Note- In our last years Mains test series, we gave a question related to taxing agricultural income, although the question was not asked by UPSC last year, still it is one of the most debated topic in policy circles. The below article gives reasons on why it should be taxed.
In 1925, the Indian taxation enquiry committee noted, “There is no historical or theoretical justification for the continued exemption from the income tax of income derived from agriculture. There are, however, administrative and political objections to the removal of the exemption at the present time.” Almost a century later, both parts of that observation still hold true.
NITI Aayog member Bibek Debroy’s suggestion last week that agricultural income above a certain threshold should be taxed is a case in point. The political reaction was swift and predictable, from both the government and the opposition. But Debroy’s stand—backed by chief economic adviser Arvind Subramanian—is no heterodoxy.
Six states currently have agricultural tax legislation on the books—Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Assam, Bihar, Odisha and West Bengal—even if implementation varies substantially, from taxes not being levied at all to being levied only upon income from plantations. A number of other states such as Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan have flip-flopped on the issue over the decades, introducing and then rolling back agricultural tax.
The economic and governance necessity of such a tax has always been apparent. Yoginder K. Alagh’s 1961 analysis of agricultural tax yields, Case For An Agricultural Income Tax, in The Economic Weekly—now The Economic And Political Weekly—is illuminating, showing a substantial rise in revenue over the previous decade, vital for a young nation state.
Concurrently, the Planning Commission’s sample study of cooperative farms showed the onset of tax avoidance as mechanized farms with hired labour took advantage of the exemptions provided to cooperative farms. That evasion has grown over the decades into an administrative swamp. In assessment year 2014-15, for instance, nine of the top 10 claimants for tax exemption of agricultural income were corporations; the 10th was a state government department. And an RTI (right to information) query by Vijay Sharma, former income-tax chief commissioner, turned up massive irregularities in agricultural income in 2011-12 and 2012-13.
This goes beyond foregone revenue. As the 2014 Tax Administration Reform Commission report points out, “Agricultural income of non-agriculturists is being increasingly used as a conduit to avoid tax and for laundering funds, resulting in leakage to the tune of crores in revenue annually.” Nor can this government or its predecessors hide behind the fig leaf of honest—if unwise—populism.
According to the National Sample Survey’s 70th round, over 86% of agricultural households have land holdings of less than 2 hectares. Low-income farmers—the constituency state legislatures are ostensibly protecting—would thus fall outside the ambit of any sensible tax regime. The reality of political opposition is more sordid: pressure brought to bear by the rural elite that can deliver votes and funds and would fall under the tax net.
Little wonder there is a robust history of policy reform attempts. The 1972 Raj committee on taxation of agricultural wealth and income report is perhaps the most comprehensive. The Vijay Kelkar committee in 2002 had also addressed the issue, noting that states should be persuaded to pass a resolution authorizing the Centre to pass a tax on agricultural income that would then be assigned to the respective states. The reform attempts stretch as far back as 1947—when the report of the expert committee on financial provisions to the Constituent Assembly suggested consulting with the states to address the issue swiftly—and are as recent as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s conference with tax administrators in June last year when the latter brought up the issue of taxing agricultural income.
Given the extent of the informality that still exists in the agricultural sector, implementation of an agricultural tax would admittedly not be easy. In a 2004 World Bank paper, Taxing Agriculture In A Developing Country: A Possible Approach, Indira Rajaraman has analysed data from 70 developing countries to show how the twin problems of payments in cash or kind and a lack of standard account-keeping throw up barriers. But there is, demonstrably, a wealth of work done in this area to draw upon.
For instance, Rajaraman herself suggests a crop-specific levy on land rather than on self-declared output, assessed and implemented at the panchayat level for accuracy and flexibility—with the added incentive of tax yields being ploughed back into agricultural sector infrastructure.
However, to engage with such policy debates, the political establishment must first move beyond a reflexive rejection of the very concept of agricultural tax. Given the optics created by decades of grandstanding, this will perhaps be as difficult as actually implementing a tax. But with the government’s push for a less-cash economy and the proscription of cash transactions of over Rs2 lakh, both making money laundering via the agricultural sector more difficult, this is as good a time as any.
It would be a pity if the logic of the colonial administration continued to dictate tax administration in India nine decades later.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.