, Strategic Pause

Between May 6 and 10, the Indian Air Force pounded terror camps and airbases across PoK, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistani Punjab, including high-value targets like Muridke (Lashkar-e-Taiba) and Bahawalpur (Jaish-e-Mohammad). For the first time since the 1971 war, India hit deep inside Punjab, Pakistan’s political and military core.

And Pakistan blinked. The Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) reached out to halt the escalation—marking a short-term tactical win for India.

But will it deter future attacks?

Pakistan’s Punjab – The Heart of Pakistan’s ‘Jihadi-industrial Complex’

Pakistani Punjab is not just another province. It is the recruitment base of the Pakistan Army, the cradle of terrorist tanzeems, and the nerve centre of anti-India jihad. It is t Pakistan’s ‘Fertile Crescent’ of Terrorism.

It is Pakistan’s political and military powerhouse, home to:

  • Over 60% of Pakistan’s population

  • The bulk of the Pakistan Army’s recruitment

  • The headquarters of terror outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba (Muridke) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (Bahawalpur)

With a robust counter-intelligence network, Rawalpindi has successfully shielded this region from Indian covert penetration—making it India’s toughest target.

Even lethal airstrikes cannot uproot deeply embedded jihadist networks. What India needs is a non-linear, layered, and patient campaign to dismantle the ecosystem feeding Pakistan’s terrorism. For India, this is the real battlefield. And it is as psychological as it is territorial.

Beyond the Bombs: Why India Needs a Strategy of Attrition

Military might is necessary, but not sufficient.

Like Israel’s shadow war with Iran, India must now embrace a strategy of exhaustion (Ermattungsstrategie)—wearing down Pakistan’s ability and will to support terrorism through:

  • Covert Intelligence Operations: Targeting terror leadership and infrastructure, especially in Pakistan’s Punjab.

  • Economic Warfare: Leveraging tools like FATF blacklisting and trade isolation.

  • Hydro-Diplomacy: Reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty to tighten the pressure.

  • Cyber & Narrative Warfare: Exposing Pakistan’s duplicity on global platforms.

India’s past restraint has shifted now, which has shown greater political will to escalate post-attack. However, unless consistent across future administrations, India risks reverting to the oscillation between airstrikes and inaction—a dangerous pattern.

Deterrence won’t work if India swings between surgical strikes and strategic silence. There must be political continuity, regardless of party in power.

If not, Pakistan’s jihadi machine will adapt, recover, and return.

Attrition is the Only Way to Break Pakistan’s Terror Hub

Attritional warfare does not seek a single decisive victory. It seeks to bleed the adversary slowly but irreversibly—militarily, economically, diplomatically, and psychologically.

To make this work, India must:

  • Invest in language-capable, deep-cover intelligence assets

  • Build long-term technological and cyber capabilities

  • Ensure cross-party strategic consistency

  • Prepare conventional forces for short, sharp wars—even two-front scenarios with China

Strategic Patience Over Tactical Blows

The lesson from Operation Sindoor is clear: strikes punish, but they don’t dismantle. Without a sustained attritional campaign—surgical, covert, and prolonged—the terror networks embedded in the “Other Punjab” will regenerate.

India’s security doctrine must now evolve. Not just to retaliate, but to reshape the battlefield. Attrition—silent, deliberate, and sustained—is not weakness. It is the warfare of those who think long, and strike deep.

Beyond Operation Sindoor:

If Operation Sindoor leads to months of silence on the terror front, it will be hailed as a deterrent victory.

If another Chittisinghpura, Pulwama, or Pahalgam happens, India must not hesitate—but escalate wisely. And more importantly, do so silently, consistently, and surgically.

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  • Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,

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