Critical minerals are considered to be the ‘new oil’, with the potential to drive the high-technology industrial revolution. However, the concentration of critical mineral supply chains along the downstream, middle, and upstream segments in specific states, such as China, has created security challenges for other countries; this is true for the Quad members.
Consequently, countries are developing policies and strategies to create a resilient supply chain. The European Union (EU) and countries such as Canada, India, Australia, and South Korea have acknowledged the importance of critical minerals and have released either a strategy or a list of critical minerals.
Currently, the global critical mineral supply chain is concentrated among a few key players along the upstream segment, including China, Australia, and the United States (US), and regions like Latin America and Central Asia.
China controls the midstream and downstream segments.
Much of the competition is concentrated in the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, the Quad members’ push to secure the critical mineral supply chain is driven by economic growth targets and the pursuit of development and regional influence.
China’s Dominance and Weaponization of Critical Minerals:
China currently dominates the supply chain for critical minerals, including rare-earth elements (REEs) such as neodymium and dysprosium, capturing 60 percent of global REE production and almost 90 percent of worldwide processing and refining capacity
China’s domination of the critical minerals supply chain presents risks for adversaries.
In 2010, Beijing began weaponising the critical minerals supply chain by halting the export of REEs to Japan.
In 2023, Beijing began using trade weaponisation as a foreign policy tool, restricting the global export of critical minerals such as germanium and gallium.
Recognising the risk associated with the high dependence on China for strategic minerals, a number of countries began de-risking from China after the pandemic. However, the extent of de-risking differed across countries, depending on their requirements and relations with Beijing.
As the great-power rivalry intensifies, states are becoming more anxious about their dependence on China, particularly countries from groups like the Quad and AUKUS—i.e., India, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US—which have adversarial relations with Beijing.
The dependence on China is expected to increase if proper steps are not taken at the appropriate speed and scale. Existing initiatives are uneconomical and unsustainable.
Current projections indicate that the demand for lithium and REEs will experience a sharp increase between 2030 and 2050.This demand is expected to be fulfilled by China for the next decade.
The current supply of lithium is estimated to be able to meet only 50 percent of the demand by 2035. Similarly, the demand of REEs is estimated to increase by three to seven times by 2040 per current levels, with China continuing to dominate 55 percent in mining and 78 percent in refining, respectively.
This projection highlights severe challenges for Quad members in the long term, especially as geopolitical competition with China escalates in all domains.
The Quad and Critical Minerals:
The Quad members have their respective strengths in critical minerals:
Australia is a resource-rich state with critical minerals reserves; the US has the technological capability for mining; Japan has the capital and extensive experience in extracting and processing; and India has rich reserves of unexploited minerals and a growing consumer market. These capabilities, if combined, can produce positive results for the countries themselves as well as for the Indo-Pacific region.
Australia: A Resource Reserve State
Australia aims to position itself as the source of raw minerals for the world.
In 2023, Australia released its Critical Minerals Strategy 2023-2030, which highlights its political, economic, and strategic priorities to attract more sustainable financial investments into the critical minerals sectors.
Australia aims to become a vital player in the upstream and downstream segments of the supply chain, including in mining and processing, leveraging its second position only to China in “exploration investment, reserves, and capital expenditure”.
To fulfil this objective, Australia has established relations with 26 countries globally, including seven—the US, EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and India—who are also considered supply chain partners.
India: Manufacturing Hub:
Critical minerals are essential for India’s national security and development. However, this emphasis became noticeable in 2019.
India did not participate in global discussions regarding the dependence on China for critical minerals, following Beijing retaliating against Japan in 2010.
New Delhi’s quest to secure its critical mineral supply chain began after the COVID-19 pandemic and has since accelerated. This was acknowledged by Prahlad Joshi, Former Indian Minister of Coal and Mines, who emphasised that “this is the first time our country has identified the comprehensive list of critical minerals taking into account the needs of sectors like defence, agriculture, energy, pharmaceutical, telecom etc.”
This was the result of disruptions in the raw material supply chain and its increased dependence on other countries, including China, for minerals such as lithium and lithium-ion imports.
However, the India-China border conflict was one of the crucial factors in reaffirming India’s strategic concerns regarding China, including its dependence for critical minerals.
Recently, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, while addressing a strategic community gathering, emphasised India’s critical mineral vulnerability without naming China, saying, “While scramble for resources for economic reasons has had a long history, their weaponisation by some nations for strategic reasons is a comparatively new phenomenon. These tendencies are not conducive for the global good”
In 2023, the India released its first list, which comprised 30 critical minerals.
To fulfil the new vision, India began focusing on unexploited minerals domestically, based on two pillars: making the mining process for critical minerals easy and business-friendly and fostering international cooperation with resource-rich countries.
To facilitate the first pillar, in 2023, India introduced the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Amendment (MMDR) bill to liberalise the mining sector and passed the bill through parliament.
For instance, the government delisted six minerals from the atomic list, facilitating mining by private players and allowing the government to auction.
Subsequently, the government announced the royalty rates for 24 critical minerals, as mentioned in Part D of the first schedule of the MMDR Act.
India’s Import Dependence on Third Countries for Critical Minerals
India has now adopted a whole-system approach to securing critical minerals supply chains, focusing on coordinating with stakeholders from industry, academia, think tanks, and public and private sectors to bring together and leverage the capacities of different ministries and private companies to promote critical mineral mining, extraction, and processing.
This vision was first partially stated in National Mineral Policy (NMP) 2019, which stressed a more effective, meaningful, and implementable policy that brings transparency, better regulation and enforcement, balanced social and economic growth, and sustainable mining practices.
India has also joined global initiatives on critical minerals, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the Mineral Security Partnership, to further the vision in line with the NMP 2019, which states that “particular attention will be given to the prospecting and exploration of minerals in which the country has a poor resource-cum-reserve base despite having the geological potential for large resources.”
The progress achieved till date is evident in the increased exploration projects approved in India since 2019, However, responses following three tranches of auctions among private players has been lacklustre.
For international collaborations on critical minerals, the Indian government created a public-sector enterprise called Khanjij Bidesh Private Ltd. (KABIL) in 2019, which aims to identify and acquire overseas mineral resources such as lithium, cobalt, and other minerals.
So far, KABIL has finalised agreements with Australia and Argentina and is finalising a deal with Chile. Additionally, India is reported to be in talks with Sri Lanka for acquiring graphite mines in the island state.
United States: Technology Leader
Critical minerals form an essential part of the US Grand Strategy, which aims to maintain its supremacy in the digital era, where it faces strict competition from China.
Mineral resources can also help the US secure its future through green energy transition and advanced defence manufacturing, which will scale according to the increasing demand for critical minerals.
Therefore, unlike other countries that look at the critical mineral supply chain issue from the perspective of economic opportunities, the US seeks to eliminate existing strategic impediments that may threaten its position as the global technological leader, which necessitates its control over the supply chain.
Accordingly, the US strategy is based on four pillars: “Diversifying supplies of critical minerals and materials; Developing alternatives to critical minerals and materials; Improving materials and manufacturing efficiency; and Investing in circular-economy approaches.”
In 2022, the United States Geographical Survey (USGS) released a list of 50 minerals categorised as critical. The Department of Energy also released their critical mineral lists in 2023.
Currently, the US is entirely dependent on third countries (including China) for 12 critical minerals and 50 percent reliant for another 29 critical minerals.
With targets such as reducing greenhouse gases by 2030, achieving net zero by 2050, and carbon-pollution-free electricity by 2035, the US is under increasing pressure to fast-track all its initiatives to meet domestic needs and manufacturing objectives.
To manage its domestic priorities and international commitments and maintain its position as the technology leader, Washington has introduced initiatives such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and other methods such as tariffs, aimed at attracting domestic investment in critical minerals supply chains across all segments and simultaneously limiting Chinese access to the US market.
Among the Quad member states, the US is the only country that has adopted a strong stance regarding critical minerals. The tariffs implemented under US President Joe Biden on critical mineral imports is an example of the extent to which the administration is willing to push against Chinese control over the supply chain.
The US has introduced new, increased tariffs, from 0-25 percent on some critical minerals and 25 percent on graphite and permanent magnets.
The tariffs target the whole supply chain of critical minerals, from mining to processing upstream, midstream, and downstream. Tariffs have also been introduced for EVs, battery parts, lithium-ion EVs, and non-EV batteries.
These steps are part of larger efforts that began in the Biden administration’s second year through the IRA, which restricted EV imports from a “foreign entity of concern”, mainly aimed at stopping the inflow of China-made EVs and providing incentives to promote domestic EV production.
Japan: Capital Provider and Facilitator:
As a resource-scarce country and export-dependent economy, Japan does not hold any major strategic reserves of minerals and depends on third countries, including China, for its critical mineral consumption; for instance, 60 percent of its rare-earth imports come from China.
The consequences of critical mineral supply chain vulnerability were first felt in Japan, when China stopped the export of rare earth elements to the country in 2010.
Since then, Japan has made a consistent effort to de-risk its critical mineral supply chain by focusing on five main pillars.
In 2020, Japan released its International Resource Strategy to secure a stable supply of mineral resources; the strategy focused on stockpiling strategic minerals, including REEs, at 30 days for some metals, 60 days for sensitive metals, and 180 days for highly geopolitically risky metals.
Japan’s dependence of other countries:
The Quad and Critical Minerals: Potential and Opportunities
Since 2021, the Quad has taken steps towards fostering strong cooperation on critical minerals. The private sector-led Quad Investors Network (QUIN) was launched during the second Quad Leaders’ Summit in 2022 and has since worked towards identifying areas of cooperation on the critical mineral supply chain.
Currently, a few Quad members have exclusive critical mineral agreements with each other or are negotiating separate agreements with other members .
In 2023, the US signed an agreement with Japan on critical minerals. In the same year, the US and Australia established a task force focused on “identified areas in which the U.S. and Australian governments can take joint action to increase investment in critical minerals mining and processing projects.”
India has a critical mineral agreement with only Australia and none with the other Quad members.
The Quad has the political will and strategic vision to invest in developing a resilient and secure critical mineral supply chain. Currently, however, the Quad needs an overarching framework on critical minerals.
Quad can bring together Indo-Pacific multilateral initiatives operating in the domain, including the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and other minilaterals, most of which are being led by the US.
As the demand for green technologies increases, more countries are exploring options to invest in renewable energy sources, which are highly dependent on critical minerals.
For instance, India lacks the technological expertise and skills to benefit from its critical mineral reserves.
Australia has rich sources of critical minerals, including lithium, uranium, and heavy REEs like dysprosium, which can satisfy the growing demand for critical minerals in the Indo-Pacific region.
For its part, India has rich resources of light REEs, such as neodymium and praseodymium, as well as other minerals like iron ore and manganese.
The Quad’s rationale for collaboration should be two fold: first, to create a resilient supply chain to protect its interests and offer alternatives to the region, and second, to ensure that the supply chain is not concentrated in one country.
The latter is necessary as the domination of one player enables market manipulation or economic coercion, further dampening investor interests, affecting government policies, and requiring regular executive intervention.
The Quad must ensure that global markets are not manipulated and can handle supply chain vulnerabilities without external interventions. The grouping needs to align its critical mineral initiatives with the broader Indo-Pacific region to address these issues through minilateral and multilateral efforts such as the IPEF and MSP.
For example, the Quad can identify common minerals for all countries and work on a collaborative mechanism to secure the supply chains for those minerals. Its role should be to diversify the supply chain of critical minerals to provide financial stability to like-minded countries in the region.
Challenges:
Although the Quad members have taken steps to strengthen cooperation in critical minerals, challenges remain. Attempts by Quad members like Australia and the US to restrict domestic Chinese funding in mining have backfired, requiring many projects to be revised.
At the same time, other projects like BHP Group’s Nickel business have become economically unviable. The flood of Chinese minerals into the market has made businesses unviable.
The following paragraphs outline the factors that have contributed to the Quad members’ weakening position vis-a-vis China:
1) Lack of economic realism:
Quad members’ attempts to emerge as alternatives to China have not succeeded due to ill-informed expectations. For example, despite Australia’s efforts to diversify its consumers, China remains the largest market for Australian and Australia-produced critical minerals, including rare-earths, amounting to US$100 billion.
For example, nickel prices crashed from US$45,000 in March 2022 to US$15,900 in 2023, forcing Western companies like BHP Australia to cease operations.
This was a consequence of Indonesia ramping up production of nickel, with 95 percent of the ferronickel that was produced being exported to China.
2) Lack of understanding of critical mineral supply chain and industry demand:
There is a lack of expertise in next-generation technology, production costs, and transitional material development in the downstream segment of the supply chain, such as in advanced battery materials research and development. Therefore, most of the strategic investments in critical minerals and rare-earths remain removed from reality, which further jeopardises mining investments.
Research on new battery technologies for replacing minerals like lithium and cobalt are not considered in investment decisions, which poses risks for capital investments in the sector. Meanwhile, China has invested billions in new technologies such as semi-solid-state, solid-state, and sodium-ion batteries and is working on sodium-ion cells that have the potential to lower production costs.
3) Policy uncertainty
This remains a challenge for all Quad partners. Unlike the centralised political system in China, Quad democracies have decentralised decision-making at the federal and provincial levels.
For instance, markets and companies cannot be forced to invest in projects that undermine geopolitical and economic rationales.
One example is ESG. The Quad’s prospects in critical mineral mining have not fructified due to its strict emphasis on ESG compliance and lack of intra-grouping agreement.
For instance, India’s approach towards ESG remains underdeveloped, and there is a lack of clarity and convergence with the Western approach towards ESG, even in specific sectors like critical minerals mining.
4) Risk of a zero-sum game
Establishing an alternative, resilient, and secure supply chain will have its disadvantages. Beijing views joint efforts such as these to be targeted towards diminishing Chinese hegemony and is reciprocating with critical minerals restrictions and curbs.
These actions risk starting a zero-sum game involving the Quad members, paving the way for a further fragmentation of the supply chain.
Conclusion:
Emerging technologies like EVs, semiconductor chips, batteries, and green technologies will drive the next industrial revolution.
States that have control over the building blocks of these technologies, i.e., critical minerals and their supply chain, will control supply, set standards, and influence prices.
At present, China controls the entire supply chain of minerals, from extracting and processing to value addition.
In the case of third countries, the supply chain becomes intertwined with geopolitics and industrial policy, which poses a threat to states dependent on China for their mineral needs.
Therefore, it is essential for like-minded countries, particularly groups like the Quad, to mobilise resources, capital, and expertise to support an alternative supply chain that is robust, resilient, and trustworthy towards achieving mineral security.
Receive Daily Updates
Recent Posts
- Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) Coalition, a collective of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway governments, came up with a $1 billion fund.
- LEAF is supported by transnational corporations (TNCs) like Unilever plc, Amazon.com, Inc, Nestle, Airbnb, Inc as well as Emergent, a US-based non-profit.
- The world lost more than 10 million hectares of primary tropical forest cover last year, an area roughly the size of Switzerland.
- Ending tropical and subtropical forest loss by 2030 is a crucial part of meeting global climate, biodiversity and sustainable development goals. Protecting tropical forests offers one of the biggest opportunities for climate action in the coming decade.
- Tropical forests are massive carbon sinks and by investing in their protection, public and private players are likely to stock up on their carbon credits.
- The LEAF coalition initiative is a step towards concretising the aims and objectives of the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism.
- REDD+ was created by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It monetised the value of carbon locked up in the tropical forests of most developing countries, thereby propelling these countries to help mitigate climate change.
- It is a unique initiative as it seeks to help developing countries in battling the double-edged sword of development versus ecological commitment.
- The initiative comes at a crucial time. The tropics have lost close to 12.2 million hectares (mha) of tree cover last year according to global estimates released by Global Forest Watch.
- Of this, a loss of 4.2 mha occurred within humid tropical primary forests alone. It should come as no surprise that most of these lost forests were located in the developing countries of Latin America, Africa and South Asia.
- Brazil has fared dismally on the parameter of ‘annual primary forest loss’ among all countries. It has lost 1.7 mha of primary forests that are rich storehouse of carbon. India’s estimated loss in 2020 stands at 20.8 kilo hectares.
- Between 2002-2020, Brazil’s total area of humid primary forest reduced by 7.7 per cent while India’s reduced by 3.4 per cent.
- Although the loss in India is not as drastic as in Brazil, its position is nevertheless precarious. For India, this loss is equivalent to 951 metric tonnes worth carbon dioxide emissions released in the atmosphere.
- It is important to draw comparisons between Brazil and India as both countries have adopted a rather lackadaisical attitude towards deforestation-induced climate change. The Brazilian government hardly did anything to control the massive fires that gutted the Amazon rainforest in 2019.
- It is mostly around May that forest fires peak in India. However, this year India, witnessed massive forest fires in early March in states like Odisha, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Mizoram among others.
- The European Union’s Copernicus Atmospheric Monitoring Service claimed that 0.2 metric tonnes of carbon was emitted in the Uttarakhand forest fires.
- Implementation of the LEAF Coalition plan will help pump in fresh rigour among developing countries like India, that are reluctant to recognise the contributions of their forest dwelling populations in mitigating climate change.
- With the deadline for proposal submission fast approaching, India needs to act swiftly on a revised strategy.
- Although India has pledged to carry out its REDD+ commitments, it is impossible to do so without seeking knowledge from its forest dwelling population.
- providing Dominion Status to India, i.e., equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations;
- all Provinces (ruled by the British India government) and Indian States (ruled by Indian princes) should constitute one Indian Union by the British Constitution;
- the Constitution of India should be framed by an elected Constituent Assembly of Indian people but if any province (or Indian State) which was not prepared to accept the Constitution was to be free to retain its constitutional position which had existed at that time.
- Such provinces were to be free to enter separate constitutional arrangements.
- there should a Union of India consisting of British India and the States, which would have jurisdiction over subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Communication;
- all residuary powers would belong to the Provinces and the States;
- the Union would have Executive and Legislature consisting of the representatives from the Provinces and the States but for decision relating to a major communal issue in the legislature a majority of representatives of two major communities would be present, and voting along with the majority of all members present and voting would be required;
- the provinces would be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures;
- and each group would be free to determine the Provincial Subjects which would be taken up by the Group organisation.
- India’s telecom market has seen monopoly as well as hyper-competition.
- Twenty-five years ago, the government alone could provide services.
- Ten years later, there were nearly a dozen competing operators.
- Most service areas now have four players.
- The erstwhile monopolies, BSNL and MTNL, are now bit players and often ignored.
- India is ranked second globally—after China—in the number of people connected to the internet. However, it is also first in the number of people unconnected.
- Over 50% of Indians are not connected to the internet, despite giant strides in network reach and capacity.
- India’s per capita or device data usage is low. It has an impressive 4G mobile network. However, its fixed network—wireline or optical fibre—is sparse and often poor.
- 5G deployment has yet to start and will be expensive.
Context:-
At the recently concluded Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021, Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance (LEAF) Coalition, a collective of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway governments, came up with a $1 billion fund plan that shall be offered to countries committed to arrest the decline of their tropical forests by 2030.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]What is LEAF Coalition?
Why LEAF Coalition?
Brazil & India
According to the UN-REDD programme, after the energy sector, deforestation accounts for massive carbon emissions — close to 11 per cent — in the atmosphere. Rapid urbanisation and commercialisation of forest produce are the main causes behind rampant deforestation across tropical forests.
Tribes, Forests and Government
Disregarding climate change as a valid excuse for the fires, Indian government officials were quick to lay the blame for deforestation on activities of forest dwellers and even labelled them “mischievous elements” and “unwanted elements”.
Policy makers around the world have emphasised the role of indigenous tribes and local communities in checking deforestation. These communities depend on forests for their survival as well as livelihood. Hence, they understand the need to protect forests. However, by posing legitimate environmental concerns as obstacles to real development, governments of developing countries swiftly avoid protection of forests and rights of forest dwellers.
For instance, the Government of India has not been forthcoming in recognising the socio-economic, civil, political or even cultural rights of forest dwellers. According to data from the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs in December, 2020 over 55 per cent of this population has still not been granted either individual or community ownership of their lands.
To make matters worse, the government has undertaken systematic and sustained measures to render the landmark Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 ineffective in its implementation. The Act had sought to legitimise claims of forest dwellers on occupied forest land.
Various government decisions have seriously undermined the position of indigenous people within India. These include proposing amendments to the obsolete Indian Forest Act, 1927 that give forest officials the power to take away forest dwellers’ rights and to even use firearms with impunity.
There is also the Supreme Court’s order of February, 2019 directing state governments to evict illegal encroachers of forest land or millions of forest dwellers inhabiting forests since generations as a measure to conserve wildlife. Finally, there is the lack of data on novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) deaths among the forest dwelling population;
Tardy administration, insufficient supervision, apathetic attitude and a lack of political intent defeat the cause of forest dwelling populations in India, thereby directly affecting efforts at arresting deforestation.
Way Forward
Tuntiak Katan, a global indigenous leader from Ecuador and general coordinator of the Global Alliance of Territorial Communities, aptly indicated the next steps at the Climate Summit:
“The first step is recognition of land rights. The second step is the recognition of the contributions of local communities and indigenous communities, meaning the contributions of indigenous peoples.We also need recognition of traditional knowledge practices in order to fight climate change”
Perhaps India can begin by taking the first step.
INTRODUCTION:-
The Constitution of India was adopted on 26 November 1949, which means it was finalised by the Constituent Assembly on that day. But it became operative two months after its adoption, i.e., on 26 January 1950, which is also known as the date of its “commencement”.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]However, some provisions of it, i.e., those relating to citizenship, elections, provisional Parliament, temporary and transitional provisions had become operative on 26 November 1949 itself. The reason for its commencement after two months of its adoption was to signify the January 26 as the original date of achievement of Independence.
It was this day, i.e. 26th January, in 1930 which the Indian National Congress (INC) had first celebrated as the Independence Day of India. It is important to note that the Constitution of India is product of a longdrawn process and deliberations.
EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1858-1935
The Constitution of India embodies provisions providing basic democratic rights of human beings including the persons who are not Indian citizens. It also embodies provisions for the availability of institutions for legislation, execution and jurisdiction for the fulfilment these rights.
It presents a vision for social transformation and deepening of democracy in India. The process of evolution of democratic institutions and rights had started much before the Constituent Assembly really made the Constitution of India.
It, however, must be underlined that the features of democratic institutions and values which were introduced during the colonial period were meant to serve the colonial interests in contrast to the purpose of the provisions of the Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly of India.
Although the Indian Constitution was result of the deliberations (from December 9, 1947 to November 26, 1949) of the Constituent Assembly, some of its features had evolved over three quarters of a century through various Acts, i.e., from 1858 to 1935.
The Government of India Act, 1935, and Other Acts
With the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown, the British Parliament got involved in managing affairs of India. For achieving this purpose, from 1858 till 1935, the colonial government introduced certain features of constitution or rules of governance through different Acts. The Government of India Act, 1935 was the most important among these Acts.
First of these other Acts was Government of India Act, 1858. It provided for a combination of centralised and decetralised power structure to govern India. The centralised structure was introduced in the areas which were under the direct control of the Crown. These areas were known as British India provinces or provinces. The decentralized structure was introduced in the areas which were not under the direct control of the Crown. These areas were ruled by the Indian princes, and were known as princely states or states.
Under this system, the princes had freedom to govern in all internal matters of their princely states, but they were subject to the British control. In the centralized structure of power which was introduced in the provinces, all powers to govern India vested in the Secretary of State for India (and through him in the Crown). He acted on behalf of the Crown.
He was assisted by a fifteen-member council of ministers.There did not exist separation of executive, legislative and judicial functions of government; these all were concentrated in the hands of the Secretary of State for India. In British India, the Secretary of State of India was assisted by the Viceroy, who was assisted by an executive council.
At the district level, the viceroy was assisted by a small number of British administrators. The provincial government did not have financial autonomy. In 1870 viceroy Lord Mayo ensured that all parts of provincial administration received due share of revenue to meet their needs.
The scope of political institutions in the provinces was expanded a little further following the introduction of Council of India Act, 1909. This Act introduced for the first time a “representative element” in British India, which included elected non-official members.This Act also introduced separate representation to Muslim community.
The Government of India Act 1919 devolved some authority to the provincial governments, retaining the control of the central government (unitary government) on them.It relaxed the control of the central government in a limited way. It divided the subjects for jurisdiction of administration and sources of revenue between centre and provinces.
Under this arrangement, the provincial government was given control on resources of revenue such as land, irrigation and judicial stamps. The provincial subjects were divided into “transferred’ and “reserved” categories.
The “transferred” subjects were governed by the governor, and “reserved” subjects were governed by the legislature. The governor (executive head) was not accountable to the legislature.
The Government of India Act, 1935 was different from the earlier Government of India Acts. Unlike the earlier Acts, the Government of India Act, 1935 also provided for provincial government enjoying provincial autonomy. It provided “safeguards” for minorities.
Such “safeguards” included provisions for separate representations to Muslims, Sikhs, the Europeans, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians. This Act also provided for three lists of divisions of power between the federation (central government) and provinces: federal (central), concurrent and provincial.
The Act also provided for establishment of a federal court to adjudicate disputes between federation and provinces. The executive head of the provincial government was Governor, who enjoyed special power. Under the special power the Governor could veto the decisions of the provincial legislature.
He acted on behalf of the Crown, and was not a subordinate of the Governor-General (the changed designation of Viceroy). He enjoyed discretionary powers to exercise his “individual judgments” in certain matters. In such matters, he did not need to work under the advice of ministers: he was to act under the control of the Governor-General, and indeed the Secretary of the State.
He was also not accountable to the legislature but he was required to act on the advice of ministers, who were accountable to the legislature.
Government of India Act, 1935 also had provisions for setting up a central government consisting of representatives from the provinces(areas ruled by the British India government) and the states (the areas covered under princely states).Such government was supposed to be known as federal government because of composition with members both from provinces and the states.
However, the federal government could not be formed because there was no unanimity among the princes to join the federation; consent of all princes was essential for the formation of federation. Thus, only the provincial governments could be formed as per this Act.
And election to the provincial legislature as per the Government of India Act, 1935 was held in 1937. Following the election of 1937, provincial governments headed by the Indian National Congresswere formed in eight provinces. The Indian National Congress government resigned in 1937. Nevertheless, according to M. Govinda Rao and Nirvikar Singh (2005), the Government of India Act, 1935 provided a basis to the Constituent Assembly to make the Constitution.
The Nehru Report(1928): First Indian Initiative to Draft Constitution
As you have read above, attempts to introduce elements of constitution in British India through different Act since 1858 were made by the British rulers. Indians had no role in it.
The first attempt by Indians themselves to prepare a Constitution of India was made in the Nehru Report(1928).Earlier, effort by Indians was made in the name of the swaraj (self-rule) by leaders of Indian national movement during the non-cooperation movement in 1921-22.
The Nehru Report was known as such because it was named after the chairman of its drafting committee, Motilal Nehru. The decision to constitute the drafting committee was taken in the conference of the established All India parties. The principal among these parties included Indian National Congress, Swaraj Party and Muslim League. The Justice Party of Madras and Unionist Party of Punjab did not participate in this meeting.
The Nehru Report demanded universal suffrage for adults and responsible government both in the centre and in the provinces. It, however, supported the Dominion Status, not complete independence for India.
It meant that Indians would have freedom to legislate on certain limited matters under the control of the British India government. For this, the Nehru Report prepared list of central and provincial subjects, and fundamental rights. It also raised demands for universal suffrage for men and women adults.
Indeed, it was in 1934, a few years after the preparation of the Nehru report, that the Indian National Congress officially demanded a constitution of Indian people, without the interference of outsiders.
FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
The Cripps Mission
Initially, the colonial authorities resisted the demand for creation of a Constitution of India. But with the change in the circumstances – the outbreak of the World War II and formation of the new Coalition (Labour-led) government in Britain, the British government was forced to acknowledge the urgency to solve the problem related to Constitution of Indians.
In 1942, the British government sent its cabinet member – Sir Stafford Cripps with the draft declaration on proposals (regarding formation of constitution for Indians) to be implemented at the end of the WW II provided both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress had agreed to accept them.
The draft proposals of the Cripps Mission recommended the following:
Both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League did not accept the proposals of the Cripps Mission. The Muslim League demanded that India should be divided on the communal lines and some provinces should form an independent state of Pakistan; and, there should be two Constituent Assemblies, one for Pakistan and another for India.
The Cabinet Mission
The British Indian government made several attempts to bridge the differences between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. But it was unsuccessful.
The British government sent another delegation of the Cabinet members, known as the Cabinet Delegation, which came to be known as the Cabinet Mission Plan. It consisted of three cabinet members – Lord Pathic Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A.V. Alexander.
The Cabinet Delegation also failed to bring the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League to an agreement. It, however, made its own proposal which was announced simultaneously on 16 May, 1946 in England as well as in India.
The Cabinet delegation made the following recommendations:
Election to the Constituent Assembly
Meanwhile, according to the proposals of the Cabinet Mission, the election to the Constituent Assembly was held in which members of both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League were returned. The members of the Constituent Assembly were elected by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies.
However, differences between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League arose on interpretation of “Group Clauses” of the Cabinet Mission.
The British government intervened at this stage and explained to the leaders in London that the contention of the Muslim League was correct. And on December 6, 1946, the British Government published a statement, which for the first time acknowledged the possibility of two Constituent Assemblies and two States.
As a result, when the Constituent Assembly first met on December 9, 1946, it was boycotted by the Muslim League, and it functioned without the participation of the Muslim League.
NATURE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY’S REPRESENTATION
It is often argued that the Constituent Assembly of India did not represent the masses of India because its representatives were not elected through the universal adult franchise. Rather they were indirectly elected by the restricted adult franchise confined to the elite sections of society – the educated and tax payers.
According to Granville Austin the reasons for the restricted franchise and indirect election to the Constituent Assembly members were spelled by the Cabinet Mission Plan. These were to avoid the cumbersome and slow progress in the process of Constitution making.
The Cabinet Mission provided for the indirect election to the Constituent Assembly by the elected members of the provincial legislature. The Indian National Congress agreed to this proposal of the Cabinet Mission forsaking the claim of adult franchise to hold election to the Constituent Assembly.
Despite having been elected through the restricted adult franchise, the Constituent Assembly represented different shades of opinions and religious communities of India. Austin observed that though there was a majority of the Indian National Congress in the Constituent Assembly, it had an “unwritten and unquestioned belief” that the Indian National Congress should represent social and ideological diversity.
There was also its “deliberate policy” that the representatives of various minority communities and viewpoints should be represented in the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly consisted of members with different ideological orientations, and three religious communities -Sikhs, Muslims and General (Hindus and all other communities like the Anglo-Indians, Parsis, etc).
In words of K. Santaram “There was hardly any shade of opinion not represented in the Assembly”. Majority of the Constituent Assembly members belonged to the Indian National Congress. It also included more than a dozen non-Indian National Congress members.
Some of these were A.K. Ayyer, H.N. Kunjru, N.G. Ayyanger, S.P. Mukherjee and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. S.P. Mookerji represented the Hindu Mahasabha.
The Constituent Assembly included representatives from the Princely States as well. It needs to be underscored that Dr. Ambedkar was initially elected to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal as member of the Scheduled Caste Federation. But he lost this seat due to the partition of Bengal and was re-elected by the Bombay Indian National Congress (as a non-Indian National Congress candidate) at the request of the Indian National Congress High Command.
The Constituent Assembly sought to address concerns of every person irrespective of their social and cultural orientations. Before incorporating a provision in the constitution, it held elaborate deliberations. Thus, the members of the Constituent Assembly could overcome the limitations of having been elected by the restricted franchise.
The Constituent Assembly sought to accommodate universal values of democracy. The Constituent Assembly adopted several provisions from different constitutions of world and adapted them to the needs of India. In fact, Austin argues that while incorporating different provisions in the Constitution including those which were borrowed from other countries the Constituent Assembly adopted “two wholly Indian concepts” of resolving differences among its members, i.e., consensus and accommodation.
Most members of the Constituent Assembly participated in its proceedings. But these were twenty individuals who played the most influential role in the Assembly.
Some of them were Rajendra Prasad, Maulan Azad, Vallabhbhai Patel, Jawaharlal Nehru, Govind Ballabh Pant, P. Sitaramayya, A.K. Ayyar, N.G. Ayyangar, K.M. Munshi, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Satyanarayan Sinha. Though the Constituent Assembly was the sole forum where deliberations took place, yet the deliberations took place in coordination of three bodies – the Constituent Assembly, the Indian National Congress Party, and the interim government.
Some members of the Constituent Assembly were also members of other bodies at the same time. Austin said that “an oligarchy” of four – Nehru, Patel, Prasad and Azad had enjoyed unquestioned honour and prestige in the Assembly. They dominated the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly.Some of these were simultaneously in the government, Indian National Congress Party and the Constituent Assembly.
Prasad was President of Indian National Congress before becoming the President of the Constituent Assembly. Patel and Nehru were Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively at the same time. They were part of the inner circles of the committees of the Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution Drafting Committee meticulously incorporated in the draft constitution the decisions of the Constituent Assembly. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the Drafting Committee played the leading role in drafting of the Constitution.
Acknowledging the pivotal role of Dr. Ambedkar, T.T. Krishnamachari, a member of the Drafting Committee, said in one of his speeches: “The House is perhaps aware that out of the seven members nominated by you, one had resigned from the house and was replaced. One had died and was not replaced. One was away in America and his place was not filled up, and another person was engaged in State Affairs, and there was a void to that extent. One or two people were far away from Delhi and perhaps reasons of health did not permit them to attend. So it happened ultimately that the burden of drafting this constitution fell upon Dr. Ambedkar and I have no doubt that we are grateful to him for having achieved this task in a manner which is undoubtedly commendable.”
Dr. Ambedkar on his part “gave much of credit” to S.N. Mukerjee – B.N. Rau’s and Ambedkar’s assistant, the Drafting Officer of the Assembly, “for the careful wording of the Constitution”.
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN THE MAKING OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1946-1949
The inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly was held on 9 December 1946. It was supposed to be attended by all 296 members but only 207 members could attend it because the Muslim League members absented from it.
As stated earlier, they had boycotted the Constituent Assembly. In this meeting, Acharya J.B. Kripalani requested Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha to be the temporary chairman of the House. The members passed a resolution on 10 December 1946 for election of a permanent chairman, and on 11 December 1946, Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected as the permanent Chairman of the Constituent Assembly.
The Constituent Assembly divided its work among different committees for its smooth functioning. Some of the important committees were:
(a) Union Power Committee. It was chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru and had nine members;
(b) Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities. It had 54 members and Sardar Ballabh bhai Patel was its chairman;
(c) Steering Committee and its 3 members which included Dr. K.M. Munshi (chairman), Gopalaswami Iyangar and Bhagwan Das;
(d) Provincial Constitution Committee. It had 25 members with Sardar Patel as its chairman;
(e) Committee on Union Constitution. It had 15 members with Jawahalal Nehru as its chairman.
After discussing the reports of these committees, the Constituent Assembly appointed a Drafting Committee on 29 August 1947 under the chairmanship of Dr. B.R. Ambedakar. The draft was prepared by Sir B.N. Rau, Advisor to the Constituent Assembly.
A 7-member Committee was constituted to examine the draft. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who was Law Minister as well as chairman of the Drafting Committee piloted the draft in the Assembly. Dr. Ambedkar presented “Draft Constitution of India”. The “Draft Constitution” was published in February, 1948.
It was discussed by the Constituent Assembly clause by in its several sessions and was completed by October 17, 1949. This discussion was known as the second reading. The Constituent Assembly again met on 14 November 1949 to discuss the draft further or to give it a third reading.
It was finalised on 26 November 1949 after receiving the signature of the President of the Constituent Assembly. But it was January 26, 1950 which became the date of commencement of the Constitution.
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUION
The Indian Constitution has some salient features. These features give Indian Constitution a distinct identity. It is based on the features of different constitutions of the world. In the words of Dr. Ambedkar, The Indian constitution was prepared “after ransacking all the known Constitutions of the world”.
The chapter on Fundamental Rights is based on the American Constitution; the Parliamentary System has been adopted from the British Constitution; the Directive Principles of State Policy have been adopted from the constitution of Ireland; the Emergency provisions are based on the Constitution of Weimar (Germany) and Government of India Act, 1935.
The features which have been borrowed from other Constitutions have been modified in the light of the needs of our country. It is the longest written constitution. At the time of its formation, the constitution of India had 395 Articles and 8 Schedules. It ensures both Justiciable and Non-Justiciable Rights: Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the State Policy.The constituent makers preferred universal adult franchise over the separate electorates.
Universal Adult Suffrage and Abolition of the Separate Electorate
After debating its draft list of Fundamental rights the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights did not recommend inclusion of all of them in the section III of the Constitution as the Fundamental Rights. Instead, it suggested that these should be incorporated in other places in the Constitution.
One such example is that of the Universal suffrage, and Secrete and periodic elections. The sub Committee agreed unanimously in favour of the Universal suffrage but suggested that it should not be part of the Fundamental Rights.
Accordingly, it was placed in the Article 326 of the Part XV on election.The word “universal”, however, is missing from the Article 326. But the fact that every adult citizen of the country is entitled to vote makes it practically a universal adult franchise.
In fact, before Indians really got the right to universal adult franchise, the prominent leaders of the Indian National movement strove for the abolition of the separate electorate in favour of the joint electorate.
The British had sought to continue separate electorate in India since the Morley-Minto reforms, 1909 till the Communal Award of 1932 in the Constitution.
The Communal Award aimed to accord separate electorate for Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians. It also provided for seats for the Depressed Classes which were to be filled in elections from special constituencies. In such constituencies only the depressed classes could vote.
In addition, the depressed classes were also entitled to vote in general constituencies. Gandhi opposed the recommendation of the notion of separate electorate for the depressed classes. In opposition to the proposal for separate electorate, he set on fast unto death in September 1932. Gandhi’s fast evoked opposition from Ambedkar. However, both Gandhi and Ambedkar reached compromise in Poona Pact.
According to the Poona Pact, seats were reserved for the depressed classes in the general constituencies. This resulted in the abolition of the separate electorate.The abolition of separate electorate got reflected in the reservation of seats in the legislative bodies Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The making of Indian Constitution largely consisted of two phases – 1858 to 1935 and 1946 to 1949. With the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown, the British government introduced different elements of governance through different Acts.
These also included the elements of representation of Indians in the institutions of governance. The motive of the British to introduce them was to serve their colonial interests rather than to provide democratic rights to them. The provision for communal representation introduced through the Morley-Minto Reforms in 1909 and through the Communal Award in 1932 was opposed by the leaders of the Indian National Movement.
Gandhi’s fast resulted in the Poona Pact abolishing the separate electorate and in giving the reservation to the depressed classes in the provincial legislature. After the Indian National Congress emphasized the need for making of a Constitution of India by their own Constitient Assembly, the changed political situation following the Second World War and change of government in Britain, the British reluctantly realized the urgency for establishment of the Constituent Assembly of India for Indians.
The Constituent Assembly which was set up following the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission Plan was elected through the restricted adult franchise by the provincial assemblies. Despite having elected by the privileged sections of the society, the Constituent Assembly represented different shades of opinions and ideologies.
It also represented different social groups of India. The Constituent Assembly discussed all issues thoroughly before reaching decision on them. The decision and suggestions of different sub-Committees of the Constituent Assembly were finally incorporated in the Constitution of India.
The Constitution of India is a document which provides a vision for social change. The Constitution is an embodiment of principles of liberal democracy and secularism, with some elements of social democracy. It ensures protection of cultural, linguistic and religious rights of individuals and communities.
Context
Sunil Mittal, the chairman of Bharti Airtel, said recently that it would be “tragic” if India’s telecom-access market was to be reduced to only two competing operators. He was probably referring to the possible exit of the financially-stressed Vodafone Idea and the increasing irrelevance of government-owned operators, BSNL and MTNL. This would essentially leave the market to Reliance Jio and Airtel. A looming duopoly, or the exit of a global telecommunications major, are both worrying. They deserve a careful and creative response.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Thus Far
The reduced competition is worrying. Competition has delivered relatively low prices, advanced technologies, and an acceptable quality of services. These gains are now at risk. There is a long way to go in expanding access as well as network capacity.
The Indian Telecom Irony
Vodafone Tragedy
Filling the gaps in infrastructure and access will require large investments and competition. The exit of Vodafone Idea will hurt both objectives. The company faces an existential crisis since it was hit hardest by the Supreme Court judgment on the AGR issue in 2019, with an estimated liability of Rs 58,000 crore.
The closure of Vodafone Idea is an arguably greater concern than the fading role of BSNL and MTNL. The government companies are yet to deploy 4G and have become progressively less competitive. Vodafone Idea, on the other hand, still accounts for about a quarter of subscriptions and revenues and can boast of a quality network.
It has been adjudged the fastest, for three consecutive quarters, by Ookla, a web-service that monitors internet metrics. India can ill-afford to waste such network capacity. The company’s liabilities will deter any potential buyer.
Vodafone+MTNL+BSNL ?
A possible way out could be to combine the resources of the MTNL and BSNL and Vodafone Idea through a strategic partnership. Creative government action can save Vodafone Idea as well as improve the competitiveness of BSNL and MTNL.
It could help secure government dues, investment, and jobs. It is worth recalling here that, about 30 years ago, the Australian government’s conditions for the entry of its first private operator, Optus, required the latter to take over the loss-making government satellite company, Aussat. Similar out-of-the-box thinking may well be key to escape the looming collateral damage.
It is not trivial to expand competition in India’s telecom market. Especially since there are no major regulatory barriers to entry anymore. Any new private player will be driven largely by commercial considerations. Global experience suggests that well-entrenched incumbents have massive advantages. New players are daunted by the large investments—and much patience!—needed to set up networks, lure existing customers and sign new ones.
However, regulators and policymakers have other options to expand choice for telecom consumers. Their counterparts in mature regulatory regimes—e.g., in the European Union—have helped develop extensive markets for resale. Recognising the limited influence of smaller players, regulators mandate that the incumbent offer wholesale prices to resellers who then expand choice for end-users.
This has been virtually impossible in India. There is a near absence of noteworthy virtual network operators (VNOs) and other resellers. A key barrier to resale is India’s licence fee regime which requires licence-holders to share a proportion of their revenues with the government. Thus, resale could hurt exchequer revenues unless resellers are subject to identical levies. Understandably, the levies—and consequently additional reporting and compliance—is a disincentive for smaller players. The disincentive flows from levies based on revenues which comes with considerable costs of compliance. It would almost vanish if the levies were replaced by say, a flat fee computed objectively.
The ball is in the court of the regulator and the government. They have options. But will they take decisive action to exercise them? It will be ‘tragic’ if they can’t.