Ethics — Consolidated Study Notes

Nature and Scope of Ethics

Introduces the philosophical need for ethics: what moral law is, how the human person intuits ethical principles while growing, and how morality is both constant and dynamic.

1.1 Introduction — Understanding Moral Law

Two senses of "law" must be distinguished before studying ethics:

Central question of the unit: How are the general data of moral consciousness particularized into specific precepts, and why do people disagree on whether an action is good?

1.2 Moral Intuitionism

All deontological theories agree some rule/law "enforces" moral value and is intuitively known to the human person — an element of intuition runs through all ethical systems, however differently conceived:

Even teleological theories carry this intuitive element — implicitly in Epicurus' autarxia and Aristotle's eudemonia; explicitly in Hobbes' "right reason" and Mill's "conscientious feelings of mankind".

Philosophers differ on what the object of moral intuition is:

• Carritt, Prichard — rightness of specific acts
• Moore — a simple, indefinable moral property
• Sidgwick — the principle of utility itself
• Ross — a set of prima facie duties: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, non-maleficence

Kant and Aquinas on Intuition

Even Kant — most insistent on the a-priori — admits moral judgment includes elements derived from experience ("a-posteriori"); he denies concrete precepts can be derived from practical reason alone — human nature must be studied.

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes:

• First principles of synderesis — self-evident, intuitively known, cannot be erased from the human heart
• Secondary/specific principles — derived "as if by conclusion from premises", requiring reflection

Suarez goes further: even secondary principles (self-evident in themselves) need thought and experience; tertiary principles need discursive study. Difference from Aquinas: Thomas derives concrete principles from natural inclinations; Suarez derives them like a legal system.

1.3 Human Person in Search of Himself/Herself

Key question: is a principle like "serious promises should not be lightly broken" self-evident (a first principle) or derived?

Human consciousness is "in a process of becoming" — as one grows more conscious of oneself as human, one becomes more conscious of what one should be. This generates ever-clearer moral precepts.

Progress example: cave-man → modern person; ancient slavery → Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), approved without dissent.

But this development is not necessarily linear — it may suffer "setbacks, reverses and regress." Example given: the morality of abortion hinges on whether the foetus is a human person; the women's liberation movement shows women haven't been treated as full persons everywhere.

1.4 Love and the Moral Precepts

Universal love is particularized/objectified in moral precepts. Just as love is not one virtue among others but the form of all virtues, it is the form of all moral precepts. Taken by itself (non-objectified), it prescribes nothing specific — "love cannot be enforced", just as self-fulfilment as human cannot be a strict obligation in the abstract.

Love is progressive — present as a "seed" at first (already actual, not mere potentiality), maturing into fully conscious love. Human person perfects himself as human only in this mature love.

1.5 The Dynamics of Morality

Key dilemma: are moral specifications universally valid for all persons (risking rigid absolutism) or only relatively valid (risking untenable moral relativism)?

Herbert Spencer — Evolutionary Ethics

• Conduct = acts adjusted to ends; higher evolution → more purposeful action
• Distinguishes Absolute Ethics (ideal code for a completely evolved society) vs Relative Ethics (nearest approximation given one's actual, imperfectly evolved society)
• Adopts utilitarian principle — happiness is the ultimate end; rightness measured by conduciveness to happiness
• Moral intuitions = slowly organized results of racial experience, becoming instinctive reactions over generations
• Spencer later confessed evolution theory gave less practical guidance than hoped

1.6 The Constant and the Variable in Morality

Human/moral consciousness has been developing — yet moral consciousness itself is a constant feature of being human ("otherwise we are not entitled to call him/her human at all"). The stages of development are the variable.

Sources of variation in moral practice

1. Different geographical, climatic, economic situations
2. Different religious beliefs producing different moral values (e.g. human sacrifice, burning of witches)
3. Civil law ≠ morality — legality only means "allowed as far as the state is concerned," not moral endorsement

Conclusion: human moral knowledge is progressive and relative in the sense of incomplete, yet shows a "constant progression" — becoming more and more conscious of persons as persons. Debate and temporary disagreement are necessary preconditions for moral progress.

Importance and Challenges of Ethics

Establishes why ethics matters, then examines two major challenges to a universal ethics: Situation Ethics and Cultural/Ethical Relativism (via Fletcher and Ginsberg).

2.1 Introduction — Why Ethics Matters

Ethics = philosophical study of right/wrong behaviour; also called moral philosophy (Greek ethos = custom/character; Latin mores = custom).

Ethics rests on three philosophical assumptions: (1) possibility of meta-empirical knowledge, (2) the ontological structure of reality, (3) man as a rational and free being.

2.2 The Challenge of Situation Ethics — Joseph Fletcher

Joseph Fletcher (former dean, St. Paul's Cathedral, Cincinnati; professor, Episcopal Theology School, Cambridge, USA) published Situation Ethics in 1961.

Presents his view as the golden mean between two extremes:

The situationist "enters into every decision-making situation armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage," treating them "with respect as illuminators of his problems" but ready to compromise or set them aside if love is better served.

Fletcher's process, using Tillich's terms: agape (love, the one law) → sophia (wisdom / general rules) → kairos (the moment of decision). His summary: "Legalists make an idol of sophia, antinomians repudiate it, and situationists use it."

Critical Evaluation

• Fletcher's grouping is careless — if even natural-law thinkers like Aristotle count as "situationists," the term loses precise meaning
• His definition of love is legalistic: any "selfless" act (no material gain sought) counts as moral — even the "sickest of mentally deranged acts" could qualify
• Chilling remark: "everything has its price... even a 'pearl of great price' might be sold for love's sake" — used to justify even a suicide bomber's act
• Positive takeaway: Fletcher reminds us of a timeless maxim — an action, however good in itself, done without the motive of sincere love has no real ethical value

2.3 Cultural and Ethical Subjectivism

Objection to human-nature-based ethics: cultural relativism — polygamy accepted in one culture, condemned in another; killing elderly parents once seen as filial duty in some South Sea Island tribes; divergent views on widow remarriage, birth control, divorce.

Anthropology/sociology often conclude: no culture is superior; judging another culture is unfair; even claiming a "neutral ground" of common human nature is itself culturally mediated — risking domination via globalization.

Response: Kant's Categorical Imperative ≠ Natural Law

Many confuse "common natural law" with Kant's rigid categorical imperative (strict, absolute, motivated purely by "duty for duty's sake," excluding even love of country/God/family). Kant grounded ethics autonomously because:

• External grounds (God's will — Ockham; positive law — Durkheim) risked instability and vested-interest corruption
• His Humean-influenced agnostic epistemology denied we can know the "thing-in-itself" (noumenon), including human nature — so he grounded morality in a-priori synthetic judgments instead

Perceptual Relativism vs Real Ethical Bias

Sense perception (a necessary constituent of human nature) opens the door to perceptual relativism — legitimate cultural variety in taste, custom, interpretation. But this differs from cases where a custom implies certain people (by gender, ethnicity, religion) are non-persons or inferior — such discrimination cannot be justified merely by appeal to "cultural difference."

2.4 Morris Ginsberg — "On the Diversity of Morals"

Morris Ginsberg, Professor of Sociology, University of London (1929–1954), delivered the Huxley Memorial Lecture on apparent ethical relativism in cross-cultural anthropology, one year before retirement.

Ginsberg identifies six contexts of moral variation:

1. Range of persons to whom moral rules apply — "neighbour" initially narrow (family/tribe/clan, often only males); true norm is "human nature adequately considered," applying to all irrespective of age, sex, status, nationality
2. Growth of knowledge — e.g. discovery of microbes changed hygiene duties; 18th century end of witch-burning once knowledge advanced
3. Same act seen differently in different contexts — e.g. "usury" depends on standard of living; pre-emptive strikes vs aggression; self-redress where no law courts exist
4. Differences of emphasis in moral responsibility — obedience "because it is God's will," or "because of love," or "for prudential/beatitude reasons" — imbalance can lead to fanaticism, neglect of justice, or masochism
5. Alternative ways of fulfilling basic (first-order) needs via different second-order values — e.g. monogamous marriage in most societies vs. Bantu society's different channels for the same underlying needs
6. Differences of moral insight/mental development, judged along five axes: (a) degree of universalism, (b) range/comprehensiveness of the moral code, (c) coherence/justification of underlying principles, (d) separation of morality from law and religion, (e) extent of self-criticism and self-direction permitted

2.5 Summing Up

Ethics in History of Indian Philosophy

Surveys the sources and meaning of Indian ethics, tracing its development through the Vedas, Upanishads, Dharmasastras, the Gita, and the ethical systems of Buddhism and Jainism.

3.2 Sources of Moral Ideals in India

• Primary source: the Vedas (Srutis); secondary: the Smrtis (Dharmasastras of Manu). If they conflict, the Vedas prevail.
• Also: practices of good people, conscience, and reason. Gandhi and Aurobindo gave conscience a very important place as final verdict on morality.
• Both Buddhism and Jainism give reason a prestigious place — in Jainism, right faith is validated by reason before being followed; in Buddhism, personal reasoning and questioning are encouraged.

3.3 Ethics: Its Meaning in Indian Tradition — "Dharma"

Two connotations of dharma:

1. Performance of ritual sacrifices and duties according to one's caste (Varnasrama Dharma)
2. Practice of moral virtues and norms common to all — Sadharana Dharma (universal duties)

3.4 Ethics in the Vedic Period

Central concept of the Rig Veda: ṛta — a unifying cosmic/moral order pervading all things. From ṛta arise two further concepts:

Vedic ethics = primarily god-oriented — moral order reflected in right performance of sacrifices, leading to eternal happiness in heaven.

Upanishadic Ethics

Shift in highest goal: not happiness (Rig Veda) but moksa — liberation and re-attainment of the soul's inner essence. Upanishadic ethics is atman-centric and intellectualistic; Vedic sacrifices declared irrelevant to moksa.

Caution: this individualist focus on personal liberation risks undermining values of social morality.

3.5–3.6 Dharmasastras, Itihasas & the Gita

Manusmrti subordinates individuality to social structures (family, sub-caste). Duties are relative to time (Yuga), place (Desa), class (Varna), and life-stage (Asrama).

The Gita's Way of Righteousness

• Central theme: realization of Supreme Reality (Brahmajnana) through righteous action
• Chain of bondage: attachment → desire → wrath → infatuation → loss of memory/mind → perishing
• Emphasizes both Karma Yoga (path of disinterested action, Nishkama Karma) and Gnana Yoga (path of knowledge) — but Karma Yoga is superior
• Golden rule: actions should be performed without attachment to their fruits

3.7 Ethical Concepts of Hindu Tradition

Doctrine of Karma (four categories)

Transmigration of soul: entangled in Samsara (cycle of birth-rebirth) due to Karma, until it regains its original pure state.

The Four Purusharthas (Supreme Goals)

Svadharma — individual growth per one's own dharma, based on varna, asrama, and proportion of the three gunas: sattva (purity), rajas (virility), tamas (darkness).

Varnadharma — Caste as a Contested Issue

Four Ashramas (Stages of Life)

Brahmacharya (student/celibate) → Grihastha (householder) → Vanaprastha (forest-dweller) → Sannyasa (mendicant/ascetic)

Samskaras (Hindu Sacraments)

Purificatory rites sanctifying body, mind, intellect: Garbhadhanam (conception), Pumsavanam, Simanthonnayanam, Jata-Karmam (birth), Nama-karanam (naming), Nishkramanam, Annaprasnam (first solid food), Chudakaranam (tonsure), Karnavedham (ear-piercing), Vidhyarambam, Upanayanam, Samavarthanam, Vivaha (marriage), Antyesti (funeral).

3.8 Ethics in Buddhism

Ten Meritorious Deeds

Charity · Morality · Mental Culture · Reverence · Service · Sharing merits · Rejoicing in others' merits · Preaching/teaching Dhamma · Listening to Dhamma · Straightening one's views.

Ten Demeritorious Deeds (rooted in greed, hatred, delusion)

Five Precepts (Pancasila)

Voluntary training rules: refrain from (1) killing living creatures, (2) taking what is not given, (3) sexual misconduct, (4) false speech, (5) intoxicating drugs and liquor.

Kindness & charity (Metta / Dana): true charity gives without expecting anything back, does not create indebtedness, and frees both giver and recipient.

Love for Animals: every living being has a right to exist; destruction of any creature disturbs the universal order.

3.9 Jaina Ethics

Jainism, like Buddhism, rejects Vedic ceremonialism and gives ahimsa (non-violence) the highest place — even surpassing Buddhism in its observance.

Panca-maha-vrata (Five Great Vows) for Right Conduct

• Ahimsa — abstinence from all injury to life (mobile/trasa or stationary/sthavara)
• Sathyam — abstinence from falsehood; speaking what is true, good, pleasant
• Asteyam — abstinence from stealing
• Brahmacaryam — abstinence from sensual/casual pleasures
• Aparigraha — abstinence from attachment to objects of the five senses

3.10 Summing Up

Indian ethics is inseparable from religious/philosophical tradition — diverse and multi-faceted, yet not without a core ethos. Buddha's closing advice on tolerance:

Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy

Traces the deontological vs. teleological divide through nine major Western thinkers, from Epicurus to Durkheim.

4.1 Teleological vs Deontological Ethics

Per Sir David Ross (Foundations of Ethics), two broad approaches:

4.2 – 4.10 The Nine Thinkers

4.2 Epicurus (c. 4th century BCE)

Sought ataraxia — absence of pain and serenity of mind — over mere pleasure-gratification, through removing false fears (death, gods). Highest virtue: phronesis (discernment) to judge which pleasures/pains best serve a lasting good life. "Philosophy of the Garden."

4.3 Aristotle (4th century BCE)

All beings seek perfection; human happiness = self-realization via moral and intellectual virtues. Virtue = the golden mean between two extremes (e.g. courage between foolhardiness and cowardice). Five intellectual virtues: techne (practical knowledge), phronesis (prudence), episteme (logical reasoning), nous (intuitive insight), sophia (wisdom — highest). Moral badness = linked to ignorance; no one knowingly seeks evil.

4.4 Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274)

God is the ultimate end/"supreme good." Eternal law manifests as natural law, accessible via reason and revelation. Distinguishes speculative vs practical reason, each with a discursive part (ratio) and intuitive part (intellectus). Self-evident first principles of practical reason = synderesis (e.g. "Do good and avoid evil"). Secondary principles are derivable but can be adapted in concrete cases (e.g. truth-telling relaxed before an unjust aggressor). Prudence safeguards against legalism and inflexibility.

4.5 William of Ockham (1290–1349)

Franciscan friar, opponent of Thomism; founder of British empiricism (later Locke, Berkeley, Hume). Championed voluntarism: an act's rightness/wrongness stems wholly from God's free decision, not any inherent quality — limited only by logical contradiction. Critique: his simultaneous appeal to "right reason" sits in tension with pure divine-command voluntarism.

4.6 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)

Leviathan: in the state of nature, "homo homini lupus" (man is a wolf to man) — life is hell without the state. Humans surrender some freedom for peace; the state's laws prevent people tearing each other apart. Hedonist: pleasure/self-preservation motivate the social contract. "Actions are bad because they are forbidden, not the other way round." Variously labeled Ethical Egoism, Social Utilitarianism, or Moral Positivism.

4.7 Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)

Individualistic utility-seeking as the basis of ethics. Devised the felicific calculus — seven measures of pleasure: intensity, duration, certainty, nearness, fecundity, purity, inclusiveness (extent). Goal: greatest pleasure for the greatest number, for the longest time.

4.8 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Rejects "heteronomous" (externally sourced) ethics in favour of autonomous a-priori principles. Only a "good will" is unconditionally good — one that acts for duty alone. Categorical Imperative: "I must act such that my way of acting could become a universal procedure"; also, "Never treat a person merely as a means." Three postulates of practical reason: human freedom, immortality of the soul, existence of God.

4.9 John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)

Utilitarianism: refines Bentham by adding a qualitative dimension to pleasure (not just quantity), and shifts focus from personal happiness to the common happiness of all sentient beings. Appeals to "the conscientious feelings of mankind" for rational grounding.

4.10 Emile Durkheim (1858–1917)

French positivist, father of Sociology (Elementary Forms of Religious Experience). Argued religion (via Totemism) is society symbolically conceived; likewise, moral laws are simply positive laws a society enacts for its own stability — "sociological positivism." Critique: fails to explain the common structure underlying moral diversity, or the rise of radical reformers who reject their society's existing mores.

Comparative Summary Table

4.11 Let Us Sum Up — Defining Ethics

Distinction between actus humanus (human act — done knowingly and freely, hence morally accountable) and actus hominis (act of a human — done without full knowledge/freedom, not morally accountable in the same way). Example: unknowingly drinking poisoned tea is "objectively" harmful but not "subjectively" blameworthy — yet objectively wrong acts still carry real (even unintended) effects on the agent.