Gandhi and Maulana Azad – Both were tried for Sedition.
Tilak too was tried for sedition
First introduced in 1870, the primary objective of the sedition law was to deal with “increasing Wahabi activities” in India during those times as they posed a challenge to the British colonial government.
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Read the newspapers carefully and you will find that second only to murder and rape, the offence which has seized the small minds of our ministers and the police is sedition. It is as if the country is infested with sedition and the people are in a mind to revolt. The offence is initially tried by magistrates, and they have to grapple with the elastic definition of sedition.
Two English barristers of high eminence agreed that the definition of sedition “is frighteningly broad and the crime has been used in the past to suppress political views” (Media Law by Geoffrey Roberts and Andrew Nicol, Q.C.). What a burden to impose on the poor magistrate, the struggling High Court judge, and the very mighty, self-conscious Supreme Court judges who delight in delivering long judgments embellished with high sounding and irrelevant quotes!
From the condemnation of Socrates to the persecution of modern writers and journalists, our world had seen too many examples of state control of unofficial ideas. A central purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights had been to set close limits to any such assumed power. We in this country continued to owe a debt to the jury which in 1670 refused to convict the Quakers, William Penn and William Mead, for preaching ideas which offended against state orthodoxy.” (Redmond Bate vs Director of Public Prosecutions before Lord Justice Sedley and Justice Collins on July 23, 1999; The Times, July 28, 1999.)
The criminal offence of sedition was born as sin in India — the sin of racism. It was gasping for breath in its home, Britain, and was consigned to the grave of obsolete laws for good reason, as a news report in India read: “A colonial era law intended to suppress the voice of freedom continues in force in India, but Britain itself abolished sedition as a criminal offence in 2009 as it was considered to be a relic of an era where freedom of expression was not considered a right as it is now.”
Sedition was abolished through the Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, under the Gordon Brown government. Three offences were abolished: the offences of sedition and seditious libel; the offence of defamatory libel; and the offence of obscene libel.
Claire Ward, the then Justice Minister, said at the time of the Act’s enactment: “Sedition and seditious and defamatory libel are arcane offences — from a bygone era when freedom of expression wasn’t seen as the right it is today. Freedom of speech is now seen as the touchstone of democracy, and the ability of individuals to criticise the state is crucial to maintaining freedom.” Britain’s Law Commission had recommended the abolition of the law of sedition in 1977.
According to Ward, “The existence of these obsolete offences in this country had been used by other countries as justification for the retention of similar laws which have been actively used to suppress political dissent and restrict press freedom.”
Claire Ward did not know the Indian mentality. Britain’s repeal of sedition in 2009 notwithstanding, India hugely enjoys the presence of sedition in its obsolete laws.
K.M. Munshi’s amendment
Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Annie Besant, the Ali Brothers, Maulana Azad, Gandhi and very many others suffered imprisonment under this archaic, barbaric law. It is to the credit of K.M. Munshi that he single-handedly secured its deletion from the Constitution.
It is the lasting disgrace of the Supreme Court that it brought it back by the back door 14 years later, ignoring totally the Constituent Assembly Debates and the enormous labour preceding it. K.M. Munshi was a member of the Drafting Committee.
The Draft Constitution was published in February 1948 and reprinted in October 1948 with changes by the Drafting Committee. The Constituent Assembly debated the offending provision on December 10, 1948. K.M. Munshi moved his amendment:
“Sir, the importance of this amendment is that it seeks to delete the word ‘sedition’ and use a much better phraseology, viz., ‘which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the state’. The object is to remove the word ‘sedition’ which is of doubtful and varying import and to introduce words which are now considered to be the gist of an offence against the state.
“I was pointing out that the word ‘sedition’ has been a word of varying import and has created considerable doubt in the minds of not only the members of this House but of courts of law all over the world. Its definition has been very simple and given so far back as 1868.
It says ‘sedition embraces all those practices whether by word or deed or writing which are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the state and lead ignorant persons to subvert the government’. But in practice it has had a curious fortune. A hundred and fifty years ago in England, holding a meeting or conducting a procession was considered sedition.
Even holding an opinion which will bring ill-will towards government was considered sedition once. Our notorious Section 124-A of the Penal Code was sometimes construed so widely that I remember in a case a criticism of a District Magistrate was urged to be covered by Section 124-A.
But the public opinion has changed considerably since, and now that we have a democratic government a line must be drawn between criticism of government, which should be welcome, and incitement, which would undermine the security or order on which civilised life is based, or which is calculated to overthrow the state.
Therefore, the word ‘sedition’ has been omitted. As a matter of fact, the essence of democracy is criticism of government. The party system necessarily involves an advocacy of the replacement of one government by another. This amendment therefore seeks to use words which properly answer to the implication of the word ‘sedition’ as understood by the present generation in a democracy and therefore there is no substantial change; the equivocal word ‘sedition’ only is sought to be deleted from the article. Otherwise, an erroneous impression would be created that we want to perpetuate 124-A of the IPC [Indian Penal Code] or its meaning, which was considered good law in earlier days.”
This is exactly what the Supreme Court did 14 years later.
The adoption of K.M. Munshi’s amendment unanimously by the Constituent Assembly on December 1, 1948, in effect erased Section124-A of the Penal Code on sedition. The Assembly was not deliberating in a blank. All talk of sedition implied reference to Section124-A of the Penal Code which defined sedition.
Let us trace the course of the litigation. First comes Romesh Thapar vs. State of Madras. A decision was made by a bench of five Supreme Court judges on May 16, 1950. The judgment was delivered by one of the court’s finest judges, Justice Patanjali Sastri, erudite, clear-headed and liberal.
He said, “It is also worthy of note that the word ‘sedition’ which occurred in Article 13(2) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the Article was finally passed as Article 19(2). In this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar vs The King-Emperor held that ‘The acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that this is their intention or tendency’ but the Privy Council overruled that [602] decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak’s case to the effect that ‘the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small.” (King-Emperor vs Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao.)
“Deletion of the word “sedition” from the draft Article 13(2), therefore, shows that criticism of government exciting disaffection. or bad feelings towards it, is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the state. It is also significant that the corresponding Irish formula of “undermining the public order or the authority of the state” [Article 49 (6) (i) of the Constitution of Eire, 1937], did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution.
Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of free speech and expression of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion, no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible…
“We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the state or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of Article 19 although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order.”
Romesh Thapar had challenged in the Supreme Court the Madras government’s order banning the entry into the State of Cross Roads, a lively, pro-communist weekly published from Bombay, where Romesh Thapar was then resident. The Supreme Court held that the order was unconstitutional.
Justice Fazal Ali dissented.
Order upholding “sedition”
On January 30, 1962, came the disastrous Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar which upheld sedition as defined in the colonial Section 124-A of the IPC. It was also a bench of five, and Justice S.R. Das was a member of both benches, in Thapar’s case and this. The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice of India Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha. The offending speech that was under litigation had been delivered by a communist (Kedar Nath Singh) in intemperate language, but it was not seditious.
There is a clear distinction in law between extolling revolution, as the British politician Harold Laski did, and inciting it.
Chief Justice Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha ignored completely the Constituent Assembly Debates, as did the concurring judges in the case. Unlike K.M. Munshi, they had not been to jail or suffered under British rule. What is astonishing is that Justice S.R. Das was a member of both benches. Like the Vicar of Bray, he merrily went along with both sides.
Chief Justice Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha cited English cases. One such case said as far back as in 1867 that sedition was “nearly allied to that of treason”.
The tendency of sedition is to incite the people to “insurrection and rebellion” or “public disturbances or to lead to civil war”. Justice Patanjali Sastri’s words in Romesh Thapar were quoted, “It is also worthy of note that the word ‘sedition’ which occurred in Article 13(2) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the Article was finally passed as Article 19(3). But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected with Madison who was ‘the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution’ that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits.” This is pure guess work to reach a desired end.
How wrong-headed can you possibly get? Justice Sastri did not use the italicised words. The entire tenor and tone of their two judgments are fundamentally different, with Justice S.R. Das playing on both sides.
Chief Justice Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha spoke of “subverting” the government by bringing that government “contempt or hatred”. Ergo, love thy government as thyself. Do Donald Trump, Boris Johnson or Emmanuel Macron demand the people’s love on pain of imprisonment? Does lack of “affection” imply subversion? Chief Justice Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha and his four colleagues denounced “vilification and condemnation of the government in words which incite violence or have the tendency to create public disorder”. This is not sedition. If it were, cartoonists and columnists would be out of business.
“It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order. It is also well settled that in interpreting an enactment the court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation,” the judgement said. The antecedent history of the sedition law belongs to the British colonial era.
History of sedition in India
It is doubtful if any of those fine judges was aware of the history of sedition in India. It was carefully traced by Walter Russell Donogh, an English barrister who practised in the Calcutta High Court, in “A Treatise on the Laws of Sedition and Cognate Offences of British India, Penal and Preventive with an Excerpt of the Acts in Force Relating to the Press, the Stage and Public Meetings” (Calcutta, Thacker, Spark & Co. 1991).
A maxim on the frontispiece of the work reveals his outlook: “Salus Reipublicae Suprema Lex.” The safety of the republic is the supreme law. This did not apply to colonial rule.
In 1837, the idea of sedition existed in gremio as one of the clauses of Thomas Babington Macaulay’s draft Criminal Procedure Code. That Bill was shelved for more than 20 years, and when at last it saw the light of day in 1860, the sedition clause for some unaccountable reason had been omitted. It was not until 1870, 10 years later, that the want of such a provision in a complete code of crimes came to be recognised. The result was that a Special Act (XXVII of 1870) was passed by way of amendment to the Penal Code, introducing Macaulay’s original clause practically unaltered, 33 years after its conception. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, when introducing this Bill in August 1870 to amend the Penal Code observed that the provision in question was one which, by some unaccountable mistake, had been omitted from the Penal Code as ultimately passed. It stood as Section 113 in the draft Code published in 1837, and Sir Barnes Peacock was quite unable to account for its “omission” when the Code was enacted. It punished “attempts to excite feelings of disaffection to the government”.
“No one in his senses would contend that because a given law is good and suitable in England, it is therefore good and suitable in India. If a rule of law exists in England we may fairly consider whether it is suitable to India, but the answer to the question must always depend on the conditions which prevail in India. How much licence of speech can be safely allowed is a question of time and place. If I smoke a cigar on the maidan it pleases me, and hurts no one else. If I smoke a cigar in the powder magazine of the Fort, I endanger the lives of many, and do an act well deserving punishment. Language may be tolerated in England which it is unsafe to tolerate in India because in India it is apt to be transformed into action instead of passing off as harmless gas. ln legislating for India we must have regard to Indian conditions, and we must rely mainly on the advice of those who speak under the weight of responsibility and have the peace and good government of India under their charge.
“The difference between the social conditions prevailing in England and those of India appears to have been entirely overlooked by the most vigorous opponents of the Bill, for their arguments would seem to be based on the assumption of their complete similarity.”
This would account for the strenuous efforts made for the introduction of the English law, or what the colonial administration supposed to be the English law of sedition, in India.
On this point the observations of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, carry with them the weight of authority and experience. “Much of the outcry,” he said, “against the present Bill rests upon its supposed divergence from the law of England on seditious libel, and on the assertion that the law as settled in 1870 was sufficient and ought to be final.
Now I venture to assert these two propositions — first, that the law of England, built up by judicial rulings to meet the circumstances of a homogeneous people directly interested in and sharing in its own government, is not necessarily a norm to which the law of India ought strictly to conform; and second, that the conditions of the country have themselves so altered since 1870 that what was adequate then is not necessarily adequate now.
As to the first point — If the section is in strict accord with the English law, all criticism of it loses weight; if it is not, there is in the very great difference in the conditions of the two countries ample justification for any deviation from the English law necessary for effectively checking the offence of sedition in India. It is clear that a sedition law which is adequate for a people ruled by a government of its own nationality and faith may be inadequate, or in some respects unsuited, for a country under foreign rule and inhabited by many races, with diverse customs and conflicting creeds. It is impossible in India to accept the test of direct incitement to violence or intention to commit rebellion, and limit the interference of the government to such cases.”
“To anyone,” he continued, “who studies, as I do from week to week, the utterances of the press in India, nothing can be more clear than that, though we seldom have such bold sedition preached as led to the recent trials in Bombay, or as prevailed here in 1870, we are now face to face with a far more insidious and equally dangerous style of writing and speaking. And, this is an evil which is yearly growing, and with the spread of what is called education is becoming more far-reaching in its noxious effects. It is indeed, in my opinion, to our own system of education that we owe all the trouble.
I have long been convinced that it is thoroughly unsound. We are turning out by scores of thousands young men who are trained only in words, look mainly for government employment, and failing to get it become, as the Maharaja of Travancore described them, ‘a host of discontented, disobedient, and sometimes troublesome young men’. This is the class that writes for the Native Press, perorates on platforms, and generally vents its spleen upon the government which has not been able to find appointments for more than a fraction of its members. To honest, well-informed criticism no English government would ever object.
But every government has the right to object when its critics wander off from criticism to calumny. No government, such as ours in India can afford to allow the minds of an ignorant and credulous oriental population to be gradually poisoned and embittered by persistent calumny of the government and all its measures. If these sections lead to a more careful, well-considered and responsible journalism, they will confer a benefit not only on the state and the public, but on the journalistic profession itself.”
The Supreme Court’s ruling in 1962 gave birth to oddities. For example, in Nazir Khan in State of Delhi (2003) & SCC 458 at 488. Sedition was designed by a colonial regime to contain discontent. It yearned for acceptance and affection. It has no place in a democracy. But this is what the Supreme Court rules. Sedition was deliberately omitted from the Constitution. Section124 of the IPC became non esse. It was deliberately restored by the Supreme Court.
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- India’s telecom market has seen monopoly as well as hyper-competition.
- Twenty-five years ago, the government alone could provide services.
- Ten years later, there were nearly a dozen competing operators.
- Most service areas now have four players.
- The erstwhile monopolies, BSNL and MTNL, are now bit players and often ignored.
- India is ranked second globally—after China—in the number of people connected to the internet. However, it is also first in the number of people unconnected.
- Over 50% of Indians are not connected to the internet, despite giant strides in network reach and capacity.
- India’s per capita or device data usage is low. It has an impressive 4G mobile network. However, its fixed network—wireline or optical fibre—is sparse and often poor.
- 5G deployment has yet to start and will be expensive.
Context
Sunil Mittal, the chairman of Bharti Airtel, said recently that it would be “tragic” if India’s telecom-access market was to be reduced to only two competing operators. He was probably referring to the possible exit of the financially-stressed Vodafone Idea and the increasing irrelevance of government-owned operators, BSNL and MTNL. This would essentially leave the market to Reliance Jio and Airtel. A looming duopoly, or the exit of a global telecommunications major, are both worrying. They deserve a careful and creative response.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Thus Far
The reduced competition is worrying. Competition has delivered relatively low prices, advanced technologies, and an acceptable quality of services. These gains are now at risk. There is a long way to go in expanding access as well as network capacity.
The Indian Telecom Irony
Vodafone Tragedy
Filling the gaps in infrastructure and access will require large investments and competition. The exit of Vodafone Idea will hurt both objectives. The company faces an existential crisis since it was hit hardest by the Supreme Court judgment on the AGR issue in 2019, with an estimated liability of Rs 58,000 crore.
The closure of Vodafone Idea is an arguably greater concern than the fading role of BSNL and MTNL. The government companies are yet to deploy 4G and have become progressively less competitive. Vodafone Idea, on the other hand, still accounts for about a quarter of subscriptions and revenues and can boast of a quality network.
It has been adjudged the fastest, for three consecutive quarters, by Ookla, a web-service that monitors internet metrics. India can ill-afford to waste such network capacity. The company’s liabilities will deter any potential buyer.
Vodafone+MTNL+BSNL ?
A possible way out could be to combine the resources of the MTNL and BSNL and Vodafone Idea through a strategic partnership. Creative government action can save Vodafone Idea as well as improve the competitiveness of BSNL and MTNL.
It could help secure government dues, investment, and jobs. It is worth recalling here that, about 30 years ago, the Australian government’s conditions for the entry of its first private operator, Optus, required the latter to take over the loss-making government satellite company, Aussat. Similar out-of-the-box thinking may well be key to escape the looming collateral damage.
It is not trivial to expand competition in India’s telecom market. Especially since there are no major regulatory barriers to entry anymore. Any new private player will be driven largely by commercial considerations. Global experience suggests that well-entrenched incumbents have massive advantages. New players are daunted by the large investments—and much patience!—needed to set up networks, lure existing customers and sign new ones.
However, regulators and policymakers have other options to expand choice for telecom consumers. Their counterparts in mature regulatory regimes—e.g., in the European Union—have helped develop extensive markets for resale. Recognising the limited influence of smaller players, regulators mandate that the incumbent offer wholesale prices to resellers who then expand choice for end-users.
This has been virtually impossible in India. There is a near absence of noteworthy virtual network operators (VNOs) and other resellers. A key barrier to resale is India’s licence fee regime which requires licence-holders to share a proportion of their revenues with the government. Thus, resale could hurt exchequer revenues unless resellers are subject to identical levies. Understandably, the levies—and consequently additional reporting and compliance—is a disincentive for smaller players. The disincentive flows from levies based on revenues which comes with considerable costs of compliance. It would almost vanish if the levies were replaced by say, a flat fee computed objectively.
The ball is in the court of the regulator and the government. They have options. But will they take decisive action to exercise them? It will be ‘tragic’ if they can’t.
INTRODUCTION
Since most of the early scholars, researchers and historians were men, many aspects of society did not find a place in history books. For example, child-birth, menstruation, women’s work, transgenders, households etc. did not find much mention.
[wptelegram-join-channel link=”https://t.me/s/upsctree” text=”Join @upsctree on Telegram”]Rather than building a holistic picture of the past, some select aspects such as polity and the different roles of men became the central focus of history writing. Women were confined to one corner of the chapter where a paragraph or two was devoted to the ‘status and position of women’.
Even the details of these paragraphs were hardly different from each other. This made it look like as if history (and thereby society, polity, economy and all culture) belonged to men while women were only a small static unit to be mentioned separately. Of course, there were some exceptions, but these were however rare. This practice is being corrected now and the roles and presence of women are being read into all parts of historical questions.
SOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING GENDER HISTORY
Sources are the bases of history writing. From simple pre-historic tools to abstruse texts, everything can be utilized to understand life and roles of women in history. The presence as well as the absence of women from sources needs to be duly noticed, deliberated and argued upon and only then to be theorised upon.
Certain objects being directly related to the lives of women or depicting the ideas of the female principle are of central importance. These include but are not limited to female figurines, art objects, texts attributed to or authored or compiled by women, monuments created by or for women, various objects relating to their lifestyle, objects associated with women on account of their cultural roles and so on.
It has been rightly pointed out by Uma Chakravarti that much of the gender history written in early phase was a ‘partial view from above’. This referred to the utilization of select textual sources and focused only on relational identity of women. There were, however, a few exceptions.
GENDER HISTORIOGRAPHY
Amongst the many narratives propagated to denigrate Indian civilization and culture by the British colonial rulers, the condition of Indian women became a point of central reference. Various social evils that made the life of women miserable were pointed out and efforts were also made to introduce ‘reforms.’ Sati, child-marriages, imposed widowhood, polygamy, dowry, educational and economic inequality, purdah (ghoonghat) and many other practices prevailed during the colonial period that made the life of women difficult and pitiable.
Some practices affected women of higher social and economic households while others led to misery for poorer women. Many social reform movements were started in the 19th century to address these issues and contributions were made by Indian reformers as well as British officials and other Europeans.
Women in India came to be treated as a homogeneous category and over generalisation became the norm. While many communities in India practised widow remarriage and did not practise (much less forced) sati and while some practised divorces or separation, the image of the Indian woman who had been subjugated as woman, wife and widow became a dominant theme in history writing.
Secondly, a western vision was placed over the non-western societies and hence interpretations were far removed from the context. For example, notion of stridhan was equated with dowry and little regard was paid to the provisions regarding its use and ownership by women.
The huge social stigma that came along with the selling of jewellery of the household (one of the main components of stridhan) was paid no attention to. Similarly, penal provisions listed by ancient texts for misappropriation of women’s property were not even looked into.
During the Paleolithic age, hunting and gathering was norm. However much importance was given to Hunting than gathering in all literature of history. Studies, however, show that hunted prey formed only 35% of the diet while gathering fruits and other edible material supplied the major portion. Gathering of food resources was ordinarily done by women. Since gathering was an important activity, more than hunting for game, it could point to significant role playing by women.
The gendered understanding of Harappan civilization is being built upon and various archaeological remains have been studied in this respect. The female figurines, idols of pregnant women, the statue of the ‘dancing girl’, various pieces of jewellery and personal belongings that have been discovered at various sites and offer useful insights on the public and private lives of women and men.
The statue of a girl obtained from Mohanjodaro has been called a ‘dancing girl’ on grounds of familiarity with the institution of devadasis in the later times. Such backward looking explanations are problematic.
There is a wide variety of terracotta female figurines that have been found at different sites right from the pre-Harappan times. Women figures are found suckling a baby, holding utensils, kneading dough, nursing infants, carrying objects like drums, seated figures for board games, with steatopygia (fat deposition on the hips and elsewhere), with floral head-dresses and in many other forms.
Even figurines of pregnant women are quite common. However, most of these have been uncritically associated with fertility, religiosity and reproductive ideas, and have been passed off as representations of the Mother Goddesses. While some of them were votive objects, others are held to be toys or other utilities. The focus on female form has been so stereotypical that women have been seen as associated only with home, hearth, fertility, sexuality and divinity. So much so that sometimes even male figurines in assumed womanly roles were classified as female figurines.
POSITION OF WOMEN IN EARLY INDIA
The first literary tradition in the Indian subcontinent (and the oldest in the world) is that of the Vedic corpus. From the four Samhitas to the Upanishads, we find many interesting references to women in various roles. Some of these women have left their mark on the cultural heritage to this day and are remembered in various ritual and social contexts. Their names, stories, some highly revered hymns, and other interesting facets are mentioned in the Vedic corpus.
The Vedic literature has been classified as Early Vedic and Later Vedic. The Rigvedic society and polity seems to be teeming with life and agro-pastoral economy was enmeshed in close kinship ties. Women as well as men participated in society, economy and polity. Some of the most revered hymns including the gayatri mantra are ascribed to women.
Various natural phenomena are depicted as Goddesses and they are offered prayers. While quantitative analysis highlights the predominance of Indra, Agni, Varuna and other male gods, the power and stature of the goddesses is equally well established.
Women participated in all three Vedic socio-political assemblies viz. Sabha, Samiti and Vidhata. They had access to education and were even engaged in knowledge creation. They could choose to be brahmavadinis with or without matrimony.
Hence, there is no reason to believe that they were only confined to home and hearth. T. S. Rukmani attempts to understand if women had agency in early India. Her work has highlighted many interesting details. The author acknowledges the fact that though the patriarchal set up put women at a loss, there were instances where women found space to exercise their agency.
She points out that though the texts like the Kalpasutras (Srautasutras, Dharmasutras and Grhasutras) revolved around the ideology of Dharma and there was not much space to express alternative ideas, still these works also find some leeway to express ideas reflecting changed conditions.
For example, there is a statement in the Apastamba Dharmasutra that one should follow what women say in the funeral samskaras. Stephanie Jamison believes that in hospitality and exchange relations, women played an important role. She says that the approval of the wife was important in the successful completion of the soma sacrifice. In another study it has been shown that women enjoyed agency in deciding what was given in a sacrifice, bhiksha to a sanyasin. The men had no authority in telling her what to do in these circumstances.
Vedic society was the one which valued marriage immensely. In such contexts, Gender Perspectives if a woman chose not to marry, then it would point to her exercising choice in her decision to go against the grain and remain unmarried.
Mention may be made of Gargi. She was a composer of hymns and has been called a brahmavadini. This term applies to a woman who was a composer of hymns and chose to remain unmarried, devoting herself to the pursuit of learning.
Similarly, in the case of Maitreyi, she consciously opts to be educated in the Upanishadic lore and Yajnavalkya does not dissuade her from exercising her choice.
The statement in the Rigveda that learned daughters should marry learned bridegrooms indicates that women had a say in marriage. Though male offspring is desired, there is a mantra in the Rigveda, recitation of which ensures the birth of a learned daughter.
Altekar refers to the yajnas like seethayagna, rudrayajna etc. that were to be performed exclusively by women. Some of the women were known for their exceptional calibre, for example, from the Rigveda Samhita we find mention of women like Apala, Ghosha, Lopamudra, Gargi, Maitreyi, Shachi, Vishwavara Atri, Sulabha and others.
Women have not only been praised as independent individuals but also with reference to their contributions towards their natal or marital families.
The Later Vedic literature shows the progression towards a State society with a change in the organization of the society and polity. The chief comes to be referred to as bhupati instead of gopati. However, within the twelve important positions (ratnis) mentioned, the chief queen retains a special position under the title mahisi.
The importance of the chief queen continued as gleaned from several references to them in the Epics, Arthashastra and even in coins and epigraphs from early historical times.
The other Samhitas also refer to women sages such as Rishikas. The wife is referred to as sahadharmini. Brahmanas or the texts dealing with the performance of the yajna (Vedic ritual), requires a man to be accompanied by his wife to be able to carry out rituals.
For example, Aitareya Brahmana looks upon the wife as essential to spiritual wholesomeness of the husband. However, there is a mention of some problematic institutions as well.
Uma Chakravarti has pointed towards the condition of Vedic Dasis (female servant/slave) who are referred to in numerous instances. They were the objects of dana (donation/gift) and dakshina (fee).
It is generally believed that from the post Vedic period the condition of the women steadily deteriorated. However, Panini’s Ashtadhyayi and subsequent grammatical literature speak highly of women acharyas and Upadhyayas.
Thus, the memory and practice of a brahmavadini continued even after the Vedic period. The Ramayana, Mahabharata and even the Puranas keep the memory of brhamavadini alive.
Mention may be made of Anasuya, Kunti, Damyanti, Draupadi, Gandhari, Rukmini who continued to fire the imagination of the poets. Texts show that the daughter of Kuni-garga refused marriage because she did not find anyone worthy of her.
The Epics also mention women whose opinions were sought in major events. For example, after the thirteen years of exile, while debating upon the future course of action regarding the restoration of their share, the Pandavas along with Krshna asks Draupadi for her views. Similarly, when Krishna goes to the Kaurava’s court to plead the case of Pandavas, Gandhari is called upon to persuade her sons to listen to reason.
Since a woman taking sanyasa was an act of transgression, one can explore women’s agency through such instances. In the Ramayana, Sabari, who was the disciple of Sage Matanga, and whose hermitage was on the banks of river Pampa was one such sanyasin.
Such women find mention in Smriti literature and Arthashashtra. Kautilya’s prohibition against initiating women into Sanyasa can make sense only if women were being initiated into sanyasa. He advises the king to employ female parivrajakas as spies.
Megasthenes mentions women who accompanied their husbands to the forest, probably referring to the Vanaprastha stage. Another category of literature called Shastras that comprises of sutras (aphorisms) and the smriti texts (‘that which is remembered’) becomes important in the postVedic period.
These textual traditions cover many subjects relating to the four kinds of pursuits of life referred to as purusharthas (namely dharma, karma, kama and moksha). In all these texts we find very liberal values and freedom for both women and men.
The setting up of a household is seen as an ideal for men as well as women (though asceticism for learning is equally praised for both). For example, Apastambha Sutra opines that rituals carried out by an unmarried man do not please the devatas (divinities). Similarly, Manusmriti provides that ‘for three years shall a girl wait after the onset of her puberty; after that time, she may find for herself a husband of equal status. If a woman who has not been given in marriage finds a husband on her own, she does not incur any sin, and neither does the man she finds’
Thus, we see that women enjoyed choice in matters of matrimony. It is interesting to note that unmarried daughters were to be provided for by the father. In fact, daughter is stated to be the object of utmost affection. Should a girl lose her parents, her economic interests were well looked after. It was provided that from their shares, ‘the brothers shall give individually to the unmarried girls, one-quarter from the share of each. Those unwilling to give will become outcastes’
With regards to defining contemporary attitude towards women, Apastambha Sutra prescribed that ‘All must make a way for a woman when she is treading a path.’ Later Dharmashastra also makes similar statements.
Yagnavalkyasmriti mentions that ‘women are the embodiment of all divine virtues on earth.’ However, there are several provisions that look problematic.
On one hand, we have reverence assigned to the feminine (divine and worldly) and important roles being played by them, on the other hand we have questionable provisions and descriptions like right to chastise them through beating or discarding.
The post-Vedic phase from 6th century BCE onwards is also rich in literary traditions with ample depictions of women. Interestingly, we have an entire body of literature that is ascribed totally to women who became Buddhist nuns. These are referred to as Therigathas i.e. the Songs of the Elder Bhikkhunis (Buddhist Women who joined the Sangha).
The Arthashastra Gender Perspectives gives us information on women who were engaged in economic activities of various kinds. They formed a part of both the skilled and the unskilled workforce. They were into professional as well as non-professional employment.
Some of their vocations were related to their gender, while the others were not. There were female state employees as well as independent working women. Similarly, some of them were engaged in activities which though not dependent on their biological constitution are nonetheless categorized as women’s domain, e.g. domestic services etc. Some of them were actual state employees, while some others were in contractual relations with the State. For example, we have female bodyguards and spies in the State employment.
Jaiswal suggests that these women perhaps came from Bhila or Kirata tribe. Female spies were not only to gather information and relay it to proper source, but also to carry out assassinations. However, a closer look at the text shows that there were different classes of female spies engaged for different purposes. Amongst others ‘women skilled in arts were to be employed as spies living inside their houses’. Others were required to work as assassins. Some were to the play the roles of young and beautiful widows to tempt the lust of greedy enemy.
We also have various Buddhist and Jaina traditions giving us some glimpses of the ideas and institutions of the times. Apart from the orthodox (Vedic and Brahmanic) and heterodox normative tradition we have many popular texts like the Epics in Sanskrit and Jatakas in Pali.
Even Prakrit language has many interesting narratives and poetic texts. The Therigatha by the Buddhist nuns are an interesting literary source that provides us with a glimpse of various women who attained arhantship or similar other stages of Realisation.
The deliberation on the age and deterioration of the body by Ambapali, the non-importance of sensual or bodily pleasures by Nanda, Vimla and Shubha etc points towards the intellectual and spiritual engagements and attainments of women.
It is interesting to note that an absolutely contrary picture is presented by the Jatakas wherein more often than not, women are depicted as evil. It is important to note that women were given an evil aura mostly in their roles as wives or beloveds.
Both the texts and the archaeological remains have been studied by various scholars and opposing interpretations are not rare. For example, on one side Sita (from Ramayana) and Draupadi (from Mahabharata) have been seen as victims of the patriarchal order; on the other hand, they are also represented as selfwilled women.
Draupadi after the game of dice presents herself as a forceful and articulate woman. It’s her wit that saves her husbands from becoming slaves of the Kauravas. Her incensed outrage at the attack on her modesty, her bitter lamentations to Krishna, her furious tirade against Yudhishthira for his seeming inability to defend her honour and many more such instances show her to be an aggressive woman. This persona is juxtaposed to her representations as an ideal wife elsewhere. However, Draupadi is never idealised as a perfect wife who endures the most severe trials without complaint. This honour is reserved for Sita in the Ramayana. She is also presented as a victim like Draupadi and voices her concern at her fate openly. However, her aggression is directed inwards as indicated by her action against the self which culminate in her union with the mother Earth.
Are the limited number of hymns ascribed to the Vedic women a signifier of their general status? Are the goddesses merely representational with no connection to the ideas and behaviour towards women? Did only princesses choose their spouses? Are the warrior women an exception? Such searching questions need to be addressed with due diligence.
While women studies are a good development there is a need to expand the horizons to include other varieties of human existence. We have narratives of fluid sexuality in various texts. The one year of Arjuna’s life spent as Brihallana and rebirth of Amba as Shikhandi are some interesting instances. The artefacts found at the site of Sheri Khan Tarakai include visibly hermaphroditic figurines. There is a need to understand the notions of the feminine, masculine, neuter, and other forms of gender and sexual identities. These will have ramifications for understanding the ideas of conjugality, family, community, society and even polity and spirituality.
CONCLUSION
Human civilisations were built by men as well as women, however, history writing has a huge male-bias. Women were confined to questions of status and position that were largely evaluated in terms of their roles in the domestic sphere.
Their treatment as wives and widows became a central focus of most research alongside their place in ritual or religious context. This made them peripheral to mainstream history. This was questioned by various scholars from time to time and led to the development of gendered understanding of history. Focusing attention on women’s history helps to rectify the method which sees women as a monolithic homogeneous category. Writing gender history has helped in building an image of the past that is wholesome and nuanced.