Background
The Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC), India’s apex regulator of genetically modified plants and food products, has approved the environmental release of Dhara Mustard Hybrid-11 (DMH-11), a genetically-engineered variant of mustard.
If approved for commercial cultivation it would be the first genetically modified food crop available to Indian farmers.
What is DMH-11?
DMH-11 is a hybrid variant of mustard developed by researchers at The Centre for Genetic Manipulation of Crop Plants, at the University of Delhi. DMH-1, a hybrid variant that was developed without transgenic technology.
DMH-1 was approved for commercial release in northwest India in 2005-2006 but scientists have said that this technology wasn’t bankable enough to consistently produce hybrid mustard.
While India has several mustard varieties, it is a self-pollinating plant and therefore a challenge for plant-breeders to cross different mustard varieties and induce desirable traits.
Being able to turn off this self-pollinating trait to enable such crossings and then restoring the trait, to enable seed production, is how the mustard plant’s genes are to be manipulated.
DMH-11 is a result of a cross between two varieties: Varuna and Early Heera-2.
Such a cross wouldn’t have happened naturally and was done after introducing genes from two soil bacterium called barnase and barstar.
Barnase in Varuna induces a temporary sterility because of which it can’t naturally self-pollinate.
Barstar in Heera blocks the effect of barnase allowing seeds to be produced.
The result is DMH-11 (where 11 refers to the number of generations after which desirable traits manifest) that not only has better yield but is also fertile. DMH-11 is a transgenic crop because it uses foreign genes from a different species.
Are hybrid mustard varieties better?
Trials conducted over three years by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) suggest that DMH-11 has 28% higher yields than its parent Varuna and was 37% better than zonal checks, or local varieties that are considered the best in different agro-climatic zones.
DMH-11 rather than being an end in itself signals the proof of success of the barnase-barstar system that can act as a platform technology to develop newer hybrids.
Scientists say that having better hybrids is necessary to meet India’s rising edible-oil import bill.
Mustard (Brassica juncea) is cultivated in 6-7 million hectares during the Rabi winter season predominantly in Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh. India imports anywhere from 55-60% of its domestic edible-oil requirement.
In 2020-21, around 13.3 million tonnes of edible oil were imported at a cost of ₹1,17,000 crore according to the National Academy of Agricultural Sciences. This is primarily due to low productivity — of about 1-1.3 tonnes/hectare — that has been stagnant for over two decades.
On the other hand, hybrid mustard and rapeseed are the dominant form of oil seeds in Canada, China and Europe. So, proponents say, the only way to improve India’s productivity is to have more mustard hybrids.
Why is it controversial?
There are two main reasons why transgenic mustards are a topic of debate.
The use of genes that are foreign to the species is one and secondly, the preparation of mustard hybrids require the use of another gene, called the bar gene, that makes it tolerant to a herbicide called glufosinate-ammonium.
Activist groups allege that the GM mustard hasn’t been evaluated as a herbicide tolerant crop posing potential risks. Finally, they allege, GM mustard plants may dissuade bees from pollinating the plant and this could have knock-off environmental catastrophes.
What next for GM mustard?
This isn’t the first time that the GEAC has cleared the environmental release of GM mustard. In 2017 too, the apex body had cleared it but the process got stalled after a case was lodged in the Supreme Court.
The government, or specifically the Environment Ministry, hasn’t officially supported GM mustard despite the GEAC being a body under it.
Bt Brinjal, the first transgenic food crop, too was cleared by the GEAC in 2009 but was put on hold by the then-UPA government on the grounds that more tests were needed.
Currently the only transgenic crop grown in India is Bt-cotton.
The GEAC go-ahead only allows DMH-11 to be grown in fields under the supervision of the ICAR. The Indian Agricultural Research Institute has said that the crop would be commercially available after “three seasons” now that they can be grown in large quantities for evaluation.
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Steve Ovett, the famous British middle-distance athlete, won the 800-metres gold medal at the Moscow Olympics of 1980. Just a few days later, he was about to win a 5,000-metres race at London’s Crystal Palace. Known for his burst of acceleration on the home stretch, he had supreme confidence in his ability to out-sprint rivals. With the final 100 metres remaining,
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Ovett waved to the crowd and raised a hand in triumph. But he had celebrated a bit too early. At the finishing line, Ireland’s John Treacy edged past Ovett. For those few moments, Ovett had lost his sense of reality and ignored the possibility of a negative event.
This analogy works well for the India story and our policy failures , including during the ongoing covid pandemic. While we have never been as well prepared or had significant successes in terms of growth stability as Ovett did in his illustrious running career, we tend to celebrate too early. Indeed, we have done so many times before.
It is as if we’re convinced that India is destined for greater heights, come what may, and so we never run through the finish line. Do we and our policymakers suffer from a collective optimism bias, which, as the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman once wrote, “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases”? The optimism bias arises from mistaken beliefs which form expectations that are better than the reality. It makes us underestimate chances of a negative outcome and ignore warnings repeatedly.
The Indian economy had a dream run for five years from 2003-04 to 2007-08, with an average annual growth rate of around 9%. Many believed that India was on its way to clocking consistent double-digit growth and comparisons with China were rife. It was conveniently overlooked that this output expansion had come mainly came from a few sectors: automobiles, telecom and business services.
Indians were made to believe that we could sprint without high-quality education, healthcare, infrastructure or banking sectors, which form the backbone of any stable economy. The plan was to build them as we went along, but then in the euphoria of short-term success, it got lost.
India’s exports of goods grew from $20 billion in 1990-91 to over $310 billion in 2019-20. Looking at these absolute figures it would seem as if India has arrived on the world stage. However, India’s share of global trade has moved up only marginally. Even now, the country accounts for less than 2% of the world’s goods exports.
More importantly, hidden behind this performance was the role played by one sector that should have never made it to India’s list of exports—refined petroleum. The share of refined petroleum exports in India’s goods exports increased from 1.4% in 1996-97 to over 18% in 2011-12.
An import-intensive sector with low labour intensity, exports of refined petroleum zoomed because of the then policy regime of a retail price ceiling on petroleum products in the domestic market. While we have done well in the export of services, our share is still less than 4% of world exports.
India seemed to emerge from the 2008 global financial crisis relatively unscathed. But, a temporary demand push had played a role in the revival—the incomes of many households, both rural and urban, had shot up. Fiscal stimulus to the rural economy and implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission scales had led to the salaries of around 20% of organized-sector employees jumping up. We celebrated, but once again, neither did we resolve the crisis brewing elsewhere in India’s banking sector, nor did we improve our capacity for healthcare or quality education.
Employment saw little economy-wide growth in our boom years. Manufacturing jobs, if anything, shrank. But we continued to celebrate. Youth flocked to low-productivity service-sector jobs, such as those in hotels and restaurants, security and other services. The dependence on such jobs on one hand and high-skilled services on the other was bound to make Indian society more unequal.
And then, there is agriculture, an elephant in the room. If and when farm-sector reforms get implemented, celebrations would once again be premature. The vast majority of India’s farmers have small plots of land, and though these farms are at least as productive as larger ones, net absolute incomes from small plots can only be meagre.
A further rise in farm productivity and consequent increase in supply, if not matched by a demand rise, especially with access to export markets, would result in downward pressure on market prices for farm produce and a further decline in the net incomes of small farmers.
We should learn from what John Treacy did right. He didn’t give up, and pushed for the finish line like it was his only chance at winning. Treacy had years of long-distance practice. The same goes for our economy. A long grind is required to build up its base before we can win and celebrate. And Ovett did not blame anyone for his loss. We play the blame game. Everyone else, right from China and the US to ‘greedy corporates’, seems to be responsible for our failures.
We have lowered absolute poverty levels and had technology-based successes like Aadhaar and digital access to public services. But there are no short cuts to good quality and adequate healthcare and education services. We must remain optimistic but stay firmly away from the optimism bias.
In the end, it is not about how we start, but how we finish. The disastrous second wave of covid and our inability to manage it is a ghastly reminder of this fact.