The geo-political ascendancy of India achieved a new milestone this month when it was granted the membership of missile technology control regime (MTCR). This was considered as a major achievement of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign policy.

The membership allows India to buy or sell advanced missile technology and military know-how from a third-party, in accordance with the guidelines of membership.

However, many analysts viewed the MTCR membership of India as a stepping stone to get into the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which was ironically founded after the first nuclear test conducted by India in 1974. The NSG is poised to meet in Seoul for the 23-24 June plenary and India’s membership will be an important issue to be discussed.

The United States (US) is strongly supporting India’s NSG membership and has been quite vociferous about it, with US Secretary of State John Kerry writing letter to support India’s candidature. Also, in his recently concluded five-nation visit, Prime Minister Modi was able to build a consensus in India’s favour and garner support from Mexico, Japan and Switzerland.

The countries which are still opposing India’s membership are, New Zealand, Ireland, Turkey, South Africa, Austria and China. China, however, has softened its stand and said: “the door is open” for the admission of non-NPT members “but the members of the NSG should stay focused on whether the criteria should be changed.”

The chief contention among the opposing countries is India’s refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India maintains that military use of nuclear technology is a matter of its national security and thus denies any negotiation on the topic. Many argue that allowing India would set a precedent for other non-NPT countries such as Pakistan, and weaken the stringent NSG eligibility criteria.

However, many diplomats attribute the opposition of China to its more congenial relationship with Pakistan.

The US is trying to negate the growing influence of China in South-East Asia and aims to develop India as an ally in the developing world.

Several new India-US agreements such as Logistics Exchange Agreement, which provides provision of sharing military facilities between the two nations are in negotiation and may harm the geo-strategic interest of China as it threatens Beijing hegemony in South-East Asia.

This increasing bilateral ties between India and the US is a cause for concern for China and thus it was refusing to recognise India in NSG and lobbying for Pakistan.

The trade benefits associated with NSG is also an important factor in China’s resistance to India’s membership as it is sceptic of granting New Delhi the same benefits as it enjoys in international nuclear market.

India has sizeable deposit of uranium and especially thorium, which can be traded in international market and thus have huge trade potential.

New Delhi argues that it was applying for membership based ‘on merit’ and not ‘on guidelines’ and asserts that it is not required to be a NPT-signed country to be a member of NSG.

At a Press Conference, External Affairs Ministry spokesman Vikas Swarup argued that France was a member of NSG while it was not a NPT nation and thus, China’s objection on India being a non-NPT nation is ambiguous.

But it is evident that the moves are in play and finer diplomacy is needed to advance respective national interest (China, India and the US), before any satisfactory conclusion could be reached.

However, many officials and diplomats argue that China should support India’s NSG application. India already has trade exemption which was granted in 2008 under George Bush government and allows India to engage in civil nuclear commerce. It also led to exchange of novel nuclear technologies between US and India.

China supported India in this endeavour albeit on the insistence of the then US president but it is strategically important that China does the same in Seoul too. China is widely viewed as a proliferator of nuclear technology as it has helped states such as North Korea and Pakistan in the past to gain access to nuclear technology for military purpose.

Supporting India would set a positive precedent for China for a membership of MTCR to which India was recently granted membership and China is not a member.

India and China have similar interest and voting pattern on pertinent economic policies such as climate funding and World Trade Organisation, and this is in accordance with Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy, which is more focused on trade opportunities rather than geo-political associations.

This can present a unique opportunity for China to increase its trade commitments with India. Also, the US Congress recently rejected an amendment to grant India a special status as global strategic and defence partner, which exhibit a lack of dimension in India-US strategic cooperation and gives China a ‘wiggle-room’ to extend cooperation with India especially in trade and commerce.

Given the geographical location of India and China and a shared past, it is evident that they will be rivals but the recent allocation of approximately $300 million to Pakistan by the US to ‘fight terror’ implies that Pakistan is still a close ally of the US and it would be mutually beneficial for India and China to extend cooperation.

The recent missile and nuclear development of North Korea also poses a threat to the national security of China and thus is in need of new allies.

China is aware of the threat North Korea poses and thus backed the increase in United Nation sanctions after Pyongyang‘s missile test.

The common threat is in the form of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and associated terrorism, making it more important for India and China to have some level of cooperation as both the countries are a part of ‘grand’ caliphate of ISIS. Thus, the change in global politics and economics have led to the evolution of many new factors which China need to contemplate before it decided to throw a wrench in India’s effort to gain NSG membership.


 

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  • Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,

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    Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.

    This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.

    It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.

    The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.

    Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.

    India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.

    More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.

    An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.

    India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.

    Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.

    And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.

    A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.

    We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.

    We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.

    In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.