Geopolitics & Diplomacy · September 2026

India at Bishkek: How India Turned the SCO’s 25th Birthday Into a Platform Against Terror

Prime Minister Modi walked into the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek on August 31 with a clear agenda: use a forum dominated by China and Russia to push India’s position on terrorism, connectivity, and its growing role in Eurasia. He walked out with 13 agreed outcomes, English as an SCO official language, and a historic anti-terror declaration. Here is what happened — and why it matters.

The photograph tells a story by itself. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood together before the group photograph at the 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, shaking hands. Behind them: the leaders of eight other nations spanning from Minsk to Islamabad. It was September 1, 2026. The SCO was turning 25. And India, the democracy sitting awkwardly in a bloc built by China and Russia, was very visibly present.

The 2026 Bishkek SCO Summit was the 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State, held from August 31 to September 1 under the theme “25 Years of the SCO: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity,” chaired by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.

It was the 25th anniversary of an organisation that began as a six-nation Central Asian security forum and has since grown into one of the world’s largest multilateral blocs by population and land area. And for India, it was a summit that produced more concrete wins than most previous SCO meetings had.

India joined the SCO in 2017 — in the same batch as Pakistan — and the decision has never been entirely comfortable. The SCO is dominated by China, which is India’s primary strategic rival. It includes Pakistan, with whom India has fought four wars.

It includes Russia, which is simultaneously a traditional partner and an increasingly China-aligned power. And its founding architecture — built on Chinese and Russian diplomatic priorities — does not always align with India’s.

And yet India stays, and attends, and increasingly shapes outcomes. The reason is simple: the SCO gives India a seat at the table in a region increasingly shaped by competition among larger powers, allowing it to protect its interests, track shifting geopolitical currents, and project itself as a reliable stakeholder.While it may not entirely shape the agenda, it gives New Delhi a first-hand view of the region and allows it to hedge its position with others.

What INDIA Said at Bishkek

India has a formula for SCO summits that has been consistent across multiple years: raise terrorism loudly and specifically, push connectivity, and propose cultural or digital cooperation initiatives. At Bishkek, all three were on display.

On terrorism, PM Modi was direct. “Can the open support for terrorism by certain countries ever be acceptable to us?” he asked. “Double standards on terrorism are unacceptable. Together, we must oppose terrorism in every form and manifestation. This is our responsibility towards humanity.”

The message was aimed without ambiguity at Pakistan and its state-supported sponsorship of cross-border terrorism — and equally at China, which has repeatedly shielded Pakistani-linked terror groups from UN designations.

PM Modi recalled the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22 — in which 26 people, mostly tourists, were killed by Pakistan-linked terrorists in Kashmir — as an “open challenge to every nation and every individual who believes in humanity.” He thanked member countries for their strong solidarity in the wake of the Pahalgam attack, urged the group to hold countries that perpetrate and support cross-border terrorism accountable, and emphasised that there should be no double standards in dealing with terrorism.

On connectivity, PM Modi underscored India’s support for projects such as Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor, framing connectivity as essential to fostering development and building trust across the region.

On culture and innovation, PM Modi proposed commencing a Civilizational Dialogue Forum within the group to foster greater people-to-people ties and cultural understanding. He also called for a Youth Science Forum and a Young Author’s Conclave — initiatives that were subsequently included in the Bishkek Declaration.

India-Pakistan at Bishkek:

One of the enduring awkwardnesses of India’s SCO membership is that it shares the same table as Pakistan. At Bishkek, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was present. No bilateral meeting between PM Modi and Sharif was announced or held — in keeping with India’s consistent policy since the Pahalgam attack that diplomacy and cross-border terrorism cannot coexist. The two leaders addressed the same plenary session within hours of each other, making pointed statements that everyone in the room understood to be directed at the other without the other being named.

India’s position at Bishkek was that terrorism cannot be a strategic asset — and that an organisation which includes both a victim of cross-border terrorism and the state accused of sponsoring it must be explicit about which side it stands on. The Bishkek Declaration’s language on “double standards” in counter-terrorism and its specific provisions for the SCO Anti-Narcotics Centre were India’s clearest wins on this front: multilateral language that, while not naming Pakistan directly, clearly supports the position India has held for years.

Lahore was named the SCO Tourism and Cultural Capital for 2026–27 — Pakistan’s own symbolic gain from Bishkek, coming as it takes over the rotating chairmanship. India raised no objection.

The next SCO summit will be held in Islamabad in 2027. India will attend. India and Pakistan will again sit at the same table. That is what multilateral diplomacy — uncomfortable, imperfect, and occasionally useful — looks like.

India-China at Bishkek: No Bilateral, But a Handshake

A bilateral meeting between PM Modi and Xi Jinping could not take place on the margins of the Bishkek Summit, but a video of the PM, Russian President Putin, and Xi shaking hands before the leaders’ photograph was the highlight of the day — a moment that signalled a normalisation of optics, if not yet of the underlying bilateral tensions over the LAC and broader strategic competition.

Both Putin and Xi were separately scheduled to be in New Delhi for the BRICS summit on September 12–13 — meaning Bishkek was the pre-meeting before the meeting. India’s relationship with China within the SCO has always been managed rather than warm: the two countries are simultaneously SCO members and strategic rivals whose troops faced off at Galwan Valley in 2020. But the SCO gives India visibility into Chinese-led Eurasian architecture — and gives India a platform to ensure its voice is heard in discussions that would otherwise proceed without it.

What India Actually Gained — and What Remains Unresolved

The wins at Bishkek are real. English as an official SCO language is a structural change that will improve India’s institutional participation for years. The anti-terror language — specifically the “double standards are unacceptable” formulation — is the kind of declaratory commitment that India has sought for years and can now point to in international forums.

The Anti-Narcotics Centre regulations directly address a cross-border threat that has long been a security priority. The AI cooperation MoU and the disaster relief cooperation agreement expand India’s bilateral footprint within the bloc. The Civilizational Dialogue Forum, if it materialises, gives India a platform to project its soft power credentials in a region where China has historically dominated cultural diplomacy.

What remains unresolved is the bigger question: can India use the SCO to achieve strategic connectivity to Central Asia?

India’s land access to Central Asia — its most immediate economic opportunity in the SCO region — remains blocked by Pakistan’s refusal to allow trade transit. The Chabahar-INSTC route via Iran is a partial workaround, but it is more expensive and slower than a land corridor through Pakistan would be. Until that changes, India’s engagement with Central Asia will remain below its potential, regardless of how many SCO declarations it signs.

India faces a “dilemma of engagement” — how to participate meaningfully in a body designed by and for China and Russia, without legitimising positions that directly contradict India’s own interests. Bishkek did not resolve that dilemma. But it demonstrated that engaged participation, specific demands, and consistent pressure can extract real outcomes from multilateral forums — even deeply imperfect ones.

In 2027, the SCO summit will be in Islamabad. Pakistan will chair the organisation that India joined largely to keep an eye on the region — and on Pakistan.

That is what multilateral diplomacy looks like when it works badly enough to continue and well enough to be worth continuing. For India, after Bishkek, continuing is clearly the right call.