Background:
- The impossible trinity, or the trilemma, refers to the idea that an economy cannot pursue independent monetary policy, maintain a fixed exchange rate, and allow the free flow of capital across its borders at the same time.
- According to economists, any economy can choose to pursue only two out of the three policy options noted above simultaneously in the long-run.
- The idea was proposed independently by Canadian economist Robert Mundell and British economist Marcus Fleming in the early 1960s.

A difficult choice
- Practically speaking, in today’s world in which capital is largely free to move across borders with ease, the choice before policymakers is between maintaining a fixed exchange rate and pursuing independent monetary policy.
- If policymakers choose to peg or maintain the value of their currency at a certain level against a foreign currency, this decision will limit the kind of monetary policy they can adopt in the long-run.
- This is because the decision to peg the exchange value of the currency can tie down the hands of central bankers when it comes to their domestic monetary policy stance.
- For example, if a country’s policymakers want their currency to appreciate, or become stronger, against foreign currencies, they cannot achieve this goal and maintain the external strength of the currency over a considerable period of time without adopting a tight domestic monetary policy stance which will weaken domestic demand.
- This is because loose monetary policy will put pressure on the country’s currency to depreciate in value. Thus, policymakers will have to choose between maintaining the strength of their currency and upholding nominal demand in the domestic economy which is heavily influenced by monetary policy.
- On the other hand, if policymakers of a country choose to pursue independent monetary policy, they may not be able to maintain the foreign exchange value of their currency at a desired peg.
- This is because the kind of monetary policy adopted by an economy’s central bank invariably influences the exchange value of its currency against foreign currencies.
- For example, if a country’s central bank adopts easy monetary policy with the aim of boosting domestic demand, this will naturally cause the value of its currency to depreciate against foreign currencies if foreign central banks adopt tighter monetary policy.
- If so, it would be difficult to maintain the foreign exchange value of the currency unless the central bank holds sufficient foreign exchange reserves to prop up the currency’s value.
- In fact, over the long-run, it may be impossible for the country’s central bank to defend the foreign exchange value of its currency as it may soon run out of the foreign exchange reserves necessary to prop up the value of its currency.
Restricting movement
- It should be noted that only a few decades ago, when strict capital controls were used to regulate the flow of capital across borders, economies could choose to pursue independent monetary policy and still hope to maintain a certain exchange value against foreign currencies.
- Whenever monetary policy exerted an undesirable effect on the currency’s exchange rate, policymakers could impose controls on the flow of capital to maintain the foreign exchange value of their currency.
- For example, if a country’s central bank decides that it wants to adopt easy monetary policy that could weaken the exchange value of its currency, it could impose capital controls to stop the depreciation of its currency. It should be noted, however, that capital controls come at a price. They hinder the free flow of capital and adversely affect economic growth by preventing the efficient allocation of scarce resources across the globe.
Current trilemma
- The trilemma has come under focus recently as the U.S. Federal Reserve has been raising interest rates to fight rising prices.
- In a world where capital is largely free to move across borders, this has led many investors to pull money out of the rest of the world and rush to the U.S. in search of higher yields, thus putting pressure on many currencies such as the Indian rupee.
- In fact, even developed markets like Japan and the Eurozone have seen their currencies depreciate significantly against the U.S. dollar.
- Notably Japan, in contrast to other national central banks, has been unwilling to tighten its monetary policy in response to rising interest rates in the U.S.
- This has caused the Japanese currency, the Yen, to depreciate about 25% against the U.S. dollar so far this year.
- In essence, the Bank of Japan has allowed its currency to fall, preferring to maintain control over its domestic monetary policy.
- The Reserve Bank of India may also face the dilemma of choosing between maintaining the value of the rupee and holding on to its monetary policy independence.
- As the U.S. Federal Reserve has raised interest rates, there has been increasing pressure on the rupee, which has depreciated almost 10% against the U.S. dollar this year.
- For now, the RBI seems to be fairly happy tightening its monetary policy stance to defend the rupee as it also helps to rein in price rise which has been a concern even in India.
- But if the U.S. Federal Reserve continues to tighten its policy stance even after price rise in India is reined in by the RBI, then the Indian central bank may have to choose between defending the rupee and upholding domestic demand.
Receive Daily Updates
Recent Posts
Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.