Prelims Workshop: Polity

Batch 6 | Topics 76–104 | Supreme Court Landmark Judgments

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments

29 Topics
Quick Navigation Index
76 Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025) 77 Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (2025) 78 Suhas Chakma v. Union of India (2024) 79 Grounds of Arrest — Must be in Writing 80 POCSO — No Consensual Sex With Minors 81 SYL Canal — Punjab Denotification (2025) 82 UAPA Bail — Umar Khalid & Others 83 OBC Reservation in SC Staff — 2025 84 Client-Lawyer Confidentiality 85 Imran Pratapgarhi Case — Section 173(3) BNSS 86 498-A — Shivangi Bansal vs Sahib Bansal (2024) 87 Ad Hoc Judges — Article 224A Activated 88 Lokpal Jurisdiction over HC Judges (Stayed) 89 Dual Taxation on Broadcasting Services 90 Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) 91 Electoral Bond Scheme Struck Down (2024) 92 SC Sub-Classification — Davinder Singh (2024) 93 Maharashtra Political Crisis — SC Ruling 94 Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) 95 Mineral Royalties Case (2024) 96 Prison Reforms — Sukanya Shantha (2024) 97 Industrial Alcohol Regulation (2024) 98 Rohingya/Illegal Migrant Cases 99 EVM-VVPAT Verification (2024) 100 Puttaswamy Extensions — Digital Rights Cases 101 Social Media & Free Speech — Ranveer Allahbadia 102 Gayatri Balasamy (2025) — Arbitral Awards 103 Estate Officer, Haryana UDA (2025) 104 Historical SC Cases Quick Reference
TOPIC 76

Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025) — Anti-Defection Speaker Delay

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2025, the SC intervened in the Telangana anti-defection case after the Speaker delayed deciding disqualification petitions of 10 MLAs for over a year. SC ruled the Speaker must decide within 3 months or face contempt, reiterating Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) and the foundational Kihoto Hollohan (1992) framework — while the reform debate on transferring anti-defection decisions to ECI continues.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025, Padi Kaushik Reddy): Speaker must decide disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule within 3 months or face contempt of court
  • Speaker does NOT have constitutional immunity while acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal under the Tenth Schedule
  • Petitions cannot be allowed to "die a natural death" approaching the end of the House's tenure — SC explicitly prohibited this tactic
  • Based on Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — foundational precedent; reaffirmed by Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020)
  • Pattern: Speaker delays reported in Telangana, Bihar, Manipur, and Goa; SC consistently directed 3–6 month timelines
  • Reform debate: Experts suggest transferring anti-defection decisions from Speaker to ECI or an independent tribunal
Important Points
  • Tenth Schedule (52nd CAA, 1985): Anti-Defection Law — disqualification grounds: voluntary giving up membership; voting against party whip; independent merging with a party
  • Grounds NOT amounting to defection: Merger of at least 2/3 of original party strength with another party; election as Speaker/Deputy Speaker and becoming neutral
  • Kihoto Hollohan (1992): Speaker's decision on Tenth Schedule is a "tribunal" decision — subject to judicial review; but no interim relief until final order
  • Art. 102(2)/191(2): Disqualification under Tenth Schedule treated as constitutional disqualification for MPs/MLAs
  • Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016): Speaker facing a disqualification motion cannot adjudicate anti-defection petitions — later modified in Shinde vs Thackeray (2023)
  • Shinde vs Thackeray (2023): Modified Nabam Rebia; Speaker can hear anti-defection cases unless the disqualification motion has been admitted and listed
  • Art. 105(2)/194(2): Speeches in Parliament/legislature immune from court proceedings — but quasi-judicial Tenth Schedule decisions are not protected by this immunity
TOPIC 77

Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (2025) — Preventive Detention

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • SC quashed a preventive detention order in Kerala in 2025, powerfully distinguishing between "public order" (serious threat requiring preventive detention) and mere "law and order" (ordinary criminal breach solvable through prosecution).
  • The case reaffirmed that preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025, Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala): Set aside preventive detention order — preventive detention must NOT substitute criminal prosecution
  • Key distinction reaffirmed: "Public order" (grave threat to community) vs. "law and order" (individual crime solvable by normal criminal process) — only the former justifies preventive detention
  • Individual liberty cannot be curtailed lightly; burden is on the State to justify each element of detention
  • Art. 22(4): No detention beyond 3 months without approval of an Advisory Board consisting of persons qualified to be judges of a High Court
  • Jaseela Shaji v. UoI (2024): Failure or delay in furnishing detention documents to the detenu = denial of Art. 22(5) right — leads to automatic quashing
  • UAPA: Investigation period extendable up to 180 days; anticipatory bail not available; bail for illegal foreign nationals statutorily barred (Section 43D(7))
Important Points
  • Art. 22(1): Right to be informed of grounds of arrest; right to consult lawyer — applies to punitive detention
  • Art. 22(3): Arts. 22(1) and (2) do NOT apply to persons detained under preventive detention law — preventive detention is an exception to normal Art. 22 protections
  • Art. 22(4): Preventive detention beyond 3 months only with Advisory Board approval; Advisory Board = persons qualified as HC judges
  • Art. 22(5): Detenu must be informed of grounds of detention "as soon as may be"; given earliest opportunity to make representation
  • Art. 22(6): State can withhold facts "against public interest" — but must be specifically pleaded, not a blanket immunity
  • Art. 22(7): Parliament may by law prescribe circumstances under which detention beyond 3 months without Advisory Board is valid — e.g., NSA, COFEPOSA
  • National Security Act (NSA), 1980: Allows detention up to 12 months; MISA (repealed); Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) — all operate under Art. 22(3) framework
TOPIC 78

Suhas Chakma v. Union of India (2024) — Open Prisons

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2024, the SC observed in Suhas Chakma v. UoI that establishing open prisons is a key solution to chronic prison overcrowding (Indian prisons operate at ~130% capacity) and promotes rehabilitation.
  • The Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 now includes open prison provisions — but prisons remain a State subject requiring individual State adoption.
Key Facts
  • SC (2024, Suhas Chakma v. UoI): Observed that establishing open prisons is a key solution to prison overcrowding and rehabilitation
  • Prisons fall under Entry 4, State List — States have legislative and administrative jurisdiction
  • Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023: MHA's advisory framework includes open prison provisions
  • Indian prisons operate at ~130% of capacity; undertrial prisoners constitute ~75% of prison population
Important Points
  • Entry 4, State List: Prisons, reformatories, Borstal institutions — States' exclusive subject; Centre can only advise
  • Art. 21: Right to life includes right to live with dignity — prisoners retain this right even after conviction; prison conditions must meet minimum standards
  • Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978): Prisoners retain all Fundamental Rights except those necessarily lost due to incarceration — solitary confinement, bar fetters regulated
  • Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979): Right to speedy trial is FR under Art. 21; undertrial prisoners who have served more than maximum sentence must be released
  • Open Prisons: Low-security facilities where convicted prisoners live with limited supervision; allowed to work, earn, and maintain family contact — proven rehabilitation model
  • Section 479 BNSS, 2023: First-time offenders entitled to bail after serving 1/3rd of maximum sentence (bond) or 1/2 (mandatory bail) — directly reduces undertrial overcrowding
  • NALSA v. UoI (2013): Free legal aid to prisoners is mandatory; SC directed legal aid clinics in all jails — Model Prisons Act codifies this
TOPIC 79

Grounds of Arrest — Must be in Writing

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • The SC mandated that all arrested persons must be furnished the grounds of arrest in writing in a language they understand.
  • Non-compliance — providing verbal-only grounds or grounds in an unknown language — renders both the arrest and any subsequent remand illegal, and the person must be immediately released.
  • This directly operationalises Article 22(1).
Key Facts
  • SC ruling: Arrested persons must be provided grounds of arrest in WRITING in a language they understand — verbal communication alone is insufficient
  • Non-compliance consequence: Both the arrest AND any subsequent remand by the Magistrate are rendered illegal
  • Consequence of illegal arrest/remand: Person must be immediately set free
  • This applies across all categories of arrest — punitive (CrPC/BNSS), preventive detention, and special law arrests (UAPA, PMLA, NDPS)
Important Points
  • Art. 22(1): Every person who is arrested shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of arrest; shall not be denied right to consult/be defended by legal practitioner of choice
  • Art. 22(2): Arrested person must be produced before nearest Magistrate within 24 hours; no detention beyond 24 hours without Magistrate's order
  • Written grounds of arrest: SC held this is a constitutional requirement flowing from Art. 22(1) — "informed" must mean meaningful communication, not mere formality
  • Section 47 BNSS (formerly Section 50 CrPC): Police officer must communicate substance of the warrant/grounds of arrest to the person
  • PMLA Arrest: SC in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022) upheld PMLA arrest powers but held grounds must be communicated; subsequent SC ruling mandated written grounds
  • Pankaj Bansal v. UoI (2023): SC held grounds of arrest under PMLA must be provided in writing to the arrested person — landmark ruling extended in subsequent cases
  • Right to Bail: Art. 21 and BNSS Sections 478–479 — illegal arrest and remand directly affect bail computation and undertrial rights
TOPIC 80

POCSO — No Consensual Sex With Minors & Key Provisions

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2024–25, the SC struck down a Calcutta HC order that had overturned a POCSO conviction, reaffirming that POCSO does not recognise "consensual" sexual activity with minors (under 18).
  • The 2023 Law Commission explicitly opposed reducing the age of consent from 18 to 16 — keeping POCSO's protective scope intact despite push from some quarters.
Key Facts
  • SC struck down Calcutta HC order which had overturned a POCSO conviction on grounds of "consensual" relationship
  • POCSO does not recognise consensual sex with minors under 18 — consent of minor is legally irrelevant
  • POCSO Act, 2012: Gender-neutral law criminalising sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography involving children
  • 2019 Amendment: Enhanced punishments including death penalty for penetrative sexual assault on children below 12 years
  • 2023 Law Commission Report 283: Opposed reducing age of consent from 18 to 16 — rejected call to "Romeo-Juliet" exceptions
  • SC withheld sentencing under Art. 142 pending expert panel report on sentencing guidelines for POCSO cases
Important Points
  • Art. 15(3): State can make special provisions for protection of children — POCSO is the primary legislative implementation
  • Art. 21: Right to life with dignity — POCSO protects children's bodily integrity and dignity as an FR
  • Art. 39(f) (DPSP): Children to be protected from exploitation — POCSO directly implements this directive
  • POCSO, 2012 key features: Special Court for trial; Special Public Prosecutor; victim not to be called to testify repeatedly; camera trials; child-friendly procedures
  • POCSO Section 29: Presumption of guilt — once prosecution establishes sexual assault, court presumes accused is guilty; burden shifts to accused to prove innocence
  • POCSO Section 30: Presumption of culpable mental state — accused must prove they did not know the victim was a child
  • UNCRC, 1989: India ratified; Article 34 protects children from sexual exploitation — POCSO aligns domestic law with this treaty obligation
TOPIC 81

SYL Canal — Punjab Denotification (2025)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2025, the SC strongly criticised Punjab's denotification of Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal land — describing it as "high-handedness" — and reminded Punjab of its 2017 status quo order.
  • The Punjab Assembly had passed a resolution declaring it would not spare "even a single drop" of water for Haryana, deepening one of India's most intractable inter-State water disputes.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025): Termed Punjab's denotification of SYL canal land as "high-handedness"; reminded Punjab of 2017 status quo order
  • Punjab Assembly passed a resolution declaring it will not spare "even a single drop" of water for Haryana — SC took note
  • 1981 Agreement: Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan agreed to share Ravi-Beas waters; SYL canal was to carry Haryana's share
  • SC earlier (2002): Had directed completion of SYL canal; Punjab continued non-compliance
  • SC cannot adjudicate original inter-State water disputes — jurisdiction lies with Parliament-constituted Tribunals under Art. 262
Important Points
  • Art. 262: Parliament may by law provide for adjudication of any dispute relating to use, distribution, or control of waters of inter-State rivers — bars SC/HC jurisdiction if Parliament so provides
  • Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Implements Art. 262; provides for Tribunals; once reference made to Tribunal, SC original jurisdiction excluded
  • Art. 131: SC has original jurisdiction in disputes between States — but this is excluded for water disputes once Parliament bars it under Art. 262
  • Entry 17, State List: Water, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage — State subject; but inter-State dimension brings it under Centre
  • Entry 56, Union List: Regulation and development of inter-State rivers — Parliament can legislate; this is basis for central water laws
  • Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal (1986): Got a 1-year extension in 2025 — Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan; award pending after 39 years
  • Cauvery case: Supreme Court can supervise implementation of Tribunal awards — but cannot adjudicate original dispute; Cauvery Water Management Board created
TOPIC 82

UAPA Bail — Umar Khalid & Others

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • Multiple UAPA bail cases — including Umar Khalid's — remained in courts through 2024–25, spotlighting the Act's stringent bail provisions.
  • Delhi HC denied bail despite over 5 years of custody, holding that Section 43D(5) UAPA's "reasonable grounds" standard must be met before bail is granted — a significantly higher threshold than ordinary criminal law.
Key Facts
  • Delhi HC denied bail to Umar Khalid despite 5+ years of custody — UAPA Section 43D(5) bars bail if "reasonable grounds" exist that accusations are prima facie true
  • UAPA: 180-day extended investigation period (vs. 60/90 days under BNSS)
  • No anticipatory bail available under UAPA; bail for illegal foreign nationals statutorily barred (Section 43D(7))
  • Courts have held that the UAPA bail standard is a higher threshold — court must be "satisfied" that accusations are not prima facie true before granting bail
Important Points
  • Art. 21: Right to personal liberty — UAPA's stringent bail provisions have been challenged as disproportionate; SC has upheld them as valid in matters of national security
  • Art. 22(3): Ordinary Art. 22(1) and (2) protections do not apply to persons detained under preventive detention law; UAPA involves punitive detention but with prosecution
  • UAPA, 1967: Originally Unlawful Activities Prevention Act; substantially amended in 2004, 2008, 2012, 2019; 2019 amendment allowed designation of individuals (not just organisations) as terrorists
  • Section 43D(5) UAPA: Court shall not grant bail if, on perusal of case diary and records, it is of opinion there are reasonable grounds for believing accusations are prima facie true
  • NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019): SC held UAPA bail standard requires broad probabilistic satisfaction; even if defence shows some merit, bail should be denied if prima facie case exists
  • Art. 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech — UAPA also used against political dissent; SC in multiple cases held speech promoting secession/violence can be penalised
  • PMLA bail: Section 45 — similar twin conditions (no reasonable grounds that accused is guilty; will not commit offence on bail); upheld in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022)
TOPIC 83

OBC Reservation in SC Staff — 2025

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2025, the Supreme Court amended its own internal recruitment rules (Rule 4A) under Article 146(2) to include OBC reservation in SC staff hiring — 33 years after the Indira Sawhney judgment (1992) mandated 27% OBC reservation in government services.
  • The SC also extended reservations to PwDs, ex-servicemen, and dependents of freedom fighters.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025): Amended Rule 4A under Art. 146(2) to include OBC reservation in SC staff recruitment — 33 years after Indira Sawhney (1992)
  • SC's internal recruitment rules now include: SC/ST reservation, OBC reservation (27%), PwD reservation (4%), ex-servicemen, and dependents of freedom fighters
  • Art. 146(2): SC can make rules regulating appointments and conditions of service of officers and servants — internal power used to implement OBC reservation
Important Points
  • Art. 146(2): Appointments of Supreme Court officers and servants shall be made by the Chief Justice or such other Judge or officer as directed; subject to any law of Parliament
  • Art. 16(4): State can make provision for reservation of appointments for any backward class of citizens not adequately represented in services
  • Indira Sawhney v. UoI (1992): 9-judge bench — upheld 27% OBC reservation; imposed 50% cap on total reservations (SC+ST+OBC); introduced concept of "creamy layer" for OBCs
  • Mandal Commission (1979–80): Recommended 27% OBC reservation; implemented by VP Singh government in 1990; upheld in Indira Sawhney (1992)
  • Art. 341 and 342: President notifies SC and ST lists for each State/UT — Parliament can only include/exclude; sub-classification now permitted (Davinder Singh, 2024)
  • SC as Employer: SC administers its own administration under Art. 146; only now aligned with Art. 16(4) OBC mandate after 33-year gap
  • Art. 335: Claims of SCs/STs shall be taken into consideration in appointments to Union and State services — similar obligation now extended to OBCs through Art. 16(4)
TOPIC 84

Client-Lawyer Confidentiality

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • The SC reaffirmed in 2024–25 that investigating agencies cannot summon lawyers to compel disclosure of professional communications made in confidence with clients.
  • Compelling a lawyer to prejudice a client infringes Article 20(3) (right against self-incrimination), and the privilege is now codified in Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
Key Facts
  • SC ruling: Investigating agencies (CBI, ED, police) cannot summon lawyers to disclose confidential client communications
  • Compelling a lawyer to disclose privileged communications infringes Art. 20(3) — the client's right against self-incrimination
  • Protected under Section 132 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 126 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872)
  • Protection extends to: All communications made in professional capacity; documents received from client in professional capacity; advice given to client
Important Points
  • Art. 20(3): No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself — lawyer-client privilege is an extension of this protection for the client
  • Art. 21: Right to life includes right to a fair trial — access to confidential legal advice is essential for fair trial
  • Section 132 BSA, 2023 (formerly IEA Section 126): Barrister/advocate/attorney cannot be compelled to disclose communications made in professional confidence — except with client's express consent
  • Exceptions to privilege: Communication made to enable crime or fraud; client provides express consent; communication relevant to a proceeding under a specific exception
  • In re: Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022): SC addressed PMLA's broad summons power — cannot override lawyer-client privilege for confidential legal advice
  • Bar Council of India Rules: Advocate's professional obligations; Rule 7 — advocate shall not disclose client's communications
  • R.K. Anand v. Delhi HC (2009): SC on professional misconduct; lawyers' duties to clients distinguished from duties to courts — privilege is attorney-client, not attorney-court
TOPIC 85

Imran Pratapgarhi Case — Section 173(3) BNSS

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • SC quashed the FIR registered against Rajya Sabha MP Imran Pratapgarhi for posting a poem online, holding that Section 173(3) BNSS mandates a preliminary 14-day inquiry BEFORE registering an FIR for offences punishable with 3–7 years — and that this preliminary inquiry requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.
  • The case is the landmark interpretation of this new BNSS provision.
Key Facts
  • SC quashed FIR against Rajya Sabha MP Imran Pratapgarhi for posting a poem online
  • Key ruling: Section 173(3) BNSS — for offences punishable with 3 to 7 years imprisonment, police must conduct a 14-day preliminary inquiry BEFORE registering FIR
  • SC held the preliminary inquiry is a mandatory obligation on police, NOT a discretionary option
  • FIR registered without completing 14-day preliminary inquiry = procedurally invalid and quashable
Important Points
  • Section 173(1) BNSS: Zero FIR — FIR can be filed at any police station regardless of jurisdiction
  • Section 173(3) BNSS: For offences with 3–7 years punishment, 14-day preliminary inquiry mandatory before FIR; for 7+ years or heinous offences, FIR must be registered immediately
  • Art. 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech — FIR against MP for poetry tested against free speech; SC found no incitement, quashed FIR
  • Art. 19(2): Permissible restrictions — speech must actually incite violence or threaten sovereignty; mere offence or hurt feelings insufficient
  • Shreya Singhal v. UoI (2015): Struck down Section 66A IT Act — vague provisions against "offensive" speech unconstitutional; Pratapgarhi case applies similar reasoning
  • Lalita Kumari v. Govt of UP (2014): SC held FIR must be registered immediately on cognisable offence; Section 173(3) BNSS creates a formal exception for 3–7 year offences
  • Section 173(3) BNSS purpose: Prevent misuse of FIR for minor speech-related offences; preliminary inquiry gives police discretion to assess whether case is made out
TOPIC 86

498-A — Shivangi Bansal vs Sahib Bansal (2024) — Cooling-Off Period

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • The SC endorsed a cooling-off period before arrest under Section 498-A IPC (now Section 85 BNS) in the Shivangi Bansal case (2024), backing the Allahabad HC's directive for a 2-month cooling-off window with family welfare committee mediation before coercive action.
  • This addresses the widely-acknowledged misuse of Section 498-A while preserving its protective purpose.
Key Facts
  • SC endorsed the Allahabad HC directive of a 2-month cooling-off period with family welfare committee mediation before arrest/coercive action in Section 498-A cases
  • Section 498-A IPC / Section 85 BNS: Penalises cruelty by husband or his relatives — cognisable, non-bailable; punishment 3 years imprisonment + fine
  • Context: Section 498-A frequently characterised as misused for personal vendettas; SC in Arnesh Kumar (2014) had already directed no automatic arrest
Important Points
  • Art. 21: Right to life with dignity — Section 85 BNS protects women from domestic cruelty; cooling-off period must not allow continued abuse during mediation
  • Art. 15(3): State can make special provisions for protection of women — Section 85 BNS / 498-A IPC grounded in this
  • Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014): SC directed police not to automatically arrest under Section 498-A without Magistrate's approval — checklist required before arrest
  • Section 85 BNS (formerly IPC 498-A): Cruelty defined as: (a) wilful conduct likely to drive to suicide or cause grave injury; (b) harassment for dowry
  • Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. UoI (2018): SC directed family welfare committees at District level — cooling-off period approach builds on this
  • Art. 20(3): Right against self-incrimination — accused in 498-A cases have this protection during police investigation
  • Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Companion legislation to Section 85 BNS; demand for dowry is a separate offence
TOPIC 87

Ad Hoc Judges — Article 224A Activated

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • Facing a massive backlog of criminal appeals pending in High Courts, the SC in 2024–25 formally activated the long-dormant Article 224A — allowing Chief Justices of High Courts to appoint retired HC judges as ad hoc judges specifically to clear the criminal appeal backlog.
  • HC uptake has been lukewarm, but the activation of this constitutional provision is historically significant.
Key Facts
  • SC activated Art. 224A: Chief Justices of HCs may appoint retired HC judges as ad hoc judges to clear criminal appeal backlog
  • Art. 224A was inserted by the 15th CAA, 1963 — remained largely unused for over 60 years
  • Appointment requires consent of retired judge + President's prior approval + Chief Justice of India's approval
  • HC response to SC directive has been lukewarm — few courts have actively appointed ad hoc judges
Important Points
  • Art. 224A: Chief Justice of a HC may, with President's prior approval, appoint a retired judge of that HC to sit and act as a judge of that HC for a specified period
  • Art. 224: Additional and Acting Judges — President can appoint additional judges when workload increases or to clear arrears; distinct from ad hoc appointments under Art. 224A
  • Art. 217: Appointment of HC judges — President, in consultation with CJI and State Governor; retirement age 62
  • Art. 145(1): SC can make rules with President's approval for regulating the practice and procedure of the Court
  • Pendency crisis: India has 50+ million pending cases; HC alone have 60 lakh+ pending; criminal appeals account for major backlog (accused sometimes in jail for years awaiting hearing)
  • National Court Management System (NCMS): Framework to monitor case pendency and judge efficiency
  • Law Commission Report 245 (2014): Recommended increasing judge-to-population ratio from current 21 to 50 judges per million population
TOPIC 88

Lokpal Jurisdiction over HC Judges (Stayed by SC)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2024–25, the Lokpal concluded that High Court judges are "public servants" under the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 and thus subject to its anti-corruption jurisdiction.
  • The SC immediately stayed this determination — holding HC judges are appointed under constitutional provisions (Art. 217) and are not ordinary "public servants" subject to an executive-supervised anti-corruption body.
Key Facts
  • Lokpal concluded HC judges are "public servants" under Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 — subject to Lokpal jurisdiction
  • SC stayed this determination: HC judges are appointed under the Constitution (Art. 217); their accountability is governed by distinct constitutional mechanisms, not ordinary statutory definitions
  • Constitutional mechanism for HC judge accountability: Removal only by presidential order after an address by each House of Parliament (Art. 217/124) — impeachment process
Important Points
  • Art. 217: HC judge appointment — President, consultation with CJI and State Governor; removal only through Art. 124(4) impeachment process
  • Art. 124(4): Judge of SC (applies to HC via Art. 217) can be removed by President only after an address by each House of Parliament supported by special majority — proven misbehaviour/incapacity
  • Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013: Lokpal has jurisdiction over "public servants" — Prime Minister, Ministers, MPs, Group A/B/C/D government employees; HC judges are NOT in this list
  • Judicial Independence as Basic Structure: Kesavananda Bharati (1973); S.P. Gupta (1982); Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (1993) — judicial independence cannot be compromised by executive oversight
  • Art. 235: HC's control over subordinate courts — HCs maintain oversight of district and sessions courts; independent accountability framework
  • In-House Procedure for Judges: CJI has an internal peer review mechanism for misconduct complaints against HC/SC judges — not statutory, but used before impeachment
  • Art. 361(1): President and Governor immune from court proceedings for official acts — judges have analogous judicial immunity for official acts in capacity as judges
TOPIC 89

Dual Taxation on Broadcasting Services

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • The SC upheld in 2024–25 that two different taxes can be levied on two different aspects of the same broadcasting/streaming activity — the Centre can tax it as a "service" (Entry 97, Union List) while States can tax the "entertainment" dimension (Entry 62, State List).
  • The ruling also confirmed that "entertainment" extends to streaming on mobile phones, smartwatches, and personal devices.
Key Facts
  • SC ruling: Imposing two different taxes on two different aspects of the same broadcasting/streaming activity is legally permissible — no double taxation violation
  • Centre can levy service tax under Entry 97 (Union List — residuary); States can levy entertainment tax under Entry 62 (State List)
  • "Entertainment" broadly interpreted to include streaming via mobile phones, smartwatches, tablets, and other personal devices
Important Points
  • Entry 92C, Union List: Taxes on services — constitutionally inserted; Centre taxes broadcasting as a service
  • Entry 62, State List: Taxes on luxuries including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling — States' independent taxing power
  • Art. 246A: GST — post-GST, most taxes on services come under GST framework; entertainment tax by States on specific amusements still permitted outside GST
  • Art. 265: No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law — both Union and State taxes on broadcasting are valid provided they have legislative authority
  • Doctrine of Pith and Substance: When two taxes appear to overlap, courts look at the "true nature" of each tax — centre taxes the service aspect, State taxes the entertainment/luxury aspect
  • GST and entertainment: Entry 62 (amusement taxes by local bodies) was preserved outside GST; States can still levy entertainment tax on cinema tickets, amusement parks etc.
  • Art. 279A: GST Council — sets GST rates on most goods and services; broadcasting services are in the GST regime but entertainment tax at local body level remains
TOPIC 90

Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) — Static Revision

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • Lily Thomas v. UoI (2013) is a UPSC Prelims perennial — holding that a lawmaker is immediately disqualified upon conviction with 2 or more years of imprisonment, striking down Section 8(4) of RPA, 1951 which previously allowed sitting lawmakers to continue pending appeal.
  • It remains constantly relevant given frequent convictions of sitting MPs/MLAs and is the foundational electoral disqualification precedent.
Key Facts
  • SC (2013, Lily Thomas v. UoI): Lawmaker is immediately disqualified upon conviction for an offence with 2+ years of imprisonment
  • Struck down Section 8(4) of RPA, 1951 — which had allowed sitting MPs/MLAs to continue in office during the pendency of their appeal against conviction
  • Effect: Conviction = immediate loss of membership; no grace period pending appeal
  • Applies to: MPs (Arts. 101/102) and MLAs (Arts. 190/191); Rajya Sabha members; members of Legislative Councils
Important Points
  • Art. 102(1)(e): An MP is disqualified if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament — RPA Section 8 is that law
  • Art. 191(1)(e): An MLA is disqualified if so disqualified by law made by the appropriate Legislature — State election laws and RPA apply
  • Section 8, RPA, 1951: Disqualification on conviction for specific offences (2+ years) — list includes moral turpitude, corruption, communal offences, promoting enmity
  • Section 8(4) RPA (struck down): Had allowed sitting lawmakers to continue pending appeal; Lily Thomas removed this protection
  • Section 8(3) RPA: Even conviction with less than 2 years but with certain specified offences leads to 6-year post-sentence disqualification
  • Section 11, RPA, 1951: President/Governor can remove disqualification or reduce the period — Presidential mercy power
  • ADR v. UoI (2002): Candidates must disclose criminal antecedents, assets, and educational qualifications in election affidavits — companion judgment
TOPIC 91

Electoral Bond Scheme Struck Down — Association for Democratic Reforms v. UoI (2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In February 2024, a 5-judge SC Constitution Bench unanimously struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme, holding it violates voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a).
  • The SC directed SBI to hand over all bond data to ECI, which published it — revealing Rs. 16,518 crore in bonds sold, with BJP receiving 47%, raising serious quid pro quo concerns about regulatory-probe companies donating to the ruling party.
Key Facts
  • 5-judge Constitution Bench (Feb 2024): Electoral Bond Scheme declared unconstitutional — unanimous ruling
  • Held: Scheme violates voters' right to information under Art. 19(1)(a) — anonymous political funding undermines informed democratic participation
  • SC directed SBI to submit all bond purchaser and encashment data to ECI; ECI published it subsequently
  • Data revealed: Rs. 16,518 crore in bonds sold; BJP received 47%, TMC 13%, Congress 9%
  • Several major donors were companies under regulatory investigation/probe — raising quid pro quo corruption concerns
  • Companion amendments struck down: Amendments to Companies Act, Income Tax Act, FCRA, and RPA that enabled anonymous unlimited corporate donations
Important Points
  • Art. 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression includes right to information — voters' right to know who funds political parties is a component of this right
  • Art. 19(2): Restrictions on 19(1)(a) must be proportionate; anonymity of donors does NOT qualify as a reasonable restriction on voters' right to information
  • Art. 324: ECI superintends elections — SC held transparency in political funding is essential for free and fair elections under Art. 324
  • Electoral Bonds: Introduced 2018 via Finance Act (Money Bill route); bought from SBI, donated to parties, encashed — donor identity kept secret from public
  • K.S. Puttaswamy proportionality test: Anonymity of donors fails all four proportionality prongs — no legitimate aim served that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means
  • RPA, 1951 Section 29C: Political parties must disclose donations above Rs. 20,000 — Electoral Bond exemption from this was struck down
  • SC also used Art. 142: Directed immediate disclosure of all existing bond data — to restore transparency retroactively
TOPIC 92

SC Sub-Classification — State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In August 2024, a 7-judge SC bench (6:1) overruled the 2004 E.V. Chinnaiah judgment and held that States CAN sub-classify the SC/ST reservation list to give preferential treatment to the most backward among the backward — provided it is based on empirical socio-economic data.
  • Justice Gavai (obiter) further suggested extending the creamy layer concept to SCs/STs — a major constitutional development.
Key Facts
  • 7-judge bench (6:1, Aug 2024): States CAN create sub-classifications within SC Presidential List reservation — overruled E.V. Chinnaiah (2004)
  • Sub-classification must be based on empirical socio-economic data — cannot be arbitrary or politically motivated
  • Constitutionally validated Bihar's Mahadalit category and Punjab's Mazhabi Sikh/Balmiki sub-quota within SC reservation
  • Justice Gavai (majority, obiter): Creamy layer concept should be extended to SCs/STs to exclude affluent individuals from reservation benefits
  • State cannot provide 100% reservation to one sub-group within SCs — must leave space for other SC communities
Important Points
  • Art. 341: President notifies SC list for each State — Parliament alone can include or exclude communities; States cannot alter the Presidential list
  • Art. 16(4): State can make provision for reservation for backward classes not adequately represented in services — sub-classification is an exercise of this power
  • E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of AP (2004): 5-judge bench had held all SCs form a homogeneous class; sub-classification was impermissible — now overruled
  • Indira Sawhney v. UoI (1992): Creamy layer applies to OBCs; excludes affluent within OBCs from reservation — Davinder Singh opens door for similar concept for SCs/STs
  • Art. 15(4): State can make special provisions for advancement of SCs/STs in educational institutions — sub-classification permissible in education also
  • Mandal II (2008): SC upheld creamy layer for OBCs in central educational institutions — Davinder Singh obiter suggests analogous treatment for SCs/STs
  • Doctrine of Reasonable Classification (Art. 14): Sub-classification must have a rational nexus to the object — adequate representation of most deprived within SCs is a legitimate objective
TOPIC 93

Maharashtra Political Crisis / Shinde vs Thackeray — SC Ruling

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • The SC's ruling in the Maharashtra political crisis (Shinde vs Thackeray, 2023) set critical precedents on Governor's powers, the Speaker's role under the Tenth Schedule, and the interface between ECI recognition and anti-defection proceedings.
  • The SC held the Governor had no valid basis to order a floor test and modified the earlier Nabam Rebia (2016) ruling on the Speaker's competence.
Key Facts
  • SC (2023): Governor had NO valid basis to call a floor test for Uddhav Thackeray government — Governor acted unconstitutionally
  • Modified Nabam Rebia (2016): Speaker facing a disqualification petition cannot hear anti-defection cases ONLY when the disqualification motion has been admitted and listed — not automatically
  • ECI recognition proceedings (granting "Shiv Sena" name to Shinde faction) and Speaker's Tenth Schedule proceedings are INDEPENDENT — neither binds the other
  • SC could not restore the Uddhav government since he had resigned before the floor test — emphasised importance of not resigning before SC determines the issue
Important Points
  • Tenth Schedule (52nd CAA, 1985): Anti-defection law; Speaker is the adjudicatory authority for disqualification petitions
  • Art. 164: Ministers hold office during pleasure of Governor — but Governor cannot arbitrarily withdraw pleasure without demonstrated loss of majority
  • Art. 174: Governor's power to summon, prorogue, dissolve legislature — calling a floor test is exercise of this power; must be based on objective material showing loss of majority
  • Nabam Rebia (2016): Original ruling — Speaker facing a disqualification motion CANNOT hear anti-defection petitions; Shinde modified this to require the motion to be "admitted and listed"
  • S.R. Bommai (1994): Floor test is the only constitutional method to verify majority; Governor cannot rely on subjective satisfaction based on letters
  • ECI recognition: Under Election Symbols (Reservation & Allotment) Order, 1968 — ECI determines which faction is the "real" political party; SC held this is independent of Speaker's proceedings
  • Rameshwar Prasad (2006): SC precedent on unconstitutional dissolution — remedies limited when irreversible acts have occurred (resignation, dissolution)
TOPIC 94

Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) — Same-Sex Marriage

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In October 2023, a 5-judge SC bench (3:2) ruled there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Indian Constitution.
  • The majority held marriage is a statutory/legislative concept — and the court cannot create new forms of marriage.
  • However, the bench directed the Union to form a high-powered committee to address the rights and entitlements of queer persons — which the Union subsequently declined to constitute.
Key Facts
  • 5-judge Constitution Bench (3:2, Oct 2023): No fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Constitution
  • Majority: Marriage is a statutory/legislative concept — courts cannot create new forms of marriage; it is Parliament's prerogative
  • All 5 judges agreed: LGBTQIA+ persons have the right to form relationships; right to choose partner is protected under Art. 21
  • SC directed Union to form a high-powered committee to examine rights of queer couples (adoption, joint bank accounts, insurance, nominee rights)
  • Union subsequently declined to constitute the committee — matter pending
  • Special Marriage Act, 1954: SC declined to read in same-sex couples; held this would require legislative amendment
Important Points
  • Art. 21: Right to life includes right to choose partner and form relationships — unanimously upheld; but no right to statutory recognition of same-sex marriage
  • Art. 15(1): Prohibition on discrimination on grounds of sex — LGBTQIA+ rights generally protected; but marriage recognition requires legislative action
  • Navtej Singh Johar v. UoI (2018): SC decriminalised homosexuality by reading down Section 377 IPC — necessary precursor to marriage equality discussions
  • K.S. Puttaswamy (2017): Right to Privacy includes right to sexual identity — affirmed in Navtej; Supriyo builds on this for relationship rights
  • Entry 5, Concurrent List: Marriage and divorce — legislative subject; both Parliament and State legislatures can legislate; Supriyo placed the issue firmly in Parliament's domain
  • Art. 44 (DPSP): Uniform Civil Code — debate on marriage law uniformity intersects with same-sex marriage; UCC if enacted may address recognition
  • International: 34+ countries recognise same-sex marriage; UNHRC resolutions recognise LGBTQIA+ rights — India's position remains conservative
TOPIC 95

Mineral Royalties Case — Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL (2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In July 2024, a 9-judge SC bench (8:1) held that States have the power to levy taxes on mineral-bearing lands under Entry 49 (land revenue) and Entry 50 (mines and minerals) of the State List — overruling India Cements Ltd. (1990).
  • The consequent filing of retrospective royalty arrear demands by States (Jharkhand: Rs. 1.36 lakh crore) triggered a massive Centre-State fiscal dispute.
Key Facts
  • 9-judge bench (8:1, July 2024): States HAVE the power to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral-bearing lands
  • Overruled India Cements Ltd. v. State of TN (1990) — which had held royalty is itself a tax, preventing States from levying additional taxes
  • States may collect retrospective arrears dating back to April 1, 2005 — when India Cements was decided to be erroneous
  • States filed massive arrear demands: Jharkhand (Rs. 1.36 lakh crore), Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Goa against mining companies including SAIL, NMDC, Coal India
  • Centre challenged retroactive collection before SC citing economic disruption — matter under consideration
Important Points
  • Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development — key entry in dispute
  • Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings — States argued mineral-bearing land falls under this entry independently of Entry 50
  • Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament necessary in the national interest — Centre's primary mining jurisdiction
  • MMDR Act, 1957 (Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act): Central law under Entry 54; defines "royalty" as the charge for extracting minerals — SC held royalty ≠ tax; States can levy taxes additionally
  • India Cements (1990): Had equated royalty with tax; held States could not levy separate tax on mineral rights — overruled after 34 years
  • Doctrine of Prospective Overruling: SC typically applies new rulings prospectively to avoid disruption; but here SC allowed retrospective collection from 2005 — causing fiscal shock
  • Art. 265: No tax shall be levied except by authority of law — State taxes on minerals now have clear constitutional and statutory authority post-Davinder Singh ruling
TOPIC 96

Prison Reforms — Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In October 2024, the SC struck down caste-based work assignments in Indian prisons — where "untouchable" castes were assigned cleaning and sanitation duties — as violating Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), and 17 (abolition of untouchability).
  • The SC directed 11 States to revise their prison manuals within 3 months to remove all caste-discriminatory provisions.
Key Facts
  • SC (Oct 2024, Sukanya Shantha v. UoI): Struck down caste-based work assignments in prisons as violating Arts. 14, 15, and 17
  • Specific practice struck down: Assigning manual scavenging, latrine cleaning to prisoners from "untouchable" castes as their designated "prison labour"
  • SC directed 11 States to revise their prison manuals within 3 months to remove all caste-discriminatory provisions
  • State prison manuals that had codified caste-based work assignments were declared unconstitutional
Important Points
  • Art. 17: Abolition of untouchability — practice of untouchability in ANY form is forbidden and its enforcement is an offence; applies within prison walls too
  • Art. 14: Right to Equality — caste-based work assignments create an impermissible classification without rational nexus to any legitimate penal objective
  • Art. 15(1): Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of caste — assigning degrading labour exclusively on grounds of caste birth violates this absolute prohibition
  • Art. 21: Right to life with dignity — prisoners retain dignity rights; degrading labour based on birth identity violates this even in incarceration
  • Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978): SC held prisoners retain all FRs except those necessarily curtailed by incarceration — Art. 17 is not curtailed by imprisonment
  • Manual Scavenging: Prohibited by Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 — caste-based prison labour assignments perpetuated this
  • Entry 4, State List: Prisons — State subject; but State prison manuals cannot override fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution
TOPIC 97

Industrial Alcohol Regulation — State of UP v. Lalta Prasad (2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In July 2024, a 9-judge SC Constitution Bench held that States CAN regulate "industrial alcohol" (denatured/rectified spirit) under Entry 8 of the State List — overruling the 1989 Synthetics & Chemicals judgment which had reserved such regulation for the Centre.
  • The ruling expands States' legislative competence in the alcohol sector significantly.
Key Facts
  • 9-judge bench (July 2024): States CAN regulate industrial alcohol (rectified/denatured spirit) under Entry 8, State List ("intoxicating liquors")
  • Overruled Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of UP (1989) — which had held only potable alcohol (liquors for drinking) falls under Entry 8; industrial alcohol was a Central subject
  • Entry 8, State List: "intoxicating liquors" broadly interpreted to include industrial alcohol that could potentially be converted to potable use
  • Centre retains regulatory power over industrial alcohol under Entry 52, Union List (industries declared by Parliament to be of national importance) via Industries Development and Regulation Act
Important Points
  • Entry 8, State List: Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors — now includes industrial alcohol
  • Entry 52, Union List: Industries — Parliament declares certain industries of national importance; Centre regulates those; Industrial alcohol industry under IDRA, 1951
  • Doctrine of Pith and Substance: When two lists seem to overlap, courts identify the "true nature" of the legislation — here SC found States' Entry 8 power is broader than previously understood
  • Art. 246(3): State list is exclusive to States; but Union list prevails in case of conflict; Entry 52 (Union) and Entry 8 (State) both apply to industrial alcohol — State law prevails unless Parliament law covers same field under Entry 52
  • Synthetics & Chemicals (1989): Had distinguished potable alcohol (Entry 8 = State) from industrial alcohol (Entry 52 = Centre) — now overruled; distinction rejected
  • Inter-State trade implications: Art. 301-307 (freedom of trade) — States' regulation of industrial alcohol must not unreasonably restrict inter-State movement
  • Excise revenue: Alcohol is States' largest own-tax revenue source; broader regulatory power under Entry 8 strengthens States' fiscal autonomy
TOPIC 98

Rohingya/Illegal Migrant Cases — Article 21 & Deportation

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • SC rulings in 2024 on Rohingya detention and deportation established that illegal migrants and stateless persons have limited but real Article 21 rights — specifically the right against indefinite arbitrary detention.
  • The SC directed Assam not to indefinitely detain declared foreigners and ordered that deportation must follow due process — raising fundamental questions about India's non-refoulement obligations.
Key Facts
  • SC (2024): Illegal immigrants have limited Art. 21 rights against arbitrary detention — cannot be indefinitely detained without due process
  • Directed Assam to not indefinitely detain declared foreigners pending deportation; deportation procedures must follow due process
  • Stateless persons (Rohingya, undocumented migrants): SC held they have limited Art. 21 protection against indefinite arbitrary detention
  • SC directed government (2024) to process deportations through proper legal procedures — no mass detention without individual determination
Important Points
  • Art. 21: "No person" — not "no citizen" — shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law; non-citizens including illegal migrants have Art. 21 rights
  • Art. 22: Safeguards against arbitrary detention apply to all persons including foreigners — grounds of arrest must be communicated, produced before magistrate within 24 hours
  • Non-Refoulement: International principle (Refugee Convention, 1951) — no person shall be returned to a country where they face persecution; India is NOT a signatory but courts have considered its humanitarian implications
  • Foreigners Act, 1946 (now repealed by Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025): Provided basis for Foreigners Tribunals to declare persons foreigners; replaced under new Act
  • NRC (National Register of Citizens) — Assam: 19 lakh declared non-citizens; those unable to prove citizenship face detention in Detention Centres pending deportation
  • Rohingya: Myanmar government does not recognise them as citizens — stateless; cannot be deported as Myanmar refuses to accept them; detention becomes indefinite
  • Louis De Raedt v. UoI (1991): SC held foreigners have Art. 21 rights but not Art. 19 rights — only citizens have Art. 19 freedoms; this distinction is foundational in immigration law
TOPIC 99

EVM-VVPAT Verification — SC Dismisses Petitions (2024)

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • Ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the SC dismissed petitions seeking 100% cross-verification of EVMs with VVPAT slips.
  • The SC upheld ECI's existing protocol (randomly selected 5 polling stations per constituency) and declared EVMs tamper-proof — rejecting the demand for return to ballot papers.
  • The ruling firmly endorsed India's electronic voting system.
Key Facts
  • SC (April 2024): Dismissed pleas for 100% VVPAT-EVM cross-verification; upheld ECI's sampling protocol
  • ECI protocol: Random verification of VVPAT slips in 5 randomly selected polling stations per constituency — SC upheld this as sufficient
  • SC declared EVMs are tamper-proof; no credible evidence of systematic manipulation presented
  • SC rejected demand for return to ballot papers — held EVM system is constitutionally valid
  • VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail): Machine prints a paper slip showing candidate voted for; slip visible to voter for 7 seconds before falling into sealed container
Important Points
  • Art. 324: ECI has superintendence, direction, and control over preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of elections — ECI's technical standards for EVMs are within its constitutional mandate
  • Art. 19(1)(a): Right to vote has been held to be a statutory right (not fundamental) — though NOTA has been given status under Art. 19(1)(a) by PUCL (2013)
  • RPA, 1951 Section 62: Right to vote is a statutory right; but free and fair elections are part of the Basic Structure (Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975)
  • Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961: Rule 49A — ECI may prescribe electronic voting machines; EVMs introduced nationwide by 2004 elections
  • People's Union for Civil Liberties v. UoI (2013): SC directed introduction of NOTA (None of The Above) option on EVMs as an exercise of Art. 19(1)(a)
  • Technical safeguards: EVMs are standalone, non-networked; cannot be remotely accessed; manufactured by BEL and ECIL under ECI supervision
  • Mock poll: Before actual polling, mock poll with political party agents present; all agents can verify EVM functioning — safeguard upheld by SC
TOPIC 100

Puttaswamy (Privacy) Extensions — Digital Rights Cases

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • Building on the foundational K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) privacy judgment, Delhi HC and Kerala HC recognized a limited "right to be forgotten" in online search results in 2024–25, while the SC issued guidelines against unauthorised data scraping.
  • These rulings shape the evolving jurisprudence of digital privacy rights in India, intersecting with the DPDP Act, 2023 framework.
Key Facts
  • Delhi HC and Kerala HC (2024): Recognised a limited "right to be forgotten" — individuals can request Google/search engines to delist specific search results under defined conditions
  • SC issued guidelines against unauthorised data scraping — collecting personal data from public platforms without consent violates privacy rights
  • Right to be forgotten is balanced against Art. 19(1)(a) (right to information) — HC weighed public interest, nature of information, time elapsed
  • DPDP Act, 2023: Codifies "right to erasure" (Section 13) — Data Principal can withdraw consent and request deletion of personal data
Important Points
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. UoI (2017): Privacy is a Fundamental Right under Art. 21 — includes informational privacy, decisional autonomy, and dignity; right to be forgotten flows from informational privacy
  • Art. 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression includes right to information — "right to be forgotten" must be balanced against this; not an absolute right
  • DPDP Act, 2023: India's data protection law; Data Principal rights include: consent withdrawal (Section 6), right to correction/erasure (Section 13), right to grievance redressal (Section 14)
  • EU GDPR: Article 17 provides "right to erasure" — Indian courts drew inspiration; India's DPDP Act partially mirrors this framework
  • Puttaswamy proportionality test (4-prong): (1) Legality — law must exist; (2) Legitimate aim; (3) Proportionality; (4) Procedural safeguards — all four must be satisfied for privacy intrusion
  • Right to be Forgotten is NOT absolute: Historical records, public interest journalism, ongoing criminal proceedings can override individual erasure requests
  • Amar Jain v. UoI (2025): SC extended digital access as an Art. 21 right for PwDs and acid attack survivors — complementary development in digital rights jurisprudence
TOPIC 101

Social Media & Free Speech — Ranveer Allahbadia Case 2025

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2025, the SC dealt with the Ranveer Allahbadia (BeerBiceps) case — where a controversial podcast triggered criminal complaints across States.
  • SC directed the Union to frame guidelines for online content regulation in consultation with the National Broadcasters and Digital Association, declared self-styled regulatory bodies insufficient, and suggested neutral autonomous regulators — reaffirming the Shreya Singhal framework for speech restrictions.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025, Ranveer Allahbadia vs UoI): Directed Union to frame guidelines for online content regulation in consultation with National Broadcasters and Digital Association
  • Declared self-styled bodies (like self-regulatory organisations of YouTube creators) insufficient to regulate online content — suggested neutral autonomous regulators
  • Reaffirmed Shreya Singhal (2015): Speech that merely offends or shocks is protected if it does not meet the Art. 19(2) threshold for restriction
  • SC recognised commercial speech (paid content, brand deals) as distinct from free speech under Art. 19(1)(a) — may attract different regulatory standards
  • Restrictions on online content can ONLY be imposed under the grounds specified in Art. 19(2)
Important Points
  • Art. 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression — includes online speech, social media posts, YouTube videos, podcasts; all protected unless restricted under Art. 19(2)
  • Art. 19(2): Permissible restrictions — sovereignty/integrity, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency/morality, contempt of court, defamation, incitement to offence
  • Shreya Singhal v. UoI (2015): SC struck down Section 66A IT Act — vague restrictions on "offensive" or "menacing" online speech unconstitutional; only "incitement" and "advocacy of imminent lawless action" can be restricted
  • IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Framework for regulation of OTT platforms and social media intermediaries — SC's guideline direction goes beyond this existing framework
  • Section 79, IT Act, 2000: Safe harbour immunity for intermediaries — platforms not liable for user content if they comply with due diligence norms and takedown notices promptly
  • Commercial speech (Tata Press v. MTNL, 1995): SC held commercial speech is protected under Art. 19(1)(a) but can be regulated in public interest — Allahbadia ruling builds on this for influencer content
  • Press Council Act, 1978 and Cable TV Networks Regulation Act, 1995: Existing regulatory frameworks for print and cable TV — online content currently lacks equivalent statutory regulator
TOPIC 102

Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies (2025) — Modification of Arbitral Awards

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2025, a 5-judge SC Constitution Bench settled the long-debated question of whether courts can modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The SC held courts have LIMITED modification powers — permissible only for severable portions, typographical errors, and post-award interest; broad merits review or reconsidering costs and factual errors is NOT permitted.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025, 5-judge bench): Courts have LIMITED powers to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Permissible modifications: Severing a legally flawed portion from a valid one; correcting typographical/clerical errors; adjusting post-award interest rates
  • NOT permissible: Broad merits review; reconsideration of costs awarded; correction of errors of fact; substituting tribunal's reasoning with court's own
  • Art. 142 (SC's plenary power to do complete justice) may be used in limited circumstances where modification serves justice without rewriting the award
Important Points
  • Art. 142: SC may pass such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause/matter pending before it — used sparingly to enable minor modifications in arbitration
  • Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: India's primary arbitration law; modelled on UNCITRAL Model Law; Section 34 — application to set aside award; Section 37 — appeal against Section 34 order
  • Section 34: Court can SET ASIDE an award only on specific limited grounds (public policy, arbitrability, due process violation) — cannot modify; Gayatri Balasamy now permits limited modification
  • Doctrine of Minimum Judicial Interference: Cornerstone of arbitration law — courts should intervene minimally in arbitral process and awards; Gayatri Balasamy upholds this principle
  • Public Policy ground: Section 34(2)(b)(ii): Award contrary to public policy of India — includes fraud, corruption, patent illegality on the face of the award
  • Speedier dispute resolution: Limiting court modification powers preserves finality of arbitral awards; reduces delay and appeals — aligns with India's push to become an arbitration hub
  • BALCO v. Kaiser (2012): SC held India-seated arbitration governed by Part I of Arbitration Act; established territoriality principle; foundational precedent for Indian arbitration jurisprudence
TOPIC 103

Estate Officer, Haryana UDA v. Landowners (2025) — Right to Rehabilitation

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • In 2025, the SC clarified that rehabilitation is NOT a fundamental right — and that deprivation of livelihood due to land acquisition alone is NOT sufficient to challenge an acquisition under Article 21. The right to fair compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and Art. 300A is the primary remedy; rehabilitation policies are welfare measures, not constitutionally mandated rights.
Key Facts
  • SC (2025, Estate Officer, Haryana UDA v. Landowners): Rehabilitation is NOT a fundamental right — no enforceable FR to rehabilitation upon land acquisition
  • Deprivation of livelihood due to land acquisition is NOT by itself a valid ground to challenge the acquisition under Art. 21
  • Remedy for land acquisition: Right to fair compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR Act) and Art. 300A
Important Points
  • Art. 300A: Persons shall not be deprived of their property save by authority of law — right to property is a constitutional right (not FR); compensation required for deprivation
  • Art. 21: Right to livelihood (Olga Tellis, 1985) is part of right to life — but SC in Haryana UDA clarified that loss of livelihood via land acquisition does not automatically render acquisition unconstitutional if compensation is paid
  • LARR Act, 2013 (Land Acquisition Act): Requires Social Impact Assessment, multi-crop land protection, consent of 70–80% landowners for private projects; compensation = 4× market value in rural areas
  • Art. 39(b) (DPSP): Material resources of the community to be distributed to serve common good — used to justify compulsory acquisition for public purpose
  • Fundamental Right to Property (Art. 31): Deleted by 44th CAA, 1978 — land acquisition no longer a FR challenge; only Art. 300A (legal authority + compensation) applies
  • Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R): Under LARR Act, R&R policy — includes livelihood support, housing, employment — but SC held this is a statutory entitlement, not a FR
  • K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka (2011): SC held Art. 300A is a constitutional right enforceable against the State; arbitrary deprivation without compensation violates Art. 300A
TOPIC 104

Historical SC Cases Quick Reference — UPSC Prelims Standards

Supreme Court Landmark Judgments
Why in News
  • This consolidated quick-reference topic covers the foundational Supreme Court judgments that form the static backbone of UPSC Prelims polity questions — from Basic Structure (Kesavananda, 1973) to Privacy (Puttaswamy, 2017) to reservations (Indira Sawhney, 1992).
  • These cases are tested in combination with current affairs judgments in the same paper.
Key Facts
  • Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Basic Structure doctrine — Parliament cannot amend the Constitution to destroy its basic features; secularism, democracy, federalism, judicial review are part of Basic Structure
  • Maneka Gandhi v. UoI (1978): "Procedure established by law" must be fair, just, and reasonable — not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive; expanded Art. 21 dramatically
  • Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): Free and fair elections are part of Basic Structure — cannot be amended away
  • S.R. Bommai v. UoI (1994): Art. 356 (President's Rule) subject to judicial review; floor test is only way to determine majority; nine features identified as Basic Structure
  • Indira Sawhney v. UoI (1992): Upheld 27% OBC reservation; introduced 50% cap; introduced creamy layer concept for OBCs
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. UoI (2017): Right to Privacy is a Fundamental Right under Art. 21; Puttaswamy proportionality test for privacy intrusion
  • Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979): Right to speedy trial is a Fundamental Right under Art. 21; basis for undertrial rights
  • Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Speaker's decision under Tenth Schedule is a quasi-judicial act subject to judicial review but no interim relief
  • Lily Thomas v. UoI (2013): Immediate disqualification upon conviction; Section 8(4) RPA struck down
  • PUCL v. UoI (2013): NOTA on EVMs is an exercise of Art. 19(1)(a) right to express disapproval
Important Points
  • Basic Structure elements (not exhaustive): Supremacy of Constitution, Republican/Democratic form, Secular character, Separation of Powers, Federal character, Unity and integrity, Judicial review, Free and fair elections, Parliamentary system, Rule of Law
  • Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010): Narco-analysis and polygraph tests violate Art. 20(3) and Art. 21 if conducted without voluntary consent
  • ADR v. UoI (2002): Candidates must disclose criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities, educational qualifications in affidavit with nomination papers
  • Berubari Union Case (1960): Parliament's power under Art. 3 does NOT include cession of Indian territory to a foreign country — requires Art. 368 constitutional amendment
  • Menaka Gandhi connection to Art. 21 expansion: Prior to 1978, "procedure established by law" was interpreted narrowly (A.K. Gopalan, 1950); Maneka Gandhi changed this to golden triangle — Arts. 14, 19, 21 must all be satisfied
  • Bommai and President's Rule: Bihar (1977), Karnataka (1989) President's Rule declared invalid retrospectively; Bommai set prospective safeguards — floor test + parliamentary approval + judicial review
  • Puttaswamy overruled M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962): both had held privacy is not a FR; unanimous 9-judge bench reversed this

UPSC Polity Revision Complete

UPSCTREE | "Atto Deepo Bhava"