Have you ever heard the adage – “Empty vessels make the loudest noise”. You probably have and that is exactly what China is doing through its state sponsored media outlets. And the PLA in Chumbi Valley is sitting ducks for Indian artillery now. Read on to understand everything behind this stand-off. Oh yes, Doklam is not Doka La/Dhoka La as many have reported.
Even standing still in the bitterly cold and windswept Doklam plateau, which is being lashed by periodic sharp showers now, will tax the fittest of men. At that altitude (more than 16,500 feet), oxygen is rare and breathing takes work; many layers of clothing are never enough to ward off the chill that threatens to freeze even the bones.
But hundreds of Indian army soldiers, their arms locked and the automatic rifles on their shoulders pointed towards the ground, have been standing in Doklam and some areas further south for two to three hours at a stretch to form a human chain. The Indian human chain confronts a similar one by Chinese soldiers, and is separated by about 10-12ft of sandy soil on which little can grow. The human chain – soldiers have rotating duties – has been in place for more than three weeks now.
The standoff is necessary – a withdrawal will result in Chinese troops advancing and occupying not only the entire Doklam plateau, which is Bhutan’s territory, but also extending the tri-junction of India-Tibet-Bhutan about 10 kilometres south of the present position. And that would make the Siliguri corridor, which connects North East India with the rest of the country, vulnerable.
Behind the human chains, both sides have amassed troops and military hardware. China has even been conducting military exercises simulating battlefield scenarios. The Chinese have also reportedly tested the Xinqingtan, a new 35-tonne battle tank with a 105 millimetre tank gun, a 35mm grenade launcher and a 12.7mm machine gun. Sounds of artillery and gunfire can be heard from the Indian side many miles away. The Chinese are, obviously, making a lot of noise on Ground Zero.
It is not as if the Indian Army (IA) and the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) have been sitting pretty. A lot of armoured, artillery, mechanised infantry and infantry units have been amassed. The IA and RBA are conducting joint exercises to test their combat readiness and coordination. The coordination between the two armies is smooth; not only do the two share extremely close ties and hold regular exercises, the RBA is also trained by the IA itself.
IA officers are, however, not quite impressed by the sound that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is making at Doklam and further south at their side of the existing tri-junction.
Indian and RBA troops and units have dug in their heels and are well prepared for the long haul. But its not only that. Both the IA and RBA occupy the higher ground at Doklam and Doka La. And, thus, they have a significant strategic advantage over Chinese troops, who are amassed at the narrow Chumbi Valley.
The Chinese have not been able to encroach much into the Doklam plateau and beyond the present trijunction into Doka La area. The Chinese started encroaching slowly and stealthily into Doklam plateau from Chumbi Valley a few years ago. A part of that plateau – about 89 sq km of it, according to Bhutan – is disputed territory between Bhutan and China. But even though treaties exist between the two nations to maintain status quo in such areas, the PLA has been surreptitiously encroaching into Bhutan’s territories.
China has built roads from Chumbi Valley to a high mountain pass called Senche La that leads to Doklam plateau in Bhutan. This road then enters Bhutan before turning west to return to Chumbi Valley. The Chinese have also extended this road down southwest till Doka La, a few kilometres into Indian territory. As they have been doing in other sectors, the Chinese now cite the existence of this road, and their own bunkers and temporary positions in encroached-upon territories, to claim them as their own.
As can be seen on the map given below, China wants to push the India-Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction further south to make Doka La, which is now well within India, into a pass that opens to the Chumbi Valley. The blue line in the map is the present boundary between Bhutan and Tibet; the blue line marks the Chinese claim on Bhutan’s territory that would push the tri-junction further south.
The Chinese want to do this for many reasons, the primary being strategic. If the Chinese can push the tri-junction south and occupy the Doklam plateau, they will gain tremendous advantage over the IA and RBA. The vital rail and road links passing through Siliguri corridor would then come within easy range of Chinese artillery from the new tri-junction. That will give China a huge advantage over India since India, aware that China can easily snap links between the North East and rest of India, will then be at the mercy of China. Beijing will be able to bend New Delhi to do its bidding.
If the Chinese game plan succeeds, Beijing would have effectively humbled India and delivered a debilitating blow to India’s ego and prestige. Beijing would also have demonstrated to India’s neighbours that China is the big brother in this neighbourhood and they can safely ignore India. Also, Beijing would be able to force Bhutan to deal directly with China instead of through India, as it happens at present.
But this scary scenario is highly unlikely. That’s because the IA and RBA still hold onto the strategic heights and China has not been able to move enough PLA troops and military hardware onto Doklam plateau to pose any serious challenge to Indian and Bhutanese armies. It would, say IA and RBA officers, be easy to push PLA troops and units back to Chumbi Valley. China has, admittedly, amassed a large number of troops, artillery and armoured units in Chumbi Valley. But these are sitting ducks for Indian artillery now. Chumbi Valley is also within easy range of Indian Air Force fighters based in the Siliguri corridor and south Bengal while IA and RBA positions in Doklam are quite out of range of the PLA’s Air Force stationed in Tibet.
This ground reality is what riles Beijing no end. China knows that it cannot start hostilities on this front since it is still at a severe disadvantage. And that is why the Chinese military, its foreign office and the state-controlled media as well as state-sponsored think tanks are spitting fire on India. The knowledge that if the PLA fires the first shot in Doklam, it will suffer huge losses there, and in the Chumbi Valley as well, is what proves to be a huge setback to China’s expansionism and severely dents its gargantuan ego. And hence all the angry noises emanating not only from behind Chinese positions in Doklam, but also from faraway Beijing.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.