Ethics: Part II
Values, Virtues, Rights & Duties
Ethics notes by UPSCTREE on moral philosophy: the metaphysics of value (are morals objective or subjective?), virtue ethics from Aristotle to MacIntyre, the philosophy and history of human rights, and the deontological theory of duty.
Human Values
This unit is about meta-ethics — not "what is good?" but the deeper question "does objective moral value exist at all?" It walks through every major position, from Subjectivism to Intuitionism, and critically weighs each one's strengths and weaknesses.
1.1 Objectivism vs Subjectivism — The Core Debate
Moral Objectivists say objective values exist; Subjectivists (anti-objectivists) say they don't. This is understood through two competing models:
Model of Perception (Objectivists)
- Something is desired because it already has value
- Value exists independently, "out there" — we simply perceive it
- The noun "value" comes first
Model of Taste (Subjectivists)
- A thing has value because it is desired
- "It is desire that gives foundation to value"
- The verb "to value" comes first
A value is called objective if it is more fundamental than our pro-attitudes (desires, preferences, approvals) toward it — i.e., it would exist even if nobody desired it. Moral Objectivism is treated as synonymous with Moral Realism here.
Ask yourself: is infanticide bad because everyone happens to disapprove of it (subjectivist) — or does everyone disapprove of it because it really, truly is bad, independent of anyone's opinion (objectivist)? That single question is the entire debate of this unit.
Anti-objectivism is a form of relativism. There are three parallel types of relativism, based on the three kinds of value:
| Type of Relativism | Claims that... |
|---|---|
| Epistemic Relativism | Truth (true/false) depends on the individual or group |
| Aesthetic Relativism | Beauty (beautiful/ugly) depends on people or cultures |
| Moral Relativism | Goodness (good/bad) depends on individuals or cultural groups |
1.2 Simple Subjectivism
Claims that all moral statements are true — truth is simply what I approve of. It holds both:
The Problem: It Cannot Handle Real Conflicts
- Intrapersonal conflicts: your own opinion changes over time (e.g., you once thought someone was bad, now you don't) — but if truth is purely relative to you, how can the newer opinion be "better" than the old one?
- Interpersonal conflicts: two people disagree — but if there's no objective fact to appeal to, there's no way to say who (if anyone) is right. This leads to an "impossibility of moral dissent" — genuine disagreement becomes meaningless.
If "smoking is bad" is true simply because I believe it, then it's logically impossible for me to ever be wrong about a moral question — I'd always be "infallible." That should feel suspicious, because in real life we do change our minds and admit past moral mistakes — which only makes sense if there was something objective to be mistaken about.
1.3 Subjectivism of Mackie — The "Error Theory"
J.L. Mackie accepts the ontological version (no objective value exists) but rejects the semantic version — so for Mackie, all moral statements are false. Every time we say "X is good," we're pretending to speak objectively when there's no such objectivity to speak of.
Mackie's second argument: moral judgments are meant to give us categorical reasons for action (reasons with no "ifs" and "buts"). But there are no such unconditional reasons in reality — so all moral judgments claiming to provide them are necessarily false.
1.4 Cultural Relativism
This school says moral statements may be true or false depending on the culture/group making the claim — each group's morality is valid "according to them."
Cultural relativists want to have it both ways: they say "nothing is objectively right or wrong across cultures" — but then insist we should tolerate other cultures, as if tolerance itself were an objective, universal value everyone should follow. That's a contradiction hiding in plain sight.
1.5 Rational Constructivism
Moral truths do exist — but only because we construct them through rational agreement. Something is good because reasoning agents agree it is, via an imagined "ideal observer" — well-informed and impartial. Comparative judgments (Hitler = wrong, MLK = right) are possible because they can be judged for coherence (rationality).
- Define Simple Subjectivism.
- What is meant by the Ontological version of subjectivism?
- What are the intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts in Simple Subjectivism? Can they be resolved? Why?
- What does Mackie object to in simple subjectivism? State the Theory of Error.
- Clarify the position that cultural relativists hold.
- What is the "argument from queerness"?
- What is Rational Constructivism?
1.6 Emotivism of Ayer
A.J. Ayer's Emotivism rests on Logical Positivism's "verifiability criterion of meaning": a claim is cognitively meaningful only if it is either—
Moral judgments (like "God exists") are neither — so Ayer concludes they lack cognitive meaning and only have emotive meaning. "X is good" really means "Hurrah for X!" — a mere expression of feeling, not true or false. This position is called Non-Cognitivism — there are no moral truths at all.
Four Objections to Emotivism
- Cannot compare moral judgments: If someone says "it is good to kill homosexuals and gypsies," Ayer can't call this statement false (only not-true) — so we can't even say human-rights defenders are more correct than this person.
- Self-refuting premise: the verifiability criterion itself is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable — so by its own standard, it is meaningless.
- Not all moral language is emotive: "Do what is good" ≠ "Do what is hurrah" — the theory can't explain the difference between moral statements and moral commands.
- We don't feel like we're just venting emotion when we make serious moral judgments.
Emotivism says "murder is wrong" is really just a fancy way of shouting "Boo, murder!" — an expressed feeling, nothing more. It's an appealing idea because it avoids saying all moral views are equally "true." But it can't explain why we argue and reason about ethics as if some views are actually more correct than others — you don't reason your way to a boo or a cheer.
1.7 Realism
Objective values really exist, independent of the subject — not a construction of individuals as subjectivists claim.
David Hume's Challenge — Two Faculties
Reason
- Deals with beliefs and facts — describes the world as it is
- Can be judged true or false
- Extrinsically related to action; the self adjusts to the world
Desire
- Represents the world as it should be
- Cannot be judged true or false
- Intrinsically related to action; the world adjusts to the self
Hume's key claim: moral convictions that motivate us to act must come from desire, not reason/belief (this is called moral internalism). But Objectivism claims moral convictions are beliefs. Since beliefs alone don't motivate action, Hume concludes moral objectivism is false.
Hume's point, in short: knowing a fact (like "the stove is hot") never by itself makes you want to avoid it — you also need a desire (not to be burned). Since moral judgments clearly do motivate us to act, they must involve desire, not pure fact-based reasoning — which is bad news for anyone who says morality is just a set of objective facts we passively perceive.
1.8 Intuitionism
Like mathematical truth, moral truth (e.g., "happiness is good") is known only through a mature, direct intuition — it cannot be reduced to or explained by any other value.
G.E. Moore's Non-Naturalism
Moore argues "good" cannot be reduced to any natural property (unlike subjectivists who reduce it to "what I approve of," or cultural relativists who reduce it to "what the group approves of"). "Good" is primitive and simple — undefinable, except through analytical properties (e.g., "bachelors are unmarried," where the predicate is already contained in the subject).
| Type of Reduction | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Conceptual | What a concept signifies by definition | "A doctor is someone in service" — but not always literally on duty |
| Metaphysical | What a thing actually is, in reality | "Water is H₂O"; "Prathap is my cousin" |
According to Moore, "good" can only ever be a conceptual, analytical relation — never a metaphysical one.
- State Moore's position on Non-Naturalism.
- What is Logical Positivism?
- Clarify the standpoint of Realism.
- What is the psychological challenge posed by David Hume?
- What is "non-natural"? How can it be defined?
- What is the argument from intuition?
- Objectivism (model of perception) says value exists first, independent of desire; Subjectivism (model of taste) says desire creates value.
- Simple Subjectivism: all moral statements are true — but this can't explain real moral disagreement or changing one's mind.
- Mackie's Error Theory: all moral statements are false (queerness argument + no categorical reasons exist) — closer to common sense but can't rank moral views.
- Cultural Relativism secretly relies on an objective value (tolerance) even while denying objectivity.
- Rational Constructivism: moral truths are built through an ideal observer's rational agreement.
- Ayer's Emotivism: moral statements express feelings only ("Hurrah for X") — but can't explain moral reasoning or comparison.
- Realism vs Hume: Hume's reason/desire split challenges whether moral beliefs alone can motivate action.
- Moore's Intuitionism: "good" is a simple, non-natural, undefinable property, known through intuition — not reducible to natural facts.
- The core tension throughout: Objectivism explains moral error well but struggles with motivation to act; Subjectivism explains motivation well but struggles with moral error.
Human Virtues
Virtue Ethics makes character, not rules or consequences, the centre of morality. This unit traces it from Aristotle's eudaimonia, through modern critiques and the Ethics of Care, to MacIntyre's relativism and virtue in Asian religious traditions.
2.1 Virtue Ethics vs Kantian Duty
Kant grounded morality in reason and duty, sidelining happiness because personal happiness varies from person to person and can't ground a universal moral law. Virtue ethics pushes back — reviving happiness not as pleasure-maximization (utilitarianism) but as the perfection of one's own existence, as old as Aristotle and revived by thinkers like Alasdair MacIntyre and Elizabeth Anscombe.
| Approach | What It Emphasizes | Example: Helping Someone in Need |
|---|---|---|
| Utilitarian (Consequentialist) | Consequences of the act | "This maximizes overall well-being" |
| Deontologist | Duty / moral rule | "This follows the rule: do unto others..." |
| Virtue Ethicist | Character of the agent | "This act is benevolent, therefore virtuous" |
2.2 Aristotle and Eudaimonia
Human beings are rational animals; reasoning toward a goal (an "end") is the Teleological Position. The key question isn't "what do you want to do?" but "what do you want to be?"
Intellectual Virtues
- Can be taught and learnt
- Example: Prudence
Moral Virtues
- Achieved by repeated action that becomes habit
- Example: Courage, Temperance
The Golden Mean: virtue lies between two vicious extremes. Courage is the mean between the deficiency of cowardice and the excess of foolhardiness. Aristotle's four cardinal virtues: Wisdom, Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude (Courage).
Aristotle's test for virtue ethics isn't "did you follow the rule?" but "what kind of person are you becoming?" A courageous person isn't someone who follows a courage-rulebook — it's someone who has practiced acting bravely so often that bravery has become part of who they are.
2.3 Virtues and Actions
A virtue ethicist judging a lie doesn't appeal to the rule "do not lie" — they judge it wrong because it lacks the virtue of honesty, which is integral to human flourishing. Actions naturally flow from character, rather than adherence to norms.
2.4 Evaluating Virtue Ethics
Strength: it supplies a motive that duty-based ethics lacks — saving a life "out of duty alone" seems to miss compassion and kindness.
Three Major Criticisms
| Criticism | Explanation |
|---|---|
| 1. Circularity | "The right action is what a virtuous person does" and "a virtuous person is someone who does the right action" — this offers no independent guiding principle. |
| 2. Lack of moral judgment | A virtuous person untrained in a field (e.g., a neophyte on stem-cell research) still can't judge right from wrong there. Rightness isn't fully dependent on character. |
| 3. Virtue conflicts | A witness at a friend's trial: telling the truth (honesty) may betray loyalty; lying to protect the friend (loyalty) betrays honesty. Virtue ethics offers no clear tie-breaker. |
2.5 Deontology vs Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is "concerned with Being rather than Doing" — "agent-centred rather than act-centred." Critics say it can't give clear action-guidance, so it may be only a supplement to (not a rival of) utilitarian/deontological ethics.
2.6 Ethics of Care
Developed by feminist thinkers like psychologist Carol Gilligan. She observed a difference in how men and women approach moral problems:
Ethics of Care emphasizes compassion, sympathy, nurturing, patience, and self-sacrifice. Whether the gender-based distinction is accurate is debated — but there's broad agreement that care deserves a place in virtue ethics alongside justice and honesty.
2.7 MacIntyre — Relativity of Virtues
In Dependent Rational Animals (1999), Alasdair MacIntyre argues morality cannot be separated from biology — humans are embodied beings, not pure rational minds. Crucially, he holds that virtues change across historical contexts:
Considered the primary virtue.
Socrates and Aristotle's era — virtue understood through character and reason.
Under Christianity's influence, spiritual virtue took precedence.
Virtues are exercised within practices and social forms of activity that generate their own internal "goods." Understanding Homeric virtue, for instance, requires understanding its role in Greek society. Yet there remains a telos (end) that transcends particular practices, constituting the good of a whole human life.
MacIntyre's point: don't judge a Homeric warrior's "virtue" (physical strength) by the standards of a medieval monk's "virtue" (spiritual devotion) — each virtue made sense within its own social world. His approach is about understanding moral decisions in context, not laying down one absolute rulebook for all times and places.
2.8 Virtues in Asian Religions
- State the process by which the teleological position is achieved, from Aristotle's view.
- What does virtue ethics emphasize — action or person? Give reasons.
- Explain in brief what is meant by the term Eudaimonia.
- What are the types of virtues?
- Explain the "Golden Mean."
- What are the disadvantages of Virtue Ethics?
- What are the virtues that men and women possess according to Carol Gilligan?
- State MacIntyre's relativist position on virtue and cultural contexts.
- Explain the basic difference between Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist views on virtue, compared to Aristotle's.
- Virtue ethics asks "what kind of person should I be?" — not "what rule should I follow?" or "what outcome should I maximize?"
- Eudaimonia = human flourishing, achieved through intellectual virtues (taught) and moral virtues (habituated) — with virtue as the Golden Mean between two extremes.
- Key criticisms: circularity, lack of guidance in specialised matters, and unresolved virtue conflicts.
- Ethics of Care (Gilligan) adds compassion and relationship-centred reasoning alongside justice.
- MacIntyre holds that virtues are relative to historical/social context, tied together by practices and an overarching telos.
- Confucianism = humaneness through relationships; Buddhism = non-attachment (no fixed self); Taoism = effortless flow.
Human Rights
This unit examines the foundations of human rights, traces their historical development across three generations, and critically probes two specific rights that touch daily life: the right to private property and the right to life.
3.1 What Grounds a Right?
A simple working definition: a "right" is a well-founded claim. John Locke's labour theory: the free gifts of nature (land, water, wild fruit) belong to no one — but "mixing your labour" with them creates a right to private property. The water in a stream belongs to everyone, but the water I fetch in my bucket is mine.
Marxists accept private ownership of consumer goods (things we use directly — food, clothes, a bicycle) but oppose private ownership of producer goods (factories, tools, land used to make other goods).
3.2 Natural Rights vs Positive Rights
Natural Rights
- Founded on our very human nature
- Inalienable — the State can only recognize/guarantee them, never truly "grant" or remove them
- Example: right to food, clothing, shelter (from being embodied beings)
Positive Rights
- Granted to us by virtue of law
- Can be defined, changed, or withdrawn by the State
- Example: the right to vote at a legal age
Even natural rights can be temporarily suspended in genuine emergencies (e.g., wartime restrictions on freedom of speech, or emergency requisitioning during a flood) — but only for the common good, not permanently removed.
3.3 Development of Human Rights — Three Generations
Rooted in liberalism — rights to be protected against the state. Emerged from the British customary constitution, the American Revolution (1787), and French Revolution (1789). Includes right to life, prohibition of slavery/torture/arbitrary detention, right to vote, freedom of assembly and religion.
Rooted in socialism — rights to be guaranteed by the state (e.g., right to work, education, social security), requiring active government intervention. Mostly recognized after WWII, though the French Revolution's 1793 law already claimed a right to work/subsistence.
Revolve around equality and non-discrimination — environmental law, bioethics, right to development, right to peace. Some propose a fourth generation of global rights, though its content remains unclear.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) upholds both generations (social security, work, education), accompanied by two 1966 UN pacts — one on Civil/Political Rights, one on Economic/Social/Cultural Rights. Interestingly, Western bloc countries signed the first pact more readily; Eastern bloc countries signed the second — reflecting the liberal/socialist divide.
3.4 A Critical Look — The Right to Private Property
Private property (even of producer goods) is argued to be a natural human right because, as embodied beings, we need material goods for growth, health, and wellbeing — including a reasonable right to "store up" for the future and to rest/recreate.
| Argument | Point |
|---|---|
| For private ownership | Historical experience (USSR, pre-reform China, India's inefficient public-sector utilities) suggests people manage what they own more efficiently than what belongs to no one in particular. |
| Against unlimited private ownership | The "free gifts of nature" also carry a social function — unlimited consumerism ("having more, producing more, hoarding more") can dehumanize both people and nature. |
The unit's real question isn't "should property be private or collective?" — it's whether the goal of human life is to "have more" (accumulate) or to "be more" (grow as a person). If "being more" is the real goal, then sometimes "having less" — through sharing — actually helps us flourish, rather than holding us back.
- Define Rights.
- Explain Natural Rights and Positive Rights.
3.5 The Right to Life
The most basic of all rights — deny it, and every other right becomes meaningless. Aquinas included self-preservation among the most basic "first principles" of human nature, shared with all beings. Human life is sacred, and no one may arrogate to themselves the right to directly destroy an innocent human being.
Self-Defence — The Principle of Double Effect
One can strike back against an unjust aggressor. Aquinas (in the Summa) justifies this: self-defence has a double effect — preservation of one's own life is intended; the killing of the aggressor is not. But using more force than necessary makes the act unlawful.
Helder Camara's "Spiral of Violence"
Is All Violence Equal? Gandhi vs Freire vs Aquinas
Gandhi (ahimsa): "Every murder or other injury... is a crime against humanity" — no exceptions. Paolo Freire and Aquinas differ: the violence of the oppressor is universally dehumanizing (it degrades victim and perpetrator both); the violence of the oppressed, fighting to reclaim their humanity, "cannot be put on the same level" as oppressive violence — though not all thinkers fully endorse this reasoning.
The Right to Revolt
Even Aquinas grants that when a government is so entrenched that no legal means can remove it, the people have a right to violent revolution — and the tyrant, not the rebels, is "more guilty of sedition," since it is the tyrant who first sowed discord to maintain power.
Jaya Prakash Narayan — a former revolutionary who later embraced non-violence — admitted he abandoned violent insurrection mainly for practical reasons ("will it actually work?"), not purely moral ones ("is it right?"). This is a useful reminder that real-world political choices often blend ethics with hard-nosed strategy.
- Explain the Right to Life.
- Briefly write on Private Property.
- A right = a well-founded claim; natural rights (inalienable, from human nature) differ from positive rights (granted by law).
- Three generations: civil/political (liberal, "protect me from the state"), social/economic (socialist, "the state must guarantee this to me"), equality/solidarity (environment, development, peace).
- Democracy (majority will) and human rights (individual claims) can conflict — courts exist to guard rights against majority overreach.
- Private property is grounded in embodied human need, but must serve a social function too — unchecked consumerism can dehumanize.
- Right to life is foundational; self-defence is justified via the Principle of Double Effect, not unlimited retaliation.
- Camara's Spiral of Violence shows how structural injustice, uprising, and repression feed into each other — and how language ("public order" vs "violence") hides this.
- Even traditional natural-law thinkers like Aquinas grant a right to revolt against entrenched tyranny, under strict conditions.
Human Duties
Where Unit 3 examined rights, this unit examines their correlative: duty. It studies Deontology (the ethics of rules/duty), the logical relationship between values and norms, Ross's Prima Facie Duties, and Rawls's Theory of Justice.
4.1–4.2 Duty and Deontology
Duty comes from Latin debitum — "a debt," something owed to another. It is the natural correlative of right: if I have a genuine right, others have a duty not to hinder my access to it — and I, in turn, owe the same respect to their rights.
Deontology (Greek deon = duty) says morality is about following rules, not chasing outcomes. Kant's version grounds morality in reason itself — not God's will, not cultural custom.
| Concept | Form | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Values | Evaluative statement, indicative | "Helping the poor is good" |
| Norms | Prescription, imperative | "Do not steal" |
Even securing one's own happiness is, indirectly, a duty — because deep discontent can tempt a person to abandon their moral duties altogether. But true moral worth comes from acting from duty, not merely from natural inclination toward happiness.
4.3 Different Types of Norms
English distinguishes right/wrong (conformity with obligation) from good/bad (values) — these are related but not identical concepts. Not all norms are ethical: "keep left when you drive" is a prescriptive norm, but not a moral one.
Fundamental vs Derived Norms
A fundamental norm isn't derived from any other norm ("it is bad to steal"). A derived norm ("it is bad to divert funds") follows from combining a fundamental ethical norm with a non-ethical fact ("diverting funds is a form of stealing").
- What is Duty?
- Explain Kant's Deontology and its implications.
4.4 Distinction between Values and Norms
It might seem that values and norms are just two ways of saying the same thing ("X is good" ⇔ "X should be done"). But three reasons show this equivalence is flawed:
- Values apply more broadly than norms. We can't "prohibit" Mount Everest or suffering — only actions can be obligated or prohibited.
- "Ought implies can." A good action is only obligatory if it's actually possible to perform. We can't be blamed for failing to do something beyond our ability — duty depends on ability.
- Values can conflict (pluralism). Since several intrinsic values exist simultaneously, they can clash — so a norm derived from one value ("do not lie") only holds "on condition that no other value is injured" (e.g., lying to save a life).
Think of values as the "why" and norms as the "what to do." Just because something is good (a value) doesn't automatically tell you exactly what action to take — you also need to check if it's possible, and whether doing it might clash with some other good thing you also care about. That's why ethics needs both concepts, not just one.
4.5 Ross and Prima Facie Duties
W. D. Ross held three intrinsic values (a "pluralist" position): virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. But he listed seven prima facie duties — duties that hold "at first glance" but can be overridden by a weightier duty in a specific situation:
Since there are three values but seven duties, there is no direct one-to-one correlation between them — reinforcing that values and norms are genuinely distinct concepts, not just two names for the same thing.
4.6 John Rawls' Theory of Justice
Rawls asks: what makes a distribution of benefits truly just? He rejects both blind tradition (e.g., slavery or caste systems, which are unjust despite being "traditional") and pure self-interest — proposing instead a thought experiment:
1. Principle of Equal Liberty
- Each person has an equal right to basic liberties
- A form of egalitarianism
2. Principle of Difference
- Inequalities are justified only if they benefit the least advantaged
- Example: reservations for deprived sections of society
These two principles seem to contradict each other, but work together: the first lets everyone compete in all fields; the second (positive discrimination / distributive justice) helps the less-privileged compete on genuinely equal footing with those who already have more resources.
Rawls's test for a fair rule: would you still agree to it if you had no idea whether you'd be born rich or poor, into a majority or a minority group? If a rule only benefits people like you, and you wouldn't accept it not knowing your own position — it's probably not just.
- Explain fundamental norms and derived norms.
- Explain John Rawls's Theory of Justice.
- Duty = the correlative of right; Deontology grounds morality in rules/reason, not consequences or divine will alone.
- Kant's Good Will: only a will acting purely from duty is unconditionally good.
- Norms are obligatory, prohibitive, or permissive; fundamental norms generate derived norms via non-ethical facts.
- Values ≠ Norms: values apply more broadly, "ought implies can," and value-pluralism means norms can be overridden when values conflict.
- Ross: 3 intrinsic values (virtue, knowledge, pleasure) but 7 prima facie duties (fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, generosity, self-improvement, non-maleficence) — no neat 1:1 mapping.
- Rawls's Veil of Ignorance yields two principles: Equal Liberty, and the Difference Principle (positive discrimination for the least advantaged).