Ethics — Study Notes, Part II

Human Values

A metaethical tour of whether moral values are objective (existing independently of us) or subjective (created by our desires/culture) — covering Subjectivism, Mackie, Cultural Relativism, Rational Constructivism, Ayer's Emotivism, Realism, and Moore's Intuitionism.

1.1 Introduction — Two Models of Value

Three types of values (and corresponding relativisms): epistemic (true/false), aesthetic (beautiful/ugly), ethical (good/bad). Moral relativism specifically holds that what is good or bad depends on individuals or cultural groups.

1.2 Simple Subjectivism

• Ontological (metaphysical) version: no objective value can exist independent of the subject.
• Semantic version: every truth-claim is true according to the person who makes it — infallibility. No statement is ever false.

Illustration: Ram refuses to jump in a river to save a drowning boy because he can't swim. Subjectivism says Ram's choice was "right" for him — but this ignores the objective value that life is precious.

Problems with Simple Subjectivism

• Intrapersonal conflict: preferences change over time (e.g. "I once thought Marshall was bad, now I think he's good") — but comparing "better than before" already smuggles in an objective standard.
• Interpersonal conflict: two people's opinions can clash, but without an objective value we can't say who is right.
• Conclusion: moral dissent becomes impossible to adjudicate — a serious weakness.

1.3 Subjectivism of Mackie — The "Error Theory"

Mackie accepts the ontological version (no objective value exists independent of the subject) but rejects the semantic version — so for Mackie, all moral statements are false.

Second argument: moral judgments must give reason for action → if good, they should give categorical reasons (no ifs/buts) → but there are no categorical reasons → therefore all moral judgments are necessarily false.

Does Mackie improve on Simple Subjectivism?

• On infallibility: Mackie says we are always mistaken — but then Martin Luther King's judgments are "as false" as Caligula's. No real gain.
• On moral conflict: Mackie does better here — since both parties claim to speak about the same external thing, genuine dissension is possible (though neither party is "right"; both are wrong).

1.4 Cultural Relativism

Accepts the ontological version but is inconsistent on the semantic version — holds that moral statements "may be true or false" depending on the group; each cultural group's claims are "true according to them."

Key insight: surface diversity in practice often masks a shared underlying objective value — e.g. tolerance itself is held as a value by all the cultures being compared, which is self-undermining for strict relativism.

1.5 Rational Constructivism

Who decides what's rational? An "ideal observer" — an imaginative (non-existent) figure who is well-informed and impartial. Comparative judgments (e.g. "Hitler was wrong, MLK was right") are made through reason alone — coherence is the test of rightness.

1.6 Emotivism of Ayer

Rooted in Logical Positivism's verifiability criterion of meaning: a claim is cognitively meaningful only if it is either analytic (true by logical/definitional connection, e.g. "all bachelors are single") or empirically verifiable (some possible observation could test it, e.g. "there are mountains on the far side of the moon").

"Good" is not analytic, and (following Moore) naturalistic definitions like "good = approved by society" fail because it's not contradictory to say "some things approved by society are not good." So moral judgments have only emotive meaning — Emotivism is a form of non-cognitivism (no moral truths exist).

Objections to Emotivism

1. Cannot favour a human-rights defender's judgment over someone who says "it is good to kill homosexuals and gypsies" — both are merely "not true," not false either.
2. The positivist premise itself (truth must be analytic or empirically verifiable) is neither analytic nor verifiable — self-refuting.
3. Not all moral statements translate into emotive expressions — "Do what is good" ≠ "Do what is hurrah."
4. We don't seem to be merely reporting our own emotions when making moral judgments.

1.7 Realism & David Hume's Challenge

Realism: objective values really exist, independent of the subject, not created by individuals.

Mackie's challenge to Realism: if objective values exist independently, what faculty lets us access them without the subject's involvement?

Hume's Two Faculties

Logical problem: there is no necessary connection between "reason → desire" or "values → norms" — e.g. from "society is unequal" (fact) we cannot derive "society must be unequal" (value).

1.8 Intuitionism (G.E. Moore)

Unlike subjectivists (good = what I approve), constructivists (good = rational agreement) or cultural relativists (good = group approval) — all of whom reduce "good" to natural properties — Moore insists good cannot be so reduced.

Two Types of Reduction

• Conceptual reduction: predicate already contained in the subject (e.g. "bachelors are unmarried")
• Metaphysical reduction: deals with what something actually is (e.g. "water is H₂O", "Prathap is my cousin")

"Good" can only ever be defined conceptually/analytically, never metaphysically — it does not contain value "in its very being."

1.9 Let Us Sum Up

Human Virtues

Virtue ethics as a counterweight to Kantian deontology — Aristotle's eudaimonia, the golden mean, ethics of care, MacIntyre's relativity of virtues, and virtue traditions across Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism.

2.1 Introduction — Virtue Ethics vs Kantianism

Kant grounds morality in duty via the categorical imperative, deliberately relativizing happiness (since personal happiness varies and can't ground a universal law). Virtue ethics reinstates the question of happiness and nature — revived by contemporary writers like Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue) and Elizabeth Anscombe (The Modern Moral Philosophy), tracing back to Aristotle.

2.2 Aristotle and Eudaimonia

Humans are rational animals; reason is our essential function, leading to a particular end/goal Aristotle calls virtue — the Teleological Position.

Action-oriented life asks "what do you want to do?"; virtuous life asks "what do you want to be?" (e.g. a good carpenter aims at a virtue — a good sense of aesthetics.)

Two Types of Virtue

Four cardinal virtues: Wisdom, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude (courage).

Virtue ethicists ask not "is lying wrong?" but "is lying here detrimental to the honesty of the person?" — mere adherence to precepts is not enough; motives and intentions matter (unlike Kant's "duty for duty's sake," which offers no place for motive — a son caring for his ailing mother out of pure duty, without love, seems morally incomplete).

2.3 Virtues and Actions

A virtue ethicist judges lying wrong because it lacks the virtue of honesty — not by citing the norm "do not lie." Honest action flows naturally from a person's cultivated character, not from rule-following.

2.4 Evaluating Virtue Ethics

Strength: offers better motivation than duty-based ethics (compassion/kindness vs. mere duty).

Three Criticisms

1. Lack of moral principles — virtue ethics can't specify exactly what a virtuous person would do in a concrete situation (e.g. dealing with a thief); its reasoning is circular: "the right action is what a virtuous person does; a virtuous person does the right action."
2. Lack of moral judgment — a virtuous but unknowledgeable person (e.g. on stem-cell research) cannot judge rightly; some moral standards are independent of character.
3. Conflicts between virtues — e.g. honesty vs loyalty when a friend is on trial; justice vs love when judging a murderer; virtue ethics offers no clear tie-breaker (a problem shared with deontology's conflicting duties).

2.5 Deontology versus Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is "concerned with Being rather than Doing" — "agent-centred rather than act-centred." Critics say it cannot provide action-guidance, so it may be no more than a supplement to utilitarian/deontological ethics rather than a full rival.

2.6 Ethics of Care

Developed mainly by feminist thinker Carol Gilligan. According to Gilligan:

Text notes: it's "not clear" whether men and women really adopt different approaches — but care deserves a place alongside justice and honesty as a virtue.

2.7 MacIntyre: Relativity of Virtues

In Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues? (1999), MacIntyre argues morality cannot be separated from biology — humans are embodied beings, not pure rational minds.

2.8 Virtues in Asian Religions

Confucianism: unlike Aristotle's inner-nature focus, Confucius derives humaneness (jen/ren) from the web of social relationships — we are not isolated individuals. All other virtues (righteousness, faithfulness) flow from humaneness.

Buddhism: the concept of "self" as substance doesn't fit Buddhist teaching — humans are five changing skandas; the imagined "self" causes desire, attachment, and suffering. Virtues are neither self-actualizing (Aristotle) nor society-centred (Confucius) but consist in freeing oneself and others from suffering, via tranquillity, non-attachment, and truthfulness.

Taoism: virtue means going with the flow, as water in a stream — an image not of weakness but of unstoppable strength. Achieved through a selfless, spontaneous, simple, serene life.

2.9 Let Us Sum Up

Moral actions are derived from virtues; the greatest good is eudaimonia, achieved via virtues as golden means. MacIntyre's revival highlights what duty-based ethics lacks — motive and intention. Western (Aristotelian) virtue ethics centres on the individual; Asian traditions emphasize social relationship and non-attachment.

Human Rights

Foundations of rights (Locke, natural vs positive), the historical generations of human rights, a critical look at private property, and an in-depth study of the right to life, self-defence, and Dom Helder Camara's "Spiral of Violence."

3.1–3.2 Rights: Natural vs Positive

John Locke (1632–1704): the free gifts of Nature belong to no one, but "mixing your labour" with them creates a right to private property (water fetched in a bucket is mine; the tree I cut down is mine). Question raised: does fencing off an entire lake entitle you to private ownership of that whole "free gift of nature"?

Marxists: no problem with private ownership of consumer goods (used directly); firmly opposed to private ownership of producer goods (used to produce other goods — factories, tools, land).

The State may suspend certain natural rights temporarily, for the common good, in emergencies (e.g. curtailing some free speech in wartime; requisitioning transport during a flood) — but cannot permanently remove a natural right's basis.

3.3 Development of Human Rights — The Generations

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is accompanied by two UN pacts (1966) — on civil/political and on economic/social/cultural rights — rarely signed together historically (Western bloc favoured the first; Eastern bloc the second), reflecting the liberal vs socialist tension in rights theory.

3.4 A Critical Look — The Right to Private Property

Private property (even of producer goods) is a natural human right rooted in our embodied nature — but "free gifts of nature" also have a social function.

3.5 The Right to Life

Self-Defence & the Principle of Double Effect

Using more violence than necessary against an aggressor is unlawful; moderate self-defence is lawful, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than that of the aggressor.

Dom Helder Camara's "Spiral of Violence"

Key critique: the dominant class controls how words like "violence" are defined and used — legitimizing the status quo (structural and repressive violence are euphemized as "public order").

Contrasting Views on Violence

Salvino Azzopardi's Five Conditions Permitting Revolt (Scholastic tradition)

1. Abuse of power is really excessive and habitual
2. All peaceful means have been tried in vain
3. No more violence than necessary
4. No harm to innocent third parties
5. No greater evil is foreseen to ensue

Text notes practical difficulty applying these in real revolutionary situations. Jaya Prakash Narayan — former firebrand revolutionary turned non-violent — admitted he abandoned popular violence for pragmatic reasons ("will it work?") rather than purely moral ones ("is it right?").

Human Duties

Deontology and Kant's categorical imperative, the taxonomy of norms, the philosophical distinction between values and norms, Ross's Prima Facie Duties, and Rawls's Theory of Justice.

4.1–4.2 Introduction & Deontology

Deontology (Greek deon = duty) is about following rules. Kant grounds morality not in God's will or cultural codes but in reason itself — moral demands are discoverable through rational reflection, freeing us from "self-imposed immaturity."

Kant's Good Will: intelligence, courage, and other qualities can become bad if the will directing them is not good. A good will is one that acts for duty's sake — this is what "constitutes character."

4.3 Different Types of Norms

Note: "right/wrong" describes conformity to obligation; "good/bad" describes values — a subtle but important distinction.

Not all norms are ethical — e.g. "keep left when you drive" is a prescriptive norm but not a moral one. A fundamental ethical norm is one not derived from any other (e.g. "it is bad to steal," from which "it is bad to divert funds" can be derived given the non-ethical fact that diverting funds is a form of stealing).

4.4 Distinction between Values and Norms

It seems prima facie that norms simply flow from values ("it is good to help the deprived" → "we should help the deprived"). But the text gives three reasons this equivalence is objectionable:

1. Values apply more broadly than norms — only actions can be obligated/prohibited (we can't "prohibit" Mount Everest, though we can deplore suffering).
2. "Ought" implies "can" — an action is obligatory only if it is possible; duty depends on ability ("duty to ability") — we cannot be blamed for what we could not do.
3. Value pluralism creates conflicts — several intrinsic values can compete (e.g. lying might be necessary to prevent someone's death), so a norm like "never lie" can't be derived directly from a value without adding "on condition that no other value is injured."

4.5 Ross and Prima Facie Duties

W. D. Ross holds three intrinsic values (pluralism): virtue, knowledge, pleasure — but seven prima facie duties:

Mulligan's three further reasons not to conflate norms and values:

1. Values have comparatives ("better than," "worse than") — norms do not.
2. Values distinguish determinable (good/bad) vs determinate (courageous/cowardly) predicates — norms lack this distinction.
3. Determinate value-properties imply natural properties (courage implies facing fear); normative properties relate to natural properties only indirectly, mediated through axiological (value) properties.

4.6 John Rawls' Theory of Justice

Rawls asks: what is the principle of justice? One that brings satisfaction to all, in quality and quantity, and thus goes unchallenged (e.g. a fair grading system rewarding hard work). But some traditions (slavery, caste) enshrine an unjust principle that the tradition itself doesn't question.

Rawls's Two Principles of Justice

1. Principle of Equal Liberty — each person has an equal right to everything (full egalitarianism).
2. Principle of Difference — inequalities are justified only if they bring the greatest benefit to the least advantaged (e.g. reservations/affirmative action for deprived groups) — a form of positive discrimination, producing distributive (not retributive) justice.

The two principles appear contradictory but work together: the first opens all fields to everyone; the second compensates for unequal starting resources so the less privileged can genuinely compete.

4.7 Let Us Sum Up

The "ought" is a fundamental experience of moral conscience — duty is an imperative distinct from strict necessity (what is obliged can be done or not done). In Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant argues duty is an a-priori value of pure reason, not derived from experience (which cannot yield universal, necessary norms).

Kant and other deontologists thus give priority to norms over values — which is why Ross speaks of prima facie duties and Rawls frames justice as an imperative.