Last week, the government relaunched the Bharatmala Pariyojana (BMP)—an initiative to add 35,000km of new highways (subsuming existing plans to add 10,000km of national highways) with an outlay of Rs5.35 trillion over the next five years—to raise investments in infrastructure, and boost economic growth. An additional Rs1.57 trillion is set to be used in existing projects. Thus, overall the Union government is set to spend around Rs6.92 trillion on roads over the next five years.

The road-building initiative was sorely needed but it does not represent acceleration in road-building, and is unlikely to provide a big boost to the capital expenditure cycle.

According to data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), newly started road projects in the last five years (i.e., between 2012-13 and 2016-17) amounted to Rs6.55 trillion. Of this, Rs4.35 trillion was spent by the centre, which tends to focus mainly on national highways, with other roads being under the jurisdiction of states. Hence, the outlay on highways envisaged over the next five years, i.e. Rs6.92 trillion, does not appear to be a big jump, especially after accounting for inflation.

Even when viewed in terms of road length, the proposals do not amount to a significant increase. The central government aims to build around 35,000km of new highways over the next five years; 24,800km under Bharatmala, and the rest under the existing NHDP program. This is not too ambitious a target given that around 27,000km of national highways were added in the last five years.

On top of that, the risk that even this not-so-ambitious target will be missed remains, given that actual road construction has typically been behind target.

As a note by UBS Securities India Pvt. Ltd pointed out, highway award activity stagnated in the last fiscal year, and the Bharatmala initiative does not change that.

“The government’s new Bharatmala programme doesn’t change that picture (of stagnation) – it was needed because existing program awards were ending,” a team of UBS analysts wrote in the recently published note.

While the initiative will lead to new awards of road contracts, it will still be a small fraction of the investments the Indian economy needs over the next five years even if the government happens to beat its past record, and meet all targets. To illustrate, the entire proposed spending on highways over the next five years—Rs6.92 trillion—only amounts to 17% of overall investment spending (gross fixed capital formation or GFCF) in the single year 2016-17. Even after adding the proposed Rs88,185 crore spending on rural roads in the next three years, the total capex plans of the road sector in coming years amounts to Rs7.8 trillion or only 19% of GFCF in 2016-17.

While it is true that investments in roads now constitute a big part of infrastructure-related capital expenditure, the trend actually reflects subdued capex activity by private firms.

Analysis of CMIE data showed that while public spending on infra projects has indeed risen over the past couple of years, overall growth in infra spending still remains muted largely because of lack of infra investments by the private sector owing to legacy problems. The boom years of high private participation in the 2000s were followed by a spike in stressed assets, leading to a pile-up of bad debt and lowered lending to the sector.

The government’s other big plan announced last week—recapitalization of state-owned banks—may partly ease such constraints in the years ahead, if it is implemented well. However, it is worth keeping in mind that funding constraints are not the only hurdles infra projects face.

Many such projects are stuck because of lack of clearances even as the extent of projects stuck because of land acquisition problems seems to have declined.


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  • Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,

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    Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.

    This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.

    It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.

    The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.

    Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.

    India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.

    More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.

    An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.

    India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.

    Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.

    And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.

    A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.

    We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.

    We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.

    In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.