By standing firm with Bhutan and helping it militarily, India has displayed its resolve. Now it’s time to get down to some deft diplomacy.
As the military standoff over Doka La (or Doklam plateau) between India and China spills over into its second month, it is important to understand both the military and geo-strategic reasons behind the incident.
Technically the Doklam plateau is Bhutanese territory but New Delhi, as Bhutan’s closest friend in the region, has an obligation to stand up for Thimphu against the aggressive posturing by China, notwithstanding the subtle change in the language of an updated treaty signed in 2007 at the advent of Parliamentary democracy in Bhutan.
Article 2 in the earlier treaty, clinched in 1949 had said: “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”
This clause was amended in 2007 to read: “In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other”
However Article 1 has remained constant. It reads in both treaties: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between India and Bhutan.” India, thus does have an obligation to defend Bhutan from any aggression.
China, in keeping with its policy of creeping advancement against smaller neighbours, has been pressuring Bhutan to settle the boundary dispute between the two. The boundary dispute exists in three pockets (see map) but for China, the one at tri-junction, is military, the most vital.
The Chinese want to gain control of the Doklam plateau for tactical military reasons by building a road into the Doklam plateau. The PLA has been trying to build a road up to Gyemochen, which is towards the lower end of the tri-junction. China claims Gyemochen is the tri-junction between India, China (Tibet) and Bhutan whereas Survey of India maps of 1956 show Batang La, north of Gyemochen, as the tri-junction. The Batalang tri-junction at the narrow end of the Chumbi Valley — wedged between East Sikkim and West Bhutan — leaves China very little depth or width to deploy its forces.
The border, as it stands today between both India and China and between China and Bhutan, affords India a tactical advantage since its forces based in North and North-east Sikkim can easily cut off the Chinese deployment in the narrow Chumbi Valley should China try any misadventure here.
The Kalimpong headquartered 27 Division can easily employ mechanised forces in north and north-east Sikkim and press home the advantage against the Chinese in the Chumbi Valley (towards the town of Yadong or Yatung in Tibet), the Gangtok-based 17 Division is well-poised to take care of any Chinese deployment from east Sikkim.
These formations have their tasks clearly defined to cut off Chinese forces by deploying rapidly from North, north-east and east Sikkim towards Bhutan. The Chinese forces in the narrow Chumbi Valley are currently in the line of sight and fire of Indian forces poised on the ridges along the Sikkim-Tibet border.
Aware of this vulnerability, the Chinese have been eyeing the Doklam plateau since any troops stationed there will be away from visible observation and beyond artillery range of Indian forces either based in North or north-east Sikkim. Moreover, once the Chinese gain control of the plateau, they can easily roll down the Zimplri ridge and undermine Indian defences in the Siliguri Corridor that connects rest of India to the seven north-eastern states. That is why India has kept a close watch on Chinese activities around the Doklam plateau since it has anticipated the possibility of the Chinese attempting to get behind Indian defences through Bhutan.
The Chinese did try to alter the ground reality once in 2008 but were unsuccessful. This time, the standoff began in late May and peaked on 5-6 June when Indian troops, alerted by their Bhutanese counterparts, blocked the Chinese construction party from extending the road into the Doklam plateau.
Tactical military compulsion apart, there is a geostrategic reason why China chose to up the ante. That Beijing made its first public statement on the standoff at a time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in the US for his first meeting with President Donald Trump clearly shows China’s annoyance with India’s perceived tilt towards the US. Peeved with India’s refusal to join the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing chose to make a series of aggressive statements against India including one that sought to remind India of the 1962 war between the two, which India lost. The remark on 1962 received a riposte from India’s Defence Minister Arun Jaitley that ‘2017 is not 1962.’
Indeed, 55 years after the 1962 war, one can confidently say that the Indian Army has firmly and exorcised the ghost of 1962, thanks to a deeper understanding of the Chinese psyche and decisive victories in two major military face offs since then — one in 1967 and the other in 1987. In fact, the standoff at Nathula, not very far from the current impasse in 1967, gave the Chinese a bloody nose, just five years after 1962. The other eyeball to eyeball confrontation at Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, exactly 30 years ago too forced the Chinese to back down from its creeping encroachment.
There are a few firsts in the current stalemate. For once China is projecting itself as the aggrieved party. Two, Beijing has retaliated by cancelling the Mansarovar Yatra through Nathu La, one of the more easily implementable confidence building measures. Three, China has called India to withdraw its troops from what it calls Chinese territory for any further talks to commence.
A far more assured and confident India reacted to the barrage of intemperate statements by China with a measured statement and offered Beijing a way out. The statement said in conclusion: “India has consistently taken a positive approach to the settlement of its own boundary with China, along with the associated issue of the tri-junctions”.
“India cherishes peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas. It has not come easily. Both sides have worked hard to establish institutional framework to discuss all issues to ensure peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas. India is committed to working with China to find peaceful resolution of all issues in the border areas through dialogue.”
The belligerence displayed by some of India’s military veterans from the safety of TV studios notwithstanding, both New Delhi and Beijing have the wisdom and sagacity to resolve the latest dispute calmly. By standing firm and helping a weaker friend militarily, India has displayed its resolve. Now it’s time to get down to some deft diplomacy.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.